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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a review of selected literature on the complex issue of 
utilization of research results: what has been written about how research results 
are translated into concrete development. 
This review is primarily focussed on research activities carried out in support of 
development in third world countries, often funded through such donor agencies 
like IDRC, CIDA, US AID, the Ford Foundation, or the Swedish SAREC. 
In introducing the subject of utilization of research, it is helpful to present a case 
study of a simple waterpump that was introduced in South Vietnam in the early 
sixties. 
The pump consisted of a motor, an impeller, and a sleeve, and was 
"developed" in 1963 by a local farmer with mechanical skills. Its major 
economic advantage was that it could move the same volume of water in 
one hour that a water wheel manned by two people over five hours, and 
could lift water from the delta to the arable land at twice the height of the 
water wheel. Because the pump was made from locally available materials, 
was easy to assemble, and addressed a pressing local need for irrigating 
land, its use spread like wildfire. By 1966, there were no more water 
wheels to be found. The dissemination process - which used no formal 
communication program, or any form of extension help -- occured strictly 
through word-of-mouth. Some farmers walked twenty kilometers to see 
such a pump. 
The author attributes the overwhelming success of this "spontaneous" 
dissemination of the technology to three factor: the clear profitability of the 
motor pump over existing methods (waterwheel), the doubling of land 
available for double cropping, because of the more than double height to 
which water could be lifted, and the lowering of seasonal unemployment, 
because of increased double cropping. 
R.L.Sanson, 'The Motor Pump: a Case Study of Innovation and 
Development", Oxford University Papers, Vol.21,No.1, March 1969. 
In effect, the pump story is about an indigenous innovation that turned out to be 
remarkably successful and reached 100% utilization in its particular environment. 
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What makes this case noteworthy is that all the components of the innovation-to- 
utilization process -- 1) a user-manufactured technology, 2) a most appropriate 
choice of technology for the environment in terms of simplicity of design, 
availability of materials, and offering an near perfect solution to real problem and 
need - are precisely the ones that many innovators, donors and agencies are 
trying to replicate when engaging in developing and promoting a technology. 
Other technologies are less appropriate, as the next case shows: 
This case involves the marketing of a new "North American-type" breakfast 
food in Kenya. The author stresses the high cost (a ratio of 90:1 between 
the "top" of the market "rice krispies" and the 'bottom" of the market maize 
flour) and the low nutritional value of new brands of generally wheat not 
maize-based breakfast cereals. He points to the intensive advertising 
methods combined with other cultural influences (elitism, contacts with the 
west etc.) which stimulate these demands. Where they are produced locally 
(import-substitution policies) they use more imported equipment and raw 
materials and have considerably less local value added. They also employ 
less people and cause a fundamental misallocation of resources to 
nutritionally less rewarding foods. (DH-56) 
KAPLINSKY, R., Inappropriate Products and Techniques: Breakfast 
Food in Kenya, in Review of African Political Economy, No. 14, 
January-April 1979. 
This case is about the introduction of a new food technology that may not fit the 
environment as well as the pump, and needs all kinds of additional marketing 
efforts to disseminate. 
THE SCOPE OF THIS REPORT 
How is research leading to a new technology connected to implementation and 
adoption of that technology? What are the stages that have to be passed? Are 
there mechanisms that can be analyzed, understood, and used, to ensure that the 
process is managed more effectively? This paper attempts to cover some of the 
fundamental theories and practices that have been written over the years on the 
process of moving from a research-based innovation to the eventual 
implementation and utilization in a given sector of an economy. 
One interesting finding of this review is that there is no clearly defined literature 
on the utilization of research results in the third world. In fact there is very little 
material on the topic. The literature is rich, however, on such realted and 
peripheral subjects as social marketing of new ideas and practies in developing 
countries, or science, technology, industrial and economic policies of these regions, 
or specific research areas such as agriculture, health, policy studies, renewable 
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energy technologies, or areas of education, technical extension, and 
communications. But few references if any have been been found describing or 
analyzing the process whereby a research activity is identified, conceived and 
carried out to its ultimate implementation and utilization in a particular area of 
society. 
Because of the very wide and fragmented nature of the literature related to the 
use and application of technology and research results, the slice presented here is 
very selective and personal, reflecting the bias of the author. It will focus on the 
management and organizational aspects of the technology application and adoption 
process. Some theoretical references are included, mostly taken from the world of 
economics, since economists were some of the first thinkers on the subject. 
Reference to experience in industrialized countries will be referred to when 
necessary, to illustrate specific management theories, or to refer to particular 
organizational research and concepts which are simply not discussed in the 
developing world literature. 
We know that the industrialised countries spend roughly twenty times more on 
research and development than developing countries. Given the immense 
economic implication of that effort, it is not surprising that the North has chosen 
to invest more energy in understanding the processes underlying research, 
innovation, adoption, technology transfer, industrial commercialization and 
utilization of technology. This is reflected in the large literature in industrialised 
countries on research management, technology management, and adaptation of 
innovation in firms and industries. 
REPORT OVERVIEW 
The report has nine chapters: 
1. The nature of research 
To understand the process of utilization of research results, we first need to define 
what we mean by research. Some standard definitions of research are presented 
here, based on work by the OECD. The scope and distribution of research in 
developing countries is also presented, based on recent surveys carried out by 
IDRC. Although the data is very crude, it is estimated that some 16 billion 
dollars US were spent a year on research and development in developing 
countries, compared to 245 billion for the industrialised countries. Over half of 
the money was spent on agricultural research. 
2. The theoretical basis for the utilization process 
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In this section, the theory of research, innovation, and technological adoption are 
reviewed in some depth. First, a historical review of the main currents of thought 
on technological innovation are presented by Andrew Jamison, in an essay 
excerpted from a book edited by Atul Wad. Nathan Rosenberg examines the 
principles of technological diffusion and adoption, by looking back to examples 
from the industrial revolution. This is followed by a review of research carried 
out in the seventies by Edwin Mansfield, a noted economist in technology transfer. 
Other works are also presented by Dahlman and Westphal on technological 
adoption in industries in the third world, and a theoretical analysis of how firms 
decide to adopt new technologies, by Bela Gold. 
3. Science and technology in the third world: policy factors 
influencing the utilization of research results 
In this section, works on the science and technology policy of third world 
countries are cited. Two major works are excerpted, Goldsmith and King's work 
on a new role for science and technology, as well as an insightful survey on the 
reaction to a series of recommendations to the Vienna 1979 UN conference on 
science for development. These and other citations give a good understanding of 
the research and science context in the third world. 
4. Research and utilization as a management process 
This section reviews the fairly new area of research having to do with 
management of research and technology transfer. We review some of the classic 
authors from MIT (Roberts, Allen), the marketing concepts of new product 
launching, and end off with a review of managing research in developing 
countries (India). 
5. The case of renewable energy and appropriate technologies 
Renewable energy and appropriate technology, in the absence of any integrated 
theory of utilization of results, offer a unique opportunity to look at all the 
components in the process of adopting new technology systems by a society: 
technical, economic, environmental, social, and political. It is a rich literature. The 
experience from these technologies, although it may not have resulted in 
significant market penetration, provides a unique overview, of what, with a little 
analysis, could become an overall utilization theory 
6. The case of marketing policy research to decision-makers 
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This is a short section, but nonetheless important, since it identifies decision- 
makers as an important user of research results. Communicating effectively with 
this target group has received relatively little attention in the scientific community. 
7. The case of agriculture and rural development 
Agriculture receives over half of the research funding in the third world, and 
agricultural extension has been the traditional method of trying to disseminate that 
research. But as a World Bank evaluation claims, to work effectively, extension 
needs heavy financial and management support, of which neither are in 
oversupply in the third world. Some alternatives are cited. Again, this area in 
itself could be the subject of much more research. 
8. The case of new strategic technologies 
New technologies such as advanced materials, microelectronics, computers, and 
biotechnology are also beginning to penetrate the third world. Bhalla explores the 
notion of "blending" these with traditional technologies. Other works are also 
cited. 
9. Organising for utilization and dissemination: 
making it happen! 
The last section explores various models which have been experimented to utilize 
research results, including a novel way to reward government laboratories, a 
network for technology transfer, and a variety of measures to encourage the 
commercialization of new technologies. A cautious note is raised by Francisco 
Sagasti, who warns us that companies in developing countries may be following 
the path of "least technological effort". 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Many thanks are due to the IDRC library staff, particularly Susan Hodges and Bev 
Chattaway, who have been unstinting in their help in collecting this data. A lot 
of the references identified here came from the IDRC library, and the many 
bibliographic databases available to it. One particularly rich source proved to be a 
small bookled edited by D.Hurley, "The Management of Change - An Annotated 
Bibliography" published in 1987 by IT publications. A number of references in 
this paper have been quoted from this source, and are identified by the notation 
(DH-no.), the number being the that of the citation in the IT report. 
6 
1. THE NATURE OF RESEARCH 
If we are interested in understanding how research results can be used, we must first 
understand the nature of the research activity itself. This question has preoccupied experts 
in the field of economics, science policy, innovation theory, and the history of science and 
technology for many decades. 
It is also a subject that has been of growing concern to funders of research. As the price 
of research keeps growing, and donor agencies are becoming more pressed for funds, there 
are increasing questions being asked as to its benefits and spinoffs for society. The price 
tag on some research projects are reaching astronomical proportions. As an extreme 
example, two recent "big science" projects being considered in the US, a high energy 
physics super-conducting super-collider to measure fundamental particles, or a genetics 
project to map the human genone, have been costed in the multi-billion dollar range each. 
The running of research establishments is also becoming more expensive. Funders, 
including donor agencies and governments, faced with these growing costs, are increasingly 
interested in getting the biggest bang for the buck, and increasin the effectiveness of these 
institutions, as we have seen in a number of western countries. 
In aid and development, the concern takes the form of growing questions rasied by Dono1- 
agencies on the impact of funded research on development. Specifically, in the case of 
IDRC, the persistent question that is being asked is what have twenty years of funding 
research-based activities contributed to development. In answering this question, efforts are 
made to identify examples of projects that have been used. Hence, the question of 
utilization. Utilization is one of those encompassing words, like innovation and technology 
transfer, at least in the IDRC parlance. Unlike innovation and technology transfer, it is 
not sufficiently mature as a buzzword to figure as a recognized key word in the several 
databases that were consulted. 
THE DEFINITIONS OF RESEARCH 
There are many reasons why people carry out research: to discover what makes the 
universe or the atom tick, and decipher some of the fundamental laws of nature, to 
discover a vaccine for aids, to develop a bigger and faster computer to predict the weather 
and break intelligence codes, or to make a company richer and more competitive on the 
international markets. Each performer of research has a unique reason or objective for 
carrying out an investigation called research, particular to his organization or group. 
Much effort has been spent in trying to categorize research activities, and each of these 
attempts is probably valid and useful for that particular context. Basically, the reason for 
labelling activities is to make life easier for the person doing the labelling. Governments 
will label research activities to facilitate their funding decisions, as between universities, 
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regions, and government departments. A company will label its research depending on 
whether the payoff is longer term, short term, or critical to its operations, as in the case 
where the assembly line and production process are shut down until a technical problem 
is resolved. And depending which label it chooses, different accounting and tax treatments 
will apply. 
One of the better known set of definitions of research categories has been formulated by the 
OECD who developed these categories so that OECD member countries could compile 
research and science and technology statistics, known as science indicators, using the 
comparable criteria. 
The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities - Frascati manual 1980, 
OECD, Paris 1981 
It is useful to review some of these definitions: 
(p. 25) Research and experimental development (R&D) comprise creative 
work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of 
knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society and the use of 
this stock on knowledge to devise new applications. 
Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to 
acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and 
observable facts, without any particular application or use in view. 
Applied research is also original investigation undertaken in order to acquire 
new knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific 
practical aim or objective. 
Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on existing 
knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience that is directed 
to producing new materials, products or devices, to installing new processes, 
systems and services, or to improve substantially those already produced or 
installed. 
p 15. R&D and Scientific and Technological Innovation 
Scientific and technological innovation may be considered as the 
transformation of an idea into a new or improved saleable product or 
operational process in industry and commerce or into a new approach to a 
social service. It thus consists of all those scientific, technical, commercial 
and financial steps necessary for the successful development and marketing 
of new or improved manufactured products, the commercial use of new or 
improved processes and equipment or the introduction of a new approach 
to a social service. R&D is only one of these steps. 
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Besides R&D, six activities may often be distinguished in the innovation 
process. 
i) New product marketing is the set of activities necessary to the successful 
introduction of a new product or process into the market. Its costs are 
those of market research and test marketing; the nonrecurring costs of 
establishing distribution, maintainance, and sales channels and advertising 
systems including the initial outlay on advertising. 
ii) Patent work is the filing of patent applications and the carrying out of 
searches for prior patents in connection with the product or process being 
introduced or improved. 
iii) Financial and organisational changes may be required to finance the 
innovation and to permit the company to successfully exploit it. These 
include the non-recurring costs of financial planning, raising additional 
capital, corporate restructuring and retraining of sales and maintainance 
personnel and exclude the interest paid on borrowedfunds and the foregone 
interest on own unds used. 
iv) Final product or design engineering is the further modification of a 
product or process after the R&D phase is completed in recognition of 
market or manufacturing requirements. For instance, it includes the cost of 
of industrial design for aesthetic value and of preparing production 
drawings, part lists and specifications. 
v) Tooling and industrial en 'neering covers all changes in production 
machinery and tools, in production and quality control procedures, methods 
and standards required to manufacture the new product or to use the new 
process. 
vi) Manufacturing start-up includes the cost of retraining personnel in the 
new techniques or in the use of new machinery, trial production runs and 
the cost of items damaged because of faulty equipment, procedures and 
operator errors. 
Furthermore, in the case of innovations based on government R&D 
programmes, there may be a significant "demonstration" stage in the process. 
"A demonstration is a project invlovling an innovation operated at or near 
full scale in a realistic environment for the purpose of (i) formulating 
national policy or (ii) promoting the use of innovation." It should be noted 
that the data collected and published by the International Energy Agency at 
OECD cover Research, Development, and Demonstration ("R' D' and D"). 
Possibly the greatest source of error in measuring R&D lies in the difficulty 
of locating the cut-off point between experimental development and the 
related activities which are required during the realisation of an innovation. 
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Errors at this point are particularly significant because, though many 
innovations may require costly R&D, the costs of preparing the invention for 
production are often higher still. 
THE SCOPE OF RESEARCH IN THE THIRD WORLD 
Because this paper focusses primarily on research in developing countries, it is useful to 
review what we know about the scope and distribution of these research efforts. In effect, 
there is little known about the R&D effort of developing countries with any accuracy 
resembling the OECD statistics, and IDRC has been one of the few carrying out some 
seminal survey research on the subject. This exerpt from IDRC's annual review 
"Searching" provides as good a summary of what we know about third world research: 
IDRC (International Development Research Centre). 1987. "Partners in 
Innovation", Searching, IDRC-257e. p 10-13. 
It is extraordinarily difficult to provide an assessment of the amount of 
resources - both financial and human - that the Third World devotes to 
research. Where estimates exist, they are seldom constituted on a 
comparable basis; indeed, comparison of different sets of data may well 
reveal major discrepancies. There is a great need to improve the data 
available in this area. A distinguished observer, Mahdi Elmandjra, noted 
recently that "it was not until 1978 that the General Conference of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) 
adopted the recommendation on the international standardization of statistics 
on science and technology. It will take many more years before we can 
dispose of relatively reliable and internationally comparable data on research 
and development expenditures." 
Those estimates that do exist on developed- and developing-country overall 
expenditure on research and development (R&D) provide some basis for 
making a number of major points such as the stark contrast between the 
proportion of world R&D expenditure being realized in and for the two sets 
of countries. It is at the individual country level, however, where major 
decisions must be taken about the allocation of resources to research, that 
the need for better information is most crucial. Along with others, IDRC 
hopes to play a role in facilitating the collection of information and 
quantitative data by countries to assist in planning future research 
expenditure. 
In the case of agriculture, most countries have a better picture of the 
resources devoted to research than for other sectors, although even here the 
information is incomplete. The International Service for National 
Agricultural Research (ISNAR) is developing a data base designed to 
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provide comparative information on agricultural research throughout the 
developing world; data will be based, where possible, on responses from 
countries themselves, supplemented by information from other primary and 
secondary sources. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of finding or collecting data in this area, 
there are a number of preliminary statements that can be made to provide a 
sense of the situation: 
One of the earliest estimates (in the 1960s) in this area was that 
developing countries accounted for 2% of world R&D expenditure. An 
estimate was made for 1973 and gave the same ratio as being about 3%. 
Unesco data shown in the 1985 statistical yearbook suggest that 
developing countries accounted for 2.3% of R&D expenditure in 1970 and 
for as much as 6% in 1980. Similar data on numbers of R&D scientists 
show developing countries with 7.9% of the total in 1970 and 10.6% in 1980. 
There is a major imbalance between the proportion of worldwide 
research undertaken in the Third World and its share of world population 
(81%) or of combined world production (21%). The figures show that over 
the last 20 years there has been some small reduction in this imbalance; 
however, the developing countries, as a whole, continue to invest usually 
less than 0.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in research activities, 
whereas the corresponding figure for the leading developed countries is 1.5- 
2%. 
More detailed estimates exist for agricultural research; however, 
even here there is a range. In 1979, one study estimated that 15% of global 
expenditure on agricultural research was spent in the [p. 11:1 developing 
countries; another study completed shortly after suggested that one-quarter 
of global agricultural research was related to expenditures in the developing 
countries. 
Most studies indicate that, whatever the relative proportion of R&D 
expenditure in developing and developed countries, the absolute amounts 
spent in this field by developing countries have increased enormously in the 
last 20 years. In agriculture, a study covering the data for 67 developing 
countries estimated that, in 1980, expenditures on agricultural research at 
1975 prices were in the order of $1082 million, 71% higher than the amount 
spent in 1975 and 170% higher than the level reached in 1970. 
There is enormous imbalance, even in the amount of money spent 
on R&D by the developing countries. A few major countries account for a 
very large percentage of overall expenditure, e.g., Argentina, Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico, and South Korea. Unesco figures on R&D scientists show 
that, of the number estimated to be working in the developing countries, 4% 
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are in Africa, 8% in the Arab world, 23% in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and 65% in Asia. (Corresponding figures for overall developing 
world population distribution are 11, 7, 11, and 71%, respectively.) One 
should also note, however, the imbalance between developed countries 
where, of the 24 OECD member countries, 88% of expenditures devoted to 
R&D in 1984 was taking place in 5 countries. 
If the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by rapid growth in 
absolute expenditure on R&D in developing countries, present circumstances 
would seem to suggest that the rate of growth is likely to slow and that 
increasing attention will have to be paid by developing-country governments 
to the question of increasing returns to the funds invested in research. 
The R&D industry in developing countries now accounts for about 
$16 billion/year and yet the broad parameters of this major activity remain 
largely underresearched and unknown. The equivalent figure for OECD 
countries is about $245 billion (1984) - a further indication of the striking 
global imbalance in this area of development investment. 
(...) As a first step in improving its knowledge of the environment in which 
it operates, IDRC determined to fund a study of support provided to Third 
World R&D by major funding agencies. This was undertaken by Professor 
John P. Lewis (...). A brief presentation of some of the survey's findings 
follows. 
Professor Lewis encountered major difficulties in collecting information, by 
questionnaire and through visits, on a consistent and comparable basis; a 
considerable part of this report deals with these problems and suggests 
methods for donors to capture information on this set of activities more 
easily. As it is, there are still anomalies apparent in the data presented - 
probably in part because of responses of "agencies" capturing slightly 
different sets of activities. It is hoped that the presentation of preliminary 
data will contribute to better information being available in the future. 
The survey data cover eight DAC countries, the World Bank, the Asian and 
Inter-American Development Banks, and the United Nations Development 
Programme. The DAC countries covered accounted for some 82% of DAC's 
overall ODA in 1984 and so provide a fairly representative picture of DAC 
funding. According to OECD statistics, the same eight countries account for 
63% of all world ODA. As a group, these eight appeared to be devoting 
some 4-5% of ODA resources to research for development. This overall 
percentage would be higher if it related only to direct flows to developing 
countries because, typically, some 30% of ODA is to multilateral agencies 
(e.g., agencies of the United Nations system and the aid branch of the 
European Economic Community [EEC]). 
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Individual countries' percentages of ODA devoted to research range from 
nearly 10% (Netherlands and United Kingdom) down to 3.1% for the USA. 
Table 1. Estimates of funding for development-related research 
from eight Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, 1984 
(CA $ million/year) 
Rural and area development' 1038 65% 
Technology, science and 
national policyb 
251 16% 
Human resources development` 257 16% 
Other 56 3% 
Total 1602 100% 
"Rural and area development includes agriculture and rural development 
and ecology, natural resources (including energy), transport and communications, 
and human settlements and area planning. 
"Technology, science, and national policy includes engineering and 
technology, including adaptation and transfer; natural sciences; and industrial 
development and management, development planning, economic policy, and 
applied social sciences. 
`Human resources development includes research on education and training; 
health and nutrition; income distribution, poverty, and employment; and 
population. 
While the first excerpt of "Searching" provides a good overview of the overall 
effort in R&D in developing countries, the second excerpt gives a more in-depth 
view, albeit still very crude, of how this effort is distributed accross various areas. 
This is based on 'a survey of about 300 multi-lateral research institutions: 
IDRC (International Development Research Centre). 1986. "Research: A Path 
to Development", Searching IDRC-245e. 52 p. 
Nearly 300 institutions were initially identified that were based in 
developing countries and appeared to have a multilateral mandate and a 
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direct role in undertaking or complementing research. No research-funding 
agencies were included. Although the survey is not yet finished, 192 
institutions have now been confirmed, mostly by returns to a mail survey, 
as fitting the general criteria of the study. 
The survey covered a heterogeneous array of research-related institutions. 
"Multilateral" was taken in most instances as meaning that an institution 
covers at least three countries, both in the sense of it owing its existence to 
the initiative of several countries or multilateral agencies and in having an 
objective of providing services to more than one country. These institutions 
are usually termed regional or international. "Multilateral" has been used 
here to cover both categories. Of the 192 institutions that have returned 
questionnaires, probably 30 could reasonably claim to have an "international" 
focus in terms of covering a number of geographical regions, whereas the 
remaining 162 were regional. This was not, however, a hard and fast line. 
The IDRC survey includes both institutions that are directly involved in 
conducting research as their major purpose (the Asian Vegetable Research 
and Development Centre and the Caribbean Industrial Research Institute, for 
example), and those that are research complementing by providing support 
services to research such as research promotion, training, information, and 
dissemination (for example, the Council for the Development of Economic 
and Social Research in Africa and the Arab Organization for Agricultural 
Development). Although a distinction has been made between these two 
groups in terms of their involvement in research, the institutions more 
properly belong on a spectrum. It is easy to distinguish between 
institutions at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their role in 
research, but the dividing line between the two categories is not a hard and 
fast one. At present, 82 of the 192 institutions are classified as "conducting 
research" and 110 as "research complementing." 
The information collected to date is believed to be reasonably comprehensive 
and representative of the total. (...) It covers only those institutions that 
are based in developing countries; those based in developed countries, such 
as the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), represent a 
significant additional number of institutions. 
The total resources required annually for the activities of all institutions 
covered in the survey may be as high as $1 billion. Those institutions 
involved in a major way with research account for about $500 million, of 
which the International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) make up a 
little under half. The research budget of institutions involved less directly 
in research is a further $75 million. 
Research may not be a major part of the overall mandate of some of those 
organizations identified as "research complementing," but, nevertheless, they 
play an important role in research developments and coordination in their 
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regions. All institutions were asked to estimate the research portion of their 
budgets, although they have clearly done this using considerably different 
criteria. Some of the IARCs, for instance, report as little as 40% of their 
total budget as research, where for the purposes of the IDRC survey almost 
their entire budget might usefully be counted as research. 
A sectoral breakdown of institutions indicates a concentration in agriculture 
and social sciences (see the following table) with considerably less focus on 
health and industry. If education were included with the social sciences, 
the number of institutions in the agricultural and social sciences fields 
would be approximately the same. 
Although the data on the resources of these institutions are still the least 
precise area of information collected in the survey, it seems that they 
employ over 5000 professional staff (the term professional was used for 
personnel having at least a Bachelor's degree or its equivalent. 
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Multilateral research-related institutions by sector and 
by region of the world, 1983. 
Sector Total Percentage 
Total 
Agriculture 63 43 
Social Sciences 41 21 
Education 20 10 
Multisector 18 9 
Health 17 9 
Industry 10 5 
Management and Administration 7 4 
Environment and ecology 4 2 
Information and communications 4 2 
Engineering and technology 3 2 
Physical Sciences 3 2 
Energy 2 1 
Total 192 100 
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2. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE UTILIZATION PROCESS 
In this section, we will review some of the fundamental theories on the innovation process 
and technology transfer and diffusion. 
A good overview of some of the issues linking research, science, and technology to 
development is given by WAD: 
Wad, A. (ed.). 1988. Science, Technology and Development. Westview Press, 
Inc., Boulder, CO, USA. p 2-5. 
It is important to recognize, however, that the Vienna Program is a specific 
articulation of a much larger and complex subject of both intellectual 
inquiry and practical action. The relationship between scientific and 
technological change and socio-economic development has been a subject of 
study and concern for several decades, if not longer. It is a complex subject, 
with various disciplinary ideological and philosophical perspectives 
represented and often in conflict with each other, many different 
interpretations about the domain of the field, and even more differences of 
opinion as to what works and does not work, and for what end goal, in the 
real world. 
Secondly, the global context of science and technology has itself changed. 
The debt crisis, increasing levels of environmental degradation, social crises 
(famines and droughts), political instability, and increasing protectionist 
tendencies all have had an effect on how science and technology is 
perceived and acted upon. In some ways, it could be argued that whereas 
the Vienna conference served to make science and technology a subject of 
special focus and concern, today there seems to be a tendency for it to 
become immersed in a broader milieu of social, political and economic 
concerns. The large external debts of several developing countries have 
undoubtedly had an effect on governmental spending on science and 
technology. The drought in parts of Africa has influenced how some of 
those countries view science and technology. The rapid economic growth of 
the southeast Asian NIC's has channeled their scientific and technological 
activities in specific directions. 
In the first section, devoted to historical and contemporary perspectives, 
Andrew Jamison explores how innovation theories and science and 
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technology policies have evolved historically. It is important to have a 
historical perspective on the subject so as not to forget that the field as such 
is not new nor solely concerned with the problems of the third world. That 
is a more contemporary manifestation. Indeed, Jamison suggests that the 
precursors of theories of science, technology and societal change go as far 
back as the 16th century. These deep historical roots are important because 
they serve to broaden the character of the field and make it possible to 
establish analytical linkages between the growth and evolution of science 
and technology, the development of societies and the interpretations of these 
developments as seen by economists, sociologists, political scientists and 
historians. (p. 2-5) 
In Wad's book, there is an important essay on the history of technology development by 
Jamison which, because of its value in understanding present issues, is excerpted in some 
detail here: 
INNOVATION THEORIES AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES by Andrew Jamison, in Wad, A. (ed.). 1988. 
Science, Technology and Development. Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, USA. 
p 17-53 
Introduction: Definitions and Distinctions 
For something that is widely considered to be of crucial, even strategic, 
importance, it is remarkable that there is so little agreement as to what is 
meant by technological innovation. (...) 
Many innovation theories are also subject to what might be called a 
commercial bias; for many of those who seek to analyze it, innovation has 
come to mean the creation of new marketable commodities. There is, we 
might say, a narrow definition that takes its point of departure in Joseph 
Schumpeter's distinction between invention and innovation, the first being 
the making of something new, the second being the successful launching of 
that new something in the marketplace. As opposed to the narrow, 
commercial definition, there is the broader idea of an innovation process as 
a wide-ranging social activity, including in its purview the entire continuum, 
or chain, of scientific research and technological development from he most 
basic laboratory investigations to the distribution of new products, and not 
forgetting all the organizational, or social, innovations in between. It is such 
a broad notion of innovation that forms the point of departure for the pages 
that follow. 
Prehistory - On the Making of Innovation Theory (p. 22-24) 
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As with most areas of social and historical analysis, theorizing about 
scientific and technical innovation is largely a 19th and 20th century activity. 
Precursors can be located in antiquity, as well as in the medieval period; 
but it was not really until the later medieval period, in the 16th century, 
that a specific innovation literature began to emerge, most especially in the 
technical treatises of Biringuccio (Pyrotechnia, 1540), Agricola (De re 
metallica, 1556) Ramelli (Le Diverse et Artificiose Machine, 1588), and others. 
In these works, amidst technical detail and fascinating pictorial representa- 
tions of existing and imagined machinery, there was also a good deal of 
what we might call "proto-innovation theory," i.e., ideas about the most 
effective ways to organize and diffuse technical development practices. 
Innovation - the creation of something new - was not the center of focus, 
however; there was little systematic interest in technical research or 
development. The works were primarily technical manuals, rather than 
works of social or economic analysis, but they do indicate how the 
European society of the late Renaissance was beginning to interest itself in 
things technical, in facts and artifacts and technical processes. They also 
show how one of the most important technical innovations of all - the 
printing press - was a contributing factor in the emergence of innovation 
theory. Printing made it possible to disseminate information, and one of the 
main sorts of information disseminated in the early printed literature was 
technical information. Perhaps most importantly, however, these treatises 
helped to elevate the status of the technical practitioner, giving technical 
work a social importance that it had previously not had, at least not since 
the "industrial revolution" of the 12th and 13th centuries, when the Gothic 
cathedrals were built and the master builders occupied a privileged position 
in the textile cities of western Europe. [Footnote: An intriguing source on 
medieval technology, especially the industrial revolution of the 12th and 
13th centuries, is Jean Gimpel, The Medieval Machine, Penguin, 1975. Lynn 
White's collected essays, Medieval Technology and Religion, University of 
California Press, 1978, are also well worth consulting, as is Arnold Pacey, 
The Maze of IngenuiM MIT Press, 1976. The importance of the printing 
press has been stressed, perhaps overly so, in Elizabeth Eisenstein, The 
Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural 
Transformations in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, 1979.1 
Their concerns would, in the early 17th century, come to be articulated and 
systematized by the English philosopher-politician Francis Bacon, who has 
been called the first philosopher of industrial science. [Footnote: See 
Benjamin Farrington, Francis Bacon Philosopher of Industrial Science, Collier 
Books, 1961. An analysis of Bacon's relation to the earlier traditions can be 
found in Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1968.1 Bacon saw in the new techniques of printing, 
gunpowder, and the mariner's compass the basis for a new kind of learning 
that was predicated around use rather than divinity, useful knowledge 
rather than scholastic discourse. His vision of the future technological society 
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in New Atlantis (1624) was merely a sketch, and a rudimentary one at that, 
but, together with his more explicitly philosophical works, it helped infuse 
the millenarian social movements of the time with an intense interest in 
technical "improvements," both in agriculture as well as in "trades." 
(p. 28-29) Marx and his colleague, Friedrich Engels, were perhaps the most 
ambitious of all 19th century writers in trying to grasp the social and 
historical significance of industrial technology. Even a contemporary writer 
like Nathan Rosenberg, who could certainly not be accused of being a 
marxist, has argued that Marx's "formulation of the problem still deserves to 
be a starting point for any serious investigation of technology and its 
ramifications." [Footnote: Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box: 
Technology and Economics, Cambridge, 1982, p. 34. For another recent 
assessment, see Donald MacKenzie, "Marx and the Machine," Technology 
and Culture 25, 1984.] 
In particular, Marx and Engels focused on the transformation in 
technological innovation that was taking place in the 19th century - the shift 
from the artisanal mode of the first scientific revolution to the science-based 
mode of technical production, which we can consider a second scientific 
revolution. Again, it was the changes in practice - in the organization of 
research (university and later industrial laboratories), the inter-linking of 
research and industry (the industrial corporation), and the changed 
technology-orientation of science (toward chemical processes and 
electrical /energetic phenomena) - that formed the basis for changes in 
innovation theory. It should not be forgotten hat Engels followed these 
transformations at close range, by directing an industrial firm in Manchester, 
and that he associated with leading chemists and other scientists of the day. 
It was such experiences that helped form Engels' and Marx's views on the 
interdependence of science and technology; as Engels puts it, in a letter to a 
corespondent, "if, as you say, technique largely depends on the state of 
science, science depends far more still on the state and requirements of 
technique. If society has a technical need, that helps science forward more 
than ten universities. [Footnote: Letter from Engels to W. Borgius, 1894, 
reprinted in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 704.1 And it was the technical needs of 19th 
century Europe that were changing so dramatically, and which formed a 
central focus of investigation for Marx and Engels. 
Marx was one of the first to try to grasp the transformation that was taking 
place in terms of its scientific-technical dimension. Firstly, he drew a 
fundamental distinction between tools and machines, criticizing his 
predecessors for neglecting the "essential difference between them." As he 
put it, Mathematicians and experts on mechanics -and they are occasionally 
followed in this by English economists - call a tool a simple machine and a 
machine a complex tool." [Footnote: Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of 
Political Economy, volume one, Penguin, 1976, p. 492.1 Marx combined the 
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internal and external approaches to analyze the machine as a social 
phenomenon; its most important characteristic was that it replaced manual 
labor. It did this by combining three different parts: a motor mechanism, a 
transmitting mechanism, and the working machine, or tool. Marx drew on 
the economic analysis of the division of labor and specialization of industrial 
tasks in the factory that had begun to be carried out by Smith, Stewart and 
Saint-Simon; but he could also utilize the writings of the early synthesizing 
theorists of innovation - Andrew Ure, Charles Babbage, and Robert Owen 
and his followers, including William Thomson, one of the leading Owenite 
political economists. [Footnote: See Alvin Gouldner, Against Fragmentation: 
The Origins of Marxism and the Sociology of Intellectuals, Oxford, 1985, for 
an intriguing discussion of Marx's sources.] Most especially, however, he 
based his theories on the actual practice of industrial transformation, as 
described in the various reports on factory production that were produced 
in the mid-19th century, especially in England, the home of the industrial 
revolution. 
(p. 30) Thirdly, and most crucially, Marx drew attention to the new kind of 
relationship that was emerging between science and technology, to the new 
mode of scientific production. He called the new system of production 
"revolutionary" because it "never views or greats the existing form of a 
production process as the definitive one ... By means of machinery, chemical 
processes and other methods, it is constantly transforming not only the 
technical basis of production but also the functions of the worker and the 
social combination of the labor process. And it was revolutionary because it 
was based on science: "the varied, apparently unconnected and petrified 
forms of the social production process were now dissolved into conscious 
and planned applications of natural science." [Footnote: Marx, op. cit., p. 
616-617.] 
(p. 33) Four years later, Mumford (1934) wrote his magnum opus, Technics 
and Civilization, which more than any other single book would serve to 
define the history of technology as a distinct historical sub-specialty. The 
aim of the sub-specialty, then as now, is to show the "human values in 
machinery," the cultural motivations behind technical change and innovation. 
Characteristically, the journal of the society of the history of technology in 
the United States, when it began to be published in 1958, was entitled 
Technology and Culture in order to emphasize the orientation toward the 
broader social and cultural understanding of technology. Elsewhere, where 
the history of technology took on an antiquarian character and was 
primarily associated with technical museums and engineering societies, it 
would have little to offer to innovation theory. [Footnote: For review of 
these cultural approaches to technology, see Carroll Pursell, "History of 
Technology," and Carl Mitcham, "Philosophy of Technology," in Paul Durbin, 
ed., A Guide to the Culture of Science, Technology, and Medicine, Free 
Press, 1980.1 
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(p. 34) Two main approaches emerged. One was epitomized by Abbott 
Payson Usher's History of Mechanical Inventions (1929), which traced the 
technical history of the various machines and mechanical procedures of 
industrial society, trying to place a "technical history" of innovation at a 
central location in the new sub-disciplinary discourse. The other was 
epitomized by the writings of Joseph Schumpeter, which sought to elucidate 
the longer-range processes that governed the development of technology. 
Indeed, Schumpetei's cyclical theory of economic growth proposed a central 
role for technology; he argued that behind Kondraieff's long waves, there 
were fundamental technological breakthroughs - "radical innovations" - that 
brought about new periods of expansion for the capitalist economy. 
Economic development, for Schumpeter, was a process of "creative 
destruction," by which one system or cluster of technologies replaced 
another. Usher and Schumpeter thus represented micro and macro 
approaches to the history of technical change within the new sub-discipline 
of economic history. 
The social theorists, perhaps especially Pitirim Sorokin, who had emigrated 
to the United States from the Soviet Union, shared with Schumpeter and 
Mumford a concern with the long cycles of historical movement, and sought 
to link the development of technology to the broader movements of cultural 
values. W.F. Ogburn, in Social Change (1922), had developed the concept of 
"cultural lag," the notion that cultural development lags behind the 
development of technology. For Obgurn, the task of the sociologist was to 
analyze the mechanisms by which society could assimilate its technical 
innovations. It was thus no accident that Ogburn was called on to direct 
what has been called the "first modern technology assessment," namely the 
report Technological Trends and National Policy, that was published by a 
U.S. government committee in 1937. [Footnote: National Resources 
Committee, Technological Trends and National Policy, Including the Social 
Implications of New Inventions, US Government Publications, 1937. The 
report is presented in Arlene Inouye and Charles Susskind, "Technological 
Trends and National Policy, 1937: The First Modern Technology 
Assessment," Technology and Culture 18, 1977. See also Carroll W. Pursell, 
"Government and Technology in he Great Depression," Technology and 
Culture 20, 1979.1 Indeed, it may well have been due to Ogburn's concern 
with the social aspects of technical change that the report was commissioned 
in the first place; it included surveys of technical developments in various 
sectors, written by industrial leaders for the respective areas. In some sense, 
it can be considered one of the first signs of a more systematic technology 
policy interest. 
(p. 35) A third American sociologist, the marxist Bernhard Stern, who 
helped found the journal Science and Society, also studied technical change 
in a number of writings in the 1930's and 1940's, focusing on patent 
statistics, diffusion patterns, and in the report to the U.S. government, 
"resistance to the adoption of technological innovations." [Footnote: These 
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developments - and much else of relevance - are described in David Noble,. 
America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate 
Capitalism, Knopf, 1977. 
The Stages of Science and Technology Policyand Their Relation to 
Innovation Theories (p. 35-38) 
In 1939, the British physicist John Desmond Bernal initiated a new era in 
the social study of science and technological innovation with the publication 
of his book, The Social Function of Science. Bernal had been active in the 
communist party during the 1930's, and had been one of the formative 
influences in the "social relations of science" movement among natural 
scientists, which had its base at Cambridge. There were similar groups of 
socially concerned natural scientists, especially physicists, in most of the 
other industrialized countries, but none of them were as productive or 
active as the so-called "visible college" in England, with names like Joseph 
Needham, P.M.S. Blackett, J.B.S. Haldane, Lancelot Hogben, and Hyman 
Levy [Footnote: For details on the activities and concerns of this group of 
scientists, see Gary Werskey, The Visible College, Allen Lane, 1978.1. It was 
out of such a context that Bernal wrote his book in 1939, which gathered as 
much material as was then available about the way in which scientific and 
technical research interacted with social development. More than any other 
single contribution, Bernal's book marked the coming of the age of science 
policy, and it would serve, in the immediate postwar period, when meso 
level bodies were established throughout the world, as a first set of theories 
and concepts for the organization and management of science and 
technological innovation. 
In accordance with his adherence to scientific marxism, Bernal saw science 
as a crucial element in the transformation of society into socialism, and he 
saw science primarily as a productive force, as a component of technological 
development [Footnote: For a concise presentation of Bernal's Marxism, see 
John D. Bernal, Marx and Science, International Publishers, 1952.]. His 
message was that science should not be left to the private industrialists, but 
that a massive state involvement - both financial as well as organizational - 
was required to bring the fruits of science to productive use. He was 
inspired, as were many natural scientists of his generation, by the social 
experiment in planning science and technology that had been taking place in 
the interwar years in the Soviet Union. And he was engaged in the battle 
against nazism and fascism, for he saw them as enemies of science and of 
reason more generally. For Bernal and the other members of the visible 
college, only socialism could provide he long-term guarantee for scientific 
and technical innovation, but Bernal"s socialism was to be itself guaranteed 
by science. And that was why it was so important for the state to 
contribute to the further development of science and technology. By 
supporting science, society would become, of necessity, socialist. 
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Not long after the ink had dried on the pages of Bernal's text, Germany 
had invaded Poland. The second world war had begun, and scientists and 
governments entered into that uneasy relationship that has since 
characterized their interaction: the age of science policy had come. It was 
not merely in the Manhattan project - the building of the first atomic bomb 
at Los Alamos in the wilds of New Mexico - that that relationship 
manifested itself. In all the belligerent nations, and many of the neutrals, 
meso level bodies were created to coordinate the utilization of science and 
technology for the war effort. Many of these bodies were headed by 
scientists, like Vanneaver Bush and James Conant in the United States, and 
Solly Zuckerman in England. Many other scientists and engineers were 
called in as advisors to government and helped to develop strategic 
instruments of warfare, like radar, computers, operations research, and 
eventually the atomic bomb. Still others were drawn, in more peripheral 
ways, into the big science projects that originated in the wartime effort. 
Science, in other words, had largely come to be integrated into defense 
policy or, more generally, into the discourse of strategic thinking. And in 
the process, it had come to be transformed into what Jerome Ravetz was 
later to call "industrialized science": the craftsman's work that was science 
had become an industry [Footnote: See Jerome R. Ravetz, Scientific 
Knowledge and Its Social Problems, Penguin, 1973. Several of the essays in 
Ina Spiege;-Rosing and Derek de Solla Price, eds., Science, Technology and 
Society, Sage, 1977, especially those by Jean-Jacques Salomon and Sandord 
Lakeoff, provide extensive reviews of the changes in thinking brought about 
by the stages in postwar science policy. On these matters, see also Derek de 
Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science, Columbia University Press, 1965.1. 
In what we can term the first phase of postwar science and technology 
policy, the overriding objectives were strategic/ military. Science and 
technology were seen as strategic national resources, and they were 
conceptualized primarily in military terms. There was relatively little 
concern with the precise nature of innovation - with going "inside the black 
box." What was fundamental was the quantity of innovation taking place 
and being diffused into the wider society. Technology, and especially 
nuclear science, were widely seen as having been crucial to the Allied 
victory, and the important task was to further develop that resource that 
had been so vital to the war effort. 
This was thus the period in which innovation was seen primarily as a 
matter of "science-push." It was science that was seen as primary and 
fundamental to the innovation chain, and it was thus science that was 
primarily to be supported and subject to policy measures. Science, in the 
words of Bush, was the "endless frontier," the never-ending source of new 
things, both weapons for the military as well as products for the consumer. 
The interlinkage between science and technology, however, was not seen as 
being particularly problematic. Rather, the problem was one of insuring 
autonomy for science, so that new ideas could develop under the control 
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and authority of the scientists themselves [Footnote: Vanneaver Bush, 
Science the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program or 
Postwar Scientific Research (1945), reprinted by the National Science 
Foundation, 1960, was one of the first doctrinal texts of postwar science 
policy.]. 
Within the academic discourse over innovations, there was a fragmentation 
into specializations, largely according to functional areas. Historians and 
philosophers of science focused on the internal development and justification 
of scientific ideas; economists and - perhaps even more so - geographers 
focused on the societal spreading or diffusion of new techniques [Footnote: 
On science studies, see Arnold Thackeray, "History of Science," in Durbin, 
ed., op. cit., and for studies on the diffusion of innovations, see Everett 
Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press, 1962.1. In between, a new kind 
of scientific management discourse began to develop, a discourse about the 
management of big science and large research establishments. It was, to a 
significant extent, inspired by Bernal's concerns and concepts, but it was 
cleansed of avowed socialist faith and primarily framed in terms of costs 
and benefits, effectiveness and payoffs. It focused on the question of how 
much governments, through their new meso level bodies, could plan science, 
and how expenditures for basic research could be motivated in a national 
economic calculation. It was a discourse largely conducted among the R&D 
managers themselves, but with time, they received some scholarly help from 
a handful of political scientists, who started to see the relations between 
science and government as a special area for academic investigation. 
(Interestingly enough, however, even some of the early academic experts, 
like Don Price, author of one of the first studies of the new area, 
Government and Science (1953), came to the subject from a practical war- 
time experience in the planning and coordination of research. Alvin 
Weinberg, who started publishing his "Reflections of Big Science" in the late 
1950's, was, for many years, director of one of the large nuclear laboratories, 
at Oak Ridge.) [Footnote: Alvin Weinberg, Reflections on Big Science, MIT 
Press, 1967, and Edward Shils, ed., Criteria for Scientific Development: 
Public Policy and National Goals, MIT Press, 1966, are two collections of 
some of these early contributions.] 
(p. 39-40) In the United States, this kind of critical understanding was 
operationalized, among others, by the economist and latter-day follower of 
Throstein Veblen, John Kenneth Galbraith, who saw in technological 
innovation the replacement of the profit motive as the driving force of 
capitalist industry, and talked of a new kind of industrial society, the 
"affluent society," in which wealth was not merely to be produced but to be 
directed and steered, as well. 
On the basis of such writings - and of the external challenge of the Soviet 
space program - ideas about innovation grew more sophisticated and a new 
kind of economic concern with technical development began to emerge, in 
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the writings of Kuznets, Schmookler, Mansfield, Arrow, Nelson, and others. 
In the 1960's, technological innovation came to be linked explicitly to 
economic development, and economists attempted to measure the 
contribution of technical change to economic growth rates. Much of their 
work was highly mathematical and difficult to understand. In general, 
however, there was a filling of the gap between what had previously been 
the somewhat disparate discourses of diffusion theory, on the one hand, and 
scientific ideas, on the other [Footnote: For a representative sampling of 
these writings, see Nathan Rosenberg, ed., The Economics of Technological 
Change, Penguin, 1971.]. Now, with the innovation economists - and a 
handful of historians of technology, like Edwin Layton and Thomas Hughes, 
who were studying the role of the engineer in technical change - the link 
between science and the larger economy, the technical development process 
itself, was being studied [Footnote: See Thomas Hughes, Elmer Sperm 
Inventor and Engineer, Johns Hopkins, 1971, and Edwin Layton, The Revolt 
of the Engineers, Case-Western Reserve, 1971.]. Smookler studied patents 
and patent statistics, Nelson looked at the "economics" of basic research, 
Arrow quantified economic growth, and Mansfield looked at the technical 
strategies of firms; and soon Galbraith would come with a catchy phrase t 
describe the whole phenomenon: "the new industrial state." (Footnote: In 
many respects, John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Houghton 
Mifflin, 1967, epitomized the new conception of technology that was 
dominant in the 1960's. See also Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic 
Growth, Harvard, 1966, Richard Nelton, The Rate and Direction of Inventive 
Activity, Princeton, 1962, and Fritz Machlup, The Economics of Technological 
Change Norton, 1968. The new concern with technological development was 
also reflected in economic history, where technical innovation was given a 
central place in explaining the coming of industrialization in, for example, 
David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and 
Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, 
Cambridge, 1969. With the new concern in economic policy and in science 
and technology policy, as well, with "reindustrialization," which we shall 
briefly discuss in the concluding section, this kind of work has recently 
experience something of a revival; for a comprehensive theoretical treatment, 
see Richard Nelson and Sheldon Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change, Harvard, 1982, and for a critical discussion and 
application, see Giovanni Dosi, Technical Change and Industrial 
Transformation, Macmillan, 1984.] 
This phase, from the late 1950's to the late 1960's, can be called the 
economic phase of science and technology policy, for at the same time as 
the academics were beginning [p. 40:1 to focus on technical development 
itself, new meso level bodies were being created in many industrialized 
countries to coordinate and finance technical development in industry. This 
was done indirectly in the United States, through the establishment of new 
departments of industry and councils for technical research and/or 
technical development. 
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This second phase was also marked by the emergence of a new kind of 
international coordination of science and technology policy - through OECD 
and some of the United Nations agencies, especially UNESCO. Where the 
first phase had primarily been concerned with building up a system for 
producing innovations, in the second phase, there was much more attention 
directed toward organizing the system more effectively and studying its 
operation. There was even a certain institutionalization in the study of 
science and technology policy, with university programs being established 
throughout the world, new journals (like Minerva, Technology and Culture, 
Technology Review, Impact of Science on Society), and working groups or 
research committees within several of the international academic 
organizations. 
In terms of theories and concepts of technological innovation, this second 
phase was marked by an emphasis on the influence of the economic market 
mechanisms on science and technology. "Market-pull" tended to replace 
"science-push" as the dominant conception; the main concern, in both theory 
and practice, was to adapt the science and technology system more directly 
to the market. A number of detailed, and large-scale, studies of the 
innovation process were carried out in this period, and most of them 
concluded that market demand, or economic needs, was the main 
determinant of the innovations studied. [Footnote: These studies are 
reviewed from slightly different vantage points in Rosenberg, op. cit., 
Salomon, op. cit., as well as in Christopher Freeman, The Economics of 
Industrial Innovation, Penguin, 1974, second edition, Frances Pinter, 1982.1 
In part, this emphasis on the market was a reflection of the times, the high- 
growth economy of the early 1960's; in part, it was a reaction against the 
science emphasis of the first phase; and in part, it was a result of the 
professionalization of the actual workings of the system. 
(p. 41) The shift in gears was signaled ideologically by the OECD report, 
Science, Growth and Society, from 1971. In practice, most countries 
expanded their science and technology realms to include a much larger 
number of societal sectors than had previously been involved. New 
environmental agencies were established, with substantial research budgets, 
and most of the other ministries or government departments obtained their 
own research councils or advisers. After the "oil crisis" in 1973, new 
departments for energy were created in many countries and, most 
everywhere, energy research and technical development became a high 
priority. At the same time, the science and technology system was made 
more democratic, as the new social interest groups were brought into the 
decision-making framework, either directly, with their own representatives 
on research councils, or indirectly, through a broadened social discourse 
over science and technology. There were a whole range of new initiatives to 
"inform" or "educate" the public on science and technology issues, 
particularly in the over-heated nuclear energy debate, but also in such areas 
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as environmental research, social welfare research, occupational health and 
safety, and international relations. 
Given this historical analysis of how technology and innovation were understood over the 
decades, we will concentrate on the industrial analysis approach, as exemplified by 
Rosenberg, Westphal and Dahlman, Mansfield and others. This is very much an 
economics viewpoint on the process. Nonetheless, it provides some valuable analytical 
frameworks for understanding some of the basic forces at play in the process of research 
utilization. The first author to be cited is Nathan Rosenberg, in a series of collected 
essays on technology and industrial development. Rosenberg states that there are a host of 
difficulties, institutional and otherwise, which impede the successful adoption of technology. 
He goes back to the 19th century arms industry to illustrate the point that personal skills 
is one of the key vectors for transfering a technology: 
Nathan Rosenberg Perspectives in Technology, N.Rosenberg (ed.),Cambrige 
University Press, 1976. 
In the mid 19th century, the transfer of technical skills occured between 
Britain and the US. This was dependent on the transfer of erp sonal skills. 
(Based on study of arms industry). Sam Colt owned a successful plant in 
Hartford, but it failed when it was transplanted to the US, because british 
workers were not trained in his manufacturing skills. This know-how can 
only be transmitted personally, because it is non-codified. 
Rosenberg then examines the nature of technological innovation in the context of the 
industrial revolution in terms of a shift from artisanal type of work to specialized tasks in 
a mass production system: 
(In our economies), technological change led to the creation of specialized 
firms, fueling industrial growth. The same path is not recommended for 
LDC's. Special industrial skills are needed for specialized production of 
machinery. This industrialization leads to growing specialization. [For 
eamplej industrialization in the 19th century involved growing adoption of 
metal, using technology employing decentralized sources of power. This 
amounts to relatively small numbers of broadly similar products and 
processes applied to a large number of industries. Eg. Cutting metal 
involved a small number of operations and machine types: turning, boring, 
drilling, milling, planing, grinding, polishing, etc. These machines needed 
power transmission, control devices, feed mechanisms, friction reduction, 
and knowldge of the properties of metals. 
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In today's parlance, these were the equivalent of today's new technologies: microelectronics, 
computers, etc. all-pervasive and critical to technological advance. Rosenberg goes on to 
discuss the importance of consumer demand in the context of growing industrialization: 
willingness of the public to accept a homogeneous (vs. handicraft) final product. This was 
the decisive factor in the transition from a highly labour-intensive handicraft technology to 
one involving a sequence of highly specialized machines. Products accomodate machines, 
rather than consumers. He gives a striking example of handguns, which in the pre- 
industrialised days used to be made to order, like a tailored suit. 
Part of the success of industrialization and mass manufacturing in America can be traced 
to the training of engineers. In the US, engineers are more effectively subordinated to the 
business discipline and commercial criteria than their British counterparts. Rosenberg 
quotes a British editor's reaction to US auto manufacturers and assembly lines as one of 
pride in the fact that British engineers and workers chose "to maintain their reputation for 
high quality (artisanal] work rather than cheapen their reputation" by becoming part of a 
mass production system, rather than reacting strongly to an obvious competitive threat. 
Another example is given by the many models of train locomotives. Traffic conditions, 
loads, patterns, etc. prevailing at that time in the U.K. required essentially five different 
types of steam locomotives. There were 500 in currennt use! 
One aspect of increased mass production is standardization of parts. The impact of 
standardization affected capital costs, and parts interchange. 
Quoting from Freeman Innovative process is now highly dependent upon a 
successful collaboration between producers of the final product and specialized 
makers of componenets." 
A key factor in industrial innovation, according to Rosenberg, is the capital goods sector. 
Producers of capital ggods are the major source of innovation, because they are motivated 
financially. Creating a capital goods industry is a major way of institutionalizing internal 
pressure for the adoption of new technology. In America, producers of Capital goods have 
always played a major role in persuading and educating machinery users about the 
superiority and feasibility of new techniques. They have a strong economic motivation to 
innovate. 
Not all technologies are equally easy to transfer: 
Industrial technology is easier to transfer than agricultural technology. It's 
self-contained, operates in a relatively closed system. Agriculture includes 
ecological relationships, interactions between human enterprise and specific 
features of the natural environment, beyond control of the farmer: biology, 
biochemistry, botany, genetics. 
The performance of an industry will frequently depend not only on 
resources within that idustry, but on the availability and the effectiveness of 
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industries which stand in an important complementary relationship with 
it.... Unless an economy is well equipped with these complementary sources, 
[agriculture] is not likely to experience rapid improvements in efficiency. eg 
machinery producing sector, agricultural research stations, educational 
institutions, fertilizer industry, genetics, chemistry. 
One important insight of Rosenberg's is his analysis of the rate at which a new innovation 
will be implemented or diffused. This analysis is critical to understanding the utilization 
process: 
A new technique establishes its advantages over old ones only slowly - 
slowness of diffusion is linked to this process. Technological novelty of 
inventions may be spectacular, but the economic impact is more gradual -- 
downward slope of real costs. 
In analysing this, he is somewhat critical of the traditional perspective of the economist, a 
view with which he agrees when it comes to explaining the contribution of technological 
innovation to economic growth, but which is fundamentally limited by its use of the 
production function. This model does not explain, argues Rosenberg, the rate at which an 
innovation is adopted by a firm, nor the mechanism by which it happens: 
(p. 66-68) But economics' view is through production function model (which 
transforms inputs into outputs), which has limits. Schumpeter's analysis 
(based on clustering of innovations) applies only to major innovations, 
equivalent to significant shifts in production function. Clustering of 
innovations is also linked to business cycles. (...) 
Economic effects (eg. productivity increases) are linked with the innovation 
process, not with the invention. What determines the length of the time 
interval which separates the making of an invention and its innovation? 
The most frequently cited attempt to examine this time lag was John 
Enos("Inventions and Innovations in the Petroleum Refining Industry" in The 
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962). 
Enos brought together information concerning 46 major innovations, eleven 
of them in petroleum refining. Enos finds an average interval of 11 years 
between invention and innovation in the petroleum refining industry and an 
average interval of 13.6 years for the the other 35 innovations. The 
observed variance, however is very large: from 79 years in the case of the 
fluorescent lamp, 56 yeard for the Gyro-compass, and 53 years in the case 
of the cotton picker, to one year for freon refrigerants and 3 years for DDT, 
the long-playing-record, lucite plexiglass, and shell moulding.... Enos 
identifies the date of an invention as "the earliest conception of the product 
in substantially its commercial form" and innovation as "the first commercial 
application or sale". 
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Rosenbergs "bottom line" for a technological innovation is the question "does a profitable 
technology exist?" Without that, there is no innovation, only inventions. In short, the 
eventual utilization of the technology is already embeded in the definition of "innovation". 
However, and this is important for us, the transformation from a potential innovation to 
an effective economic contributor is not instantaneous, but rather a slow and deliberate 
process, which requires considerable effort. He cites the seminal work of Kuznets in 
refining the concept of National Income Accounting, a concept that had been first 
articulated a couple of hundred years previous, to the point where it became a usable 
technique of accounting. 
(p. 76) An innovation acquires economic significance only through an 
extensive process of redesign, modification, and a thousand small 
improvements which suit it for a mass market, for production by drastically 
new mass production techniques, and by the eventual availability of a whole 
range of complementary activities, ranging, in the case of the automobile, 
from a network of service stations to an extensive system of paved roads. 
[p. 88 There is a I...danger... of attaching excessive significance to 
breakthroughs in the early stages of the inventive process, and neglecting 
the later stages. Good ideas usually acquire significance only when they are 
refined and elaborated and have gone through what is often an exhaustive 
process of patient modifications and revision. Only then do they become 
useful in an operational sense ...We seriously underrate, not only the 
significance of these later stages in the process of social science innovations, 
but (that) we vastly underate the sheer size and complexity of the task, and 
therefore the magnitude of the intellectual chalenge involved. [For example, 
in the case of ] national income accounting - the concepts were known long 
ago, but it took Simon Kuznetz'estimating techniques and hard work to 
make concept operational. 
One of the foremost authors who has rigourously researched the processes of research, 
innovation, technology transfer, industrial utilization and industrial development is Edwin 
Mansfield. Most of his research is based on careful quantitative measurements and case 
studies of American and other firms. It is useful to review excerpts of one of his recent 
works, largely based on research carried out in the seventies. He begins with some precise 
definitions for the various concepts used in the subsequent discussion: 
Mansfield, E.;Romeo, A; Schwartz, M.; Teece, D.; Wagner, S.; Brach, P.; 
"Technology Transfer, Productivity, and Economic Policy", Norton, New York, 
1982. 
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(p. 1...5) Science is aimed at understanding, wheras technology is aimed at 
use. Changes in technology often take place on no new scientific principles. 
Research is oriented to the pursuit of new knowledge, whereas development 
is oriented toward the capacity to produce a particular product. The 
outcome of research is generally more uncertain than the outcome of 
development. Nonetheless, in development there is often considerable 
uncertainty regarding cost, time, and the profitability of the result. 
A technological innovation is defined as the first commercial introduction of 
new technology. Reseach and development is only a part of the process 
leading to a successful technological innovation. [Economists recently 
moved to a more complex model of the innovation process]... The first part 
of this process takes place in the interval between the establishment of 
technical feasibility and the beginning of commercial development of the 
new product or process. This time of commercial development may be 
substantial (although it is shorter now than it was fifty years ago). 
[Average -- ten years for key postwar inventions] The second part of this 
process takes place in the time interval between the beginning of 
commercial development and the first commercial application of the new 
product or process. This time interval contains a number of distinct stages - 
- applied research, preparation of product specification, prototype or pilot 
plant construction, tooling and construction of manufacturing facilities, and 
manufacturing and marketing start-up. (Average time for post-war 
innovations - five years) 
Mansfield is very clear on the principle that the transition between R&D and commercial 
implementation and illusion of a technology is one of management and organization for a 
firm. The challenge for a firm is to manage this process effectively, to gain maximum 
economic advantage. 
(p. 6) A central problem facing a firm that attempts to be innovative is to 
effect a proper coupling between R and D, on the one hand, and marketing 
and production on the other. The great importance of this problem is 
emphasised by recent work of Chistopher Freeman and Edwin Mansfield. 
(C.Freeman "A study of success and failure in industrial innovation," in 
Science and Technology in Economic Growth, ed. B. Williams (london, 
McMillan 1973); Mansfield et al in The production and Application of New 
Industrial Technology and Research and Innovation in the Modern 
Corporation.) Many R&D projects are designed without sufficient 
understanding of market and productions realities. Many marketing and 
production people are unnecessarily impervious to the good ideas produced 
by R and D people. To try and reduce these problems, some firms promote 
frequent contacts between R and D people and people in other parts of the 
firm, there being considerable evidence that person-to-person contacts are 
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the most effective way of transferring ideas and technology. Firms are also 
trying to break down resistance -- in the R and D department and 
elsewhere -- to ideas stemming from outside the firm. Even in R and D 
intensive industries like chemicals and pharmaceuticals, a large proportion of 
the innovations are based on innovations made outside the innovating firm. 
Like Rosenberg, Mansfield observes that diffusion of a technology in firms is never an 
instantaneous process, but depends on a number of measurable factors, tied to the mechanis 
of the diffusion and utilization process. (Note: these are fairly fundamental factors in the 
context of industrialized countries firms. If we transport ourselves to a developing 
country, other endogenous factors have to be superimposed on these. J.A.P.) 
(p. 7) Once a new process or product is introduced, the diffusion process 
(the process by which the use of an innovation spreads) begins. The 
diffusion of a new technique is often a slow process. For example, 
measuring from the date of first commercial application ( can take over ten 
years) for industries to begin using a sample of important new 
techniques...the rate of diffusion varies widely. Sometime it took decades 
for firms to install a new technique, but in others cases they immitated the 
innovators very quickly. ...tendency for diffusion process to go on more 
rapidly in more recent times than in the past. 
...[The] rate of diffusion of an innovation depends on-- 
the average profitability of innovation 
. the variability among the firms in the profitability of the innovation 
. the size in the investment required to introduce the the innovation 
the number of firms in the industry, their average size, the 
inequalities in their sizes, and 
. the amount they spend on R and D. 
(These variables) explain a large proportion of the variation among 
innovations in the rate of diffusion. 
...firms where the expected returns from the innovations are highest tend to 
be quickest to introduce an innovation. ... big firms tend to introduce an 
innovation before small firms. 
...where firms are small, firms with younger and better educated managers 
tend to be quicker to introduce new techniques. 
(p. 8)...firms, once they hear of the existence of an innovation, may wait a 
considerable time before beginning to use it. In many cases this is quite 
rational. But to some extent, this may also be due to incomplete or 
erroneous information, prejudice, and resistance to change. The sources of 
information sometimes vary depending on how close the manager is to 
adopting the innovation. For example, in agriculture, mass media are most 
important sources at the early stages of a manager's awareness of the 
33 
innovation, but friends and neighbors are most important sources when a 
manager is ready to try the innovation. Also, there is evidence of a "two 
step flow of communication." The early users of an innovation tend to rely 
on sources of information beyond their peer group's experience; after they 
have begun using the innovation, they become a model for their less expert 
peers, who can imitate their performance. (Rogers) 
A key theoretical contribution of Mansfields' has been his authoritative analysis of the 
effective contribution of R&D and technological change to economic growth. While he was 
not the one who first discovered this (the initial work was done by Solow, for which he 
later received the Nobel prize), Mansfield certainly contributed to the refinement of the 
idea, particularly at the micro-level. 
(p. 9) The fact that technological change plays an important role in 
permitting and stimulating economic growth seems self-evident. But 
difficult to quantify. Hard to separate the effects on economic growth of 
technological change from those of investments in physical capital, since, to 
be used, new technology frequently must be embodied in physical capital -- 
new machines and plants. ...Nor can the effecs of technological change 
easily be separated from those of education, since the social returns from 
increased education are enhanced by technological change, and the rate of 
technological change is influenced by the extent and nature of society's 
investment in education. 
Robert Solow [in "Technical change and the Aggregate Production Function" 
Review of Economics and Statistics 39 (1957) p312.1 claimed that "90 percent 
of the increase in output per capita in the non-farm US economy during 
1909 and 1949 was attributable to technological change, whereas only a 
minor percentage of the increase was due to increases in the amount of 
capital employed per worker. In a more comprehensive calculation, Edward 
Denison ["The sources of Economic Growth in the United States" (new York: 
Committee for Economic Development, 1962] later revised this downward to 
40% 
On International Diffusion of Technology: (p. 14) 
Because of the diferences among nations in technological levels and 
capabilities, there is a continual process of international diffusion of 
technology. Knowledge can be transmitted in various ways - by emigration 
of engineers and skilled workers, by export of goods and servoces, by 
licensing, and by direct investments, among others. 
(p. 16) One reason why it is so difficult to measure international technology 
flows is that technology can be transferred accross national borders in a 
variety of ways.... a considerable amount of technology is transferred 
without any appreciable payment for it. eg. scientists and engineers 
exchange information at international meetings, and one country's scientists 
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and engineers read the publications of other countries' scientists and 
engineers. There is presently no way to measure it (total flow of 
technology for which there is no payment). 
Other channels: export of goods eg. advanced computers., and establishment 
and utilization of overseas subsidiaries. 
On basic R&D, applied R&D, and Productivity Increase(p. 138) 
When (a firm's) expenditure on applied R&D are hed constant, there is a 
statistically significant and direct relationship between the amount of basic 
research carried out by an industry and its rate of increase in total factor 
productivity. Distinction between basic research and applied R&D not 
always clear, basic research may be acting as proxy for long term R&D. 
First evidence that composition as well as size of an industry's R&D 
expenditures affects its productivity growth. 
On costs of Technology Transfer and Utilization (p.216) 
There is evidence that that transfers to governments in centrally planned 
economies involve substantial extra costs, sometimes because of high 
documentation requirements and differences in managerial procedures. 
(p. 217) Investment in Innovation and Diffusion. One of the most expensive 
parts of the innovation process is the construction of new plant and 
equipment. Detailed manufacturing drawings must be prepared, tooling 
must be provided, and manufacturing facilities must be constructed. In a 
sample of thirty-eight innovations in the chemical, machinery, and 
electronics industries, this stage accounted for about 40% of the innovation 
cost on the average. Becauseinvestment in plant and equipment accounts 
for a relatively large proportion of the cost of many innovations, measures 
that encourage investment are likely to encourage innovation. And since 
the profitabilioty of R&D is dependent upon the profitability of the entire 
business venture of which R&D is part, measures that reduce the after-tax 
costs to the firm of plant and equipment are likely to increase the 
profitability of R&D. 
On Patents.(p. 217) 
Contrary to the assumption of some economic models, patented innovations 
are often imitated within a few years of their initial introduction. It is a 
myth that a patent nearly always results in a seventeen-year monopoly over 
the relevant innovation. Nonetheless, patents do tend to increase imitation 
costs, articularly in the pharmaceuticals idustry. [In their sample as a 
whole the median estimated increase (due to patents) in the ratio of 
imitation cost to innovation cost was 11 percent ... (According to sample) 
about one-half of the patented innovations would not have been introduced 
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without patent protection (bulk was in drugs industry). In non drug 
industries, lack of patent protection would have affected less than one 
fourth of the firms sampled. 
60 % of the patented innovations in the sample were imitated within four 
years. 
An important contribution of Mansfield's analysis has been a better understanding of how 
government policy instruments can be used to encourage innovationand industrial 
development. This is of interest to us as we later move to examining the context of 
developing countries, and their science policies. A parallel can also be drawn between the 
guidelines for governments on programs to encourage innovation and those for donor 
agencies in sponsoring research-based activities. 
Public policy toward Civilian Technology.(p. 224) 
...[Many] economists point out that the marginal social rates of return from 
investments in civilian technoloy has been very high, both in agriculture and 
industry. 
Government can stimulate additional R&D in the private sector through tax 
credits, R&D contracts and grants, expanded work in government 
laboratories, loan insurance for innovation, purchasing poicies with greater 
emphasis on performance criteria and life-cycle costig, altered regulatory 
policies, and prizes.... general tax credits are innefficient, but involve less 
direct government controls. [This raises the distinction between selective 
and more general policy initiatives which governments can take to stimulate 
innovation in industries.] 
(p. 226) In any selective government program to increase support for civilian 
technology, it is vitally important that a pro er coupling occur between 
technology and the market. Recent studies Feg. Chris Freeman, A study of 
Success and Failures in Industrial Innovation, in Science and Technology in 
Economic Growth, ed. B.Williams London:MacMillan, 1973; also Mansfield et 
al. in The Production and Application of New Industrial Technology; and 
Mansfield, Rapoport, Schnee, Wagner, amd Hamburger, Research and 
Innovation in the Modern CoMpration, New York:Norton, 19711 of industrial 
innovation point repeatedly to the key importance of this coupling. In 
choosing areasand projects for support, the government should be sensitive 
to market demand. To the extent that it is feasible, potential users of new 
technology should play a role in project selection. Information transfer and 
communication between the generators of new technology and and the 
potential users of new technology are essential if new technology is to be 
successfully applied. As evidence of their importance, studies show that 
sound coupling of technology and marketing is one of the characteristics 
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that is most significant in distinguishing firms that are relatively successful 
innovators from those that are relatively unsuccessful innovators. 
(p. 228) [A country's] technology policies cannot be separated from its 
Macroeconomic policies. Measures that encourage economic growth, savings 
and investment, and price stability are likely to enhance (our) technological 
position. ...Indeed, improvements in our general economic climate may have 
more impact on the state of US technology than many of the specific 
measures that have been proposed to stimulate technological change. 
The other useful article, by Carl Dahlman and Larry Westphal, examines the issues of 
innovation and technological adoption at the micro-level, the firm in a developing country. 
This article is based on a review of the literature in the preceeding eight or nine years, 
and as such is a handy compendium of the latest concepts up to the early eighties. The 
authours first debunk the traditional concept of technology as a "blueprint" as simplistic: 
Carl Dalhman, Larry Westphal 'Technological Effort in Industrial Development - 
- an Interpretative Survey of Recent Research" in F.Stewart and J.James eds. 
Economics of New Technologies in Developing Countries. London : Frances 
Pinter, 1982 p. 106 
(p. 106) Identical technologies are employed with vastly unequal levels of 
technical performance in different economies, and even by different firms 
within an economy. 
[The authours then attempt to isolate what really consists of the trehhnology, 
particularly as it applies to industrial technologies, in order to better 
circumscribe what really is being transferred, when discussing technology 
transfer.] 
[In the case of ] capital goods - technology is embodied in the hardware, 
the rest is disembodied technological knowledge and related social 
arrangements -- knowledge can be transferred, but the ability to make 
effective use of it cannot be. This ability can only be acquired through 
indigenous technological effort, leading to technological mastery through 
human capital formation. 
Another issue are the particular conditions that affect the acceptance of a new twechnology 
at the local level: 
[When choosing technologies at the developing country level...] the central 
problem is lack of experience of the decision-makers. 
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Implementation of appropriate technology choices often requires 
complementary investments to enhance local technological mastery. 
Local circumstances (vs engineering norms) can include: 
. site characterisitcs, stage of development of local construction and 
engineering services (plant establishment); 
. availability of skilled mainatainance workers and capability of local 
machine shops for spare parts (plant maintainance); 
. level of labour skills, characteristics of intermediate inputs (plant opration). 
Transferring a technology to a recipient so that the latter has full "technological mastery", 
as previous authors have observed, is a very complex task, and often implies another level 
of innovation and adaptation of the original technology: 
Technology mastery is defined as the operational command over 
technological knowledge. 
Manufacturing technology is characterized by a considerable element of 
tacitness, difficulties in imitation and teaching, and uncertainty regarding 
what modifications will work and what will not (as quoted in Nelson, 1979). 
A new production activity requires a great deal of iterative problem solving 
and experimentation as the original concept is refined and given practical 
expression. [Innovation is often a continuous process.] 
[For example, in the case of ] Brazil's USIMINAS steel mill: there was a 
sequence of minor technological changes within the plant carried out by 
plant engineers over a period of years, which resulted in a doubling of 
capacity and factor productivity. 
Enos showed that once a radical innovation is introduced (for cost 
reduction), subsequent reductions in production costs due to modifications 
and adaptations of technology can often be greater than the cost reduction 
obtained in the initial innovation. 
There a number of ways a developing country can access foreign technology: 
Foreigh technological knowledge can be accessed by - 
. sending nationals abroad for training, work experience 
. consulting technical and trade journals 
copying foreign products (reverse engineering) 
Best form (most complete) is the turnkey plant. 
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Government policies -- can help foster optimal technological choices, avoid 
socially undesirable components, promote use of local suppiers. 
When it comes to the impact of government policy to encourage innovation and industrial 
development, the authours are in agreement with previous statements in this paper: 
Policies such as creation of technological infrastructure, S&T plans, 
promotion of local technological supplies, fiscal incentives/ direct subsidies, 
regulation of technology imports, etc... HAD FAR LESS IMPACT on 
technological change and the acquisition of technological mastery than macro 
policies such as trade, credit allocation, investment, licensing etc.. 
[The authors ask themselves whether this ...] true intrinsically, or is it due 
to the fact that these policies were poorly implemented, often at cross 
purposes. 
Also, the spate of R&D institutes which were created by governments as a 
simplistic solution to industrial innovation, had virtually no contact with or 
impact upon producing firms (see Diana Crane Research Policy 6, pp 374- 
395). 
Another useful article that is included in this collection is a somewhat theoretical 
discussion on the decision processes actually used in firms when adopting new 
technologies. Bela Gold, a noted author, is also writing from an economist's perspective. 
Bela Gold, "On the Adoption of Technological Innovations in Industry: 
Superficial Models and Complex Decision Processes", in Macdonald, S., 
Lamberton, D. McL., Mandeville, T. 1983. The Trouble with Technology - 
Explorations in the Process of Technological Change. St. Martin's Press, New 
York, NY, USA. p. 104 - 116. 
The technological competitiveness of firms and industries is determined not 
by the rate at which significant innovations are developed, but by the extent 
to which they are applied to commercial operations. The importance of 
such adoption decisions is further emphasised by the fact that evidence of 
resistance to the utilisation of demonstrably effective technological advances 
tends to discourage managerial commitments to risky and costly efforts 
seeking additional advances. 
[The author points out weaknesses in the traditional diffusion models.] But 
each of the fundamental elements of this conception is unrealistic. First, far 
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from being essentially fixed, almost every technological innovation in 
industry undergoes numerous significant changes in its service capabilities 
with time. (...) 
A second general shortcoming of the traditional approach to the diffusion of 
technological innovations is the assumption that the population of potential 
users is readily identifiable and essentially fixed. Actually, most studies 
have failed even to identify the group of prospective adopters realistically 
because of an understandable eagerness to utilise the convenient industrial 
categories offered by unavailable statistical series. 
A third basic weakness of many models of technological diffusion, especially 
those based on the projection of past statistical data, is their pervasive 
tendency to ignore significant dissimilarities in the economic conditions 
which characterised the various periods. (...) 
It would seem to follow, therefore, that the saturation curve so widely used 
to depict diffusion patterns, or to assess diffusion rates, or to estimate 
shortcomings in diffusion levels, is misleading. Instead of one fixed 
estimate of potential users for the entire period of diffusion, with which 
actual adoption levels are compared, such charts should show the successive 
increases in the population of potential adopters associated with important 
changes in the applicability and economic benefits of the original innovation. 
[The author then describes a saw-toothed S-curve, which he believes might 
be even more accurate in noting that successive stages of innovational 
developments are associated with changes in potential users as well as 
actual adopters.] 
The most significant implication of this conceptual [p. 108:] reorientation is 
that more effective understanding of diffusion patterns and of the factors 
affecting them requires more knowledgeable estimates of: the population of 
prospective users in any specified stage of an innovation's development; the 
number of additional adoptions likely to result from changes in the input 
and output pressures on prospective users, even without significant 
improvements in the innovation; and the number and kinds of additional 
adopters likely to be attracted by alternative further technological 
improvements in the innovation, and by reductions in its investment 
requirements and operating costs. Incidentally, careful research has also led 
to a serious questioning of the traditional use of sigmoid curves to depict 
diffusion patterns. 
The author also discusses simplifying assumptions and realities in the way firms decide 
internally on the adoption of a new technological innovation. 
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(p. 108-109) The first grossly unrealistic assumption about the intra-firm 
context of decisions involving the adoption or non-adoption of technological 
innovations involves the arbitrary foreshortening of needed analytical 
perspectives. This results from focusing immediately on evaluations of a 
particular innovation - and how such evaluations might differ among those 
firms which adopt it and those which do not. But such an approach 
ignores the frequently dominant, and always important, role of the pre- 
decision environment. For any period to be covered by current managerial 
planning and commitments, this covers the specific nature and relative 
urgency of all of the needs to be dealt with, the availability and relative net 
advantages of non-technological as well as technological options, and the 
availability of technical, managerial and financial resources to implement 
such alternative measures. 
A second grossly unrealistic simplifying assumption concerning the intra- 
firm context of decisions about adopting technological innovations is that 
such decisions are based on expected profitability after adjustments for 
probable risks and uncertainties. This is merely a tautology rather than a 
useful analytical insight, for it says in effect that a profit-seeking firm makes 
decisions which seem to favour profits and, hence, that if an innovation is 
adopted, it is expected to be profitable. As a matter of fact, however, 
diffusion patterns suggest that numerous firms arrive at quite different 
evaluations of the same innovation more or less simultaneously. Hence, 
effective understanding of diffusion patterns requires more thorough study 
of how expected 'net benefits' are estimated and to what extent such 
'evaluations' are really only rationalisations of decisions arrived at on less 
obvious and less objective grounds. 
A third grossly vulnerable basis for studies of decision-making about 
technological innovations in individual firms is the widespread reliance on 
ex post findings and interpretations. Some well-known studies are even 
unclear about how long ago the relevant decisions were made (often 10 to 
20 years ago or more), and about whether the respondents cited were 
effectively involved in making such decisions (often not. The results of 
such studies are accordingly open to serious misinterpretations because of 
the enormous differences between hindsight perspectives and expectations 
about the unknown future. 
In describing the evaluational bases for decisions, Gold points out some common errors 
companies make in evaluating the potential benefits of proposed technological innovations: 
(p. 110-111) For example, our field research suggests that the most common 
sources of errors in estimates of the expected technological benefits of 
innovations centre on: 
(1) underestimating the time needed to achieve effective functioning of 
innovation, often by a considerable margin; 
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(2) overestimating the average utilisation rate as a basis for appraising 
benefits; 
(3) underestimating the need to make adaptive adjustments in the 
preceding and subsequent operations of an integrated production 
operation - or in the reallocation of orders and support resources 
between a new facility and older facilities devoted to similar 
operations; and 
(4) underestimating the problems and costs of gaining labour acceptance 
of associated changes in tasks. 
Economic evaluations of the expected effects of technological innovations are 
frequently based on a wide array of simplifying assumptions, among which 
the following seem to be the most common and most influential: 
(1) that expected reductions in man-hours per unit of output will be 
accompanied by roughly comparable reductions in unit wage costs; 
(2) that expected reductions in material requirements per unit of output 
will yield parallel reductions in their unit costs; and 
(3) that resulting costs savings can be carried over into increased profits. 
Indeed, our research reveals that some companies in the United States no 
longer permit the inclusion of expected wage costs savings in justifications 
for proposed capital projects, on the grounds that these all to frequently 
prove unrealisable. 
Finally, Gold also criticises the lack of adequate evaluations of technological innovations 
already installed, and their real economic impact on their company environment. 
(p. 114-115) How effectively are the results of technological innovations 
determined? Such findings would obviously tend to have an important 
bearing on the rate of diffusion inasmuch as evidence of significant rewards 
is generally regarded as the most powerful incentive to increasing diffusion. 
Oddly enough, however, there is an astonishing paucity of published 
research evaluating the actual effects of such innovations after they have 
been installed, in contrast to the considerable literature on estimating the 
probable effects of technological innovations before decisions are made to 
adopt or reject them. 
Inquiries suggest that the reason for such neglect is the widespread 
assumption that the purposes, methodologies, applications and 
interpretations of such undertakings are so obvious as to offer no interesting 
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problems. Our field research, however, yields the strongly contrasting view 
that such post-installation evaluations are shot through with difficult 
problems and dubious bases for many of the results which are reported 
within firms. 
Analysis of the problems and effectiveness of post-installation evaluations of 
the effects of technological innovations offers several potentially important 
contributions to the management of innovational processes. To begin with, 
such appraisals could provide a direct comparison of results with the 
expectations which led to adoption decisions. Even more important, 
comprehensive evaluations could explore the specific loci and causes of 
deviations between expectations and results, thus indicating the relative 
accuracy of various component estimates and also identifying any variables 
which were ignored. Moreover, such evaluative efforts may reveal 
insensitivities in the performance measurement system to innovational 
impacts, thus counselling changes in order to minimise consistent anti- 
innovation biases. 
Some Shortcomings of Current Evaluation Efforts 
Only a limited array of post-installation evaluation methods has emerged as 
a by-product of our field research on the effects of technological innovations. 
Hence, the following judgements must be regarded as preliminary and 
tentative indications of possible shortcomings. Most of the 'make good', 
'follow-up' and 'post-audit' evaluations examined concentrated primarily on 
simply measuring actual results, including: the costs of acquisition, 
construction and installation relative to budget; the acceptability of technical 
performance; and resulting operating costs. Except for comparisons with 
allowed budgets and expected total unit costs, few methods were 
characterised by comprehensive comparisons of actual input requirements, 
factor prices, product quality and price, output levels and other aspects of 
performance with the respective estimates which led to the decision. 
Especially glaring is the common failure to consider the time required to 
achieve the 'acceptable' levels of performance before evaluation efforts tend 
to be initiated relative to expectations. Also disappointing is the virtual 
absence of any systematic efforts to 'learn from results' as a means of 
improving ex ante estimates of the effects of prospective technological 
innovations in the future. 
Our explorations suggest, in addition, that formal evaluation efforts, except 
for comparisons of actual expenditures with allowed budgets, seem to be 
much less common with respect to very large projects - especially when 
their results seem unfavourable. In explaining such lapses, the two most 
common reasons given were that each such project is necessarily unique and 
hence evaluations would have no feedback value in considering future 
projects, and that there was no interest in 'spilled milk' or in 'flogging dead 
horses'. 
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3. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE THIRD WORLD: POLICY FACTORS 
INFLUENCING THE UTILIZATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
There are two works worth citing here to lay the foundation for the later policy writings 
on cience and technology in third world countries, both of which are related. The first is 
Maurice Goldsmith and Alexander King 1979 symposium procedings on a New role for 
Science and Technology, the other is the 1979 UN Conference on Science and Technology 
for Development. Both are cited here, because in a sense they already identified many 
issues leading to our preoccupation with the utilization of research results in the third 
world. 
Goldsmith, M., King, A. (eds). 1979. Issues of Development: Towards a New 
Role for Science and Technology - Science, Technology and Global Problems. 
Proceedings of an International Symposium on Science and Technology for 
Development, Singapore, January 1979. Pergamon Press, Oxford, New York, 
Toronto, Sydney, Paris, Frankfurt. p. 10 -13 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY 
It was only in the early 1960s, however, that the role of research and 
development in economic growth became the subject of serious study by the 
economists. It was shown, for example, that of the economic growth of the 
United States during the first half of this century only about 40% could be 
explained by increases in the traditional productive factors of capital and 
labour. The remaining 60%, designated at first as the residual factor, was 
assumed to be due to improvements in technology, materials, management 
skills, and higher levels of education, i.e. in the quality of labour and of 
capital utilization. This recognition of the importance for economic growth 
of technological improvements and of the human factor, coincided with the 
enormous increases in research and development expenditures in all the 
industrialized countries which followed the end of the Second World War, a 
period when it was accepted that science was a good thing in itself, with 
the assumption that the more science that was done in a country, the 
greater would be the benefit to the economy - and presumably to society. 
This generalization proved to be false, and many examples can be cited of 
huge efforts of research and development, which proved to be technically 
successful, but economically disastrous. Incidentally, this facile notion that 
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scientific activity automatically results eventually in economic growth has 
been supported by the elites in some of the Third World countries; 
academic snobbery has been a significant export of the industrialized world. 
Recognition of the complexity of the process of technological innovation 
followed from studies done by OECD in the late 1960s on the so-called 
technological gap between the European countries and the United States, 
and by the work of many academic research groups. It was shown that no 
direct correlation existed between the proportion of the national expenditure 
of a country and its economic growth; [p. 11:1 indeed, the extent of the 
national technological effort seemed to have little effect, on either economic 
or trade performance. It appeared that diffusion of technology across 
frontiers was sufficiently rapid to compensate for inadequacies in the 
domestic research and development effort. This appears to be true, 
however, only with regard to countries above a certain technological 
threshold, with a mature industrial infrastructure, and a sufficient spread of 
research and development activity to enable them to scan world scientific 
and technological advances, to select what is appropriate to their needs 
rapidly and accurately. 
The considerations do not apply, however, to the diffusion or transfer of 
technology from the advanced industrialized to the less developed countries. 
In the latter, or at least in most of them, the necessary threshold for 
spontaneous diffusion has not yet been reached, nor can it be until a real 
scientific and technological capacity has been built up, working symbiotically 
with both the educational and the productive systems. Nevertheless, the 
experience of the industrialized countries with their growing understanding 
of the nature of the process of technological innovation is essential to the 
countries of the Third World, if they are wisely to select technology for 
import, assimilate it, and later develop their own. 
The process of technological innovation is extremely complex, and it is 
necessary that its complexities be thoroughly understood by political leaders, 
planners, industrial managers, and scientists. Successful innovation 
demands, of course, the initial technological novelty, either generated 
domestically or imported from abroad. Careful selection from the immense 
number of processes and products available in the world technological 
repertory is a prerequisite if the innovation is to serve well the needs of the 
developing society. Amongst other factors which determine success or 
failure in the new enterprise are availability of capital, a wise fiscal system 
which protects initially, but not to the extent of discouraging efficiency and 
high quality, entrepreneurship, management skills, marketing ability, the 
general level of education, and that of middle level technical skills, a good 
social climate, and even national psychology and cultural tradition. Thus, 
the availability of technology is the beginning, but is far from being the 
totality of industrial innovation, in countries of all types. 
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TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 
This is not the place to discuss the economic disparities between the 
industrialized and the developing countries. At the time of the first 
conference of the United Nations on Science and technology for the Benefit 
of Less Developed Areas, held in Geneva in 1963, there was considerable 
hope that the gap could be speedily narrowed and, in particular, that a 
massive transfer of technology from the industrialized North, would go far 
to reduce hunger, disease, and poverty in the disadvantaged countries to the 
South. This, alas, has proved to be only marginally true, although at first 
sight growth rates in the Third World in recent decades seem impressive. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, countries in Africa, Latin America, and non- 
Marxist Asia have achieved an average growth of the economy of about 5% 
per annum. This compares favourably with the record of the already 
industrialized world, but it starts from a very low base line, and much of 
the new wealth created found its way to the already well-to-do as a 
consequence of the inequities of the social system in some countries, so that 
the great masses have benefited little from the new technology, improved 
agriculture, and the inflow of aid capital and loans. Furthermore, the per 
capita gains in income in many places were reduced to about a half as a 
result of population increase, while substantial purchases of arms reduced 
the benefits of growth still further. 
(...) Nowhere are the disparities between the industrialized countries and 
those of the Third World more marked than in the fields of scientific 
research and technological development. True, some countries such as India 
have a sophisticated scientific structure; the oil-producers, of recent years, 
have begun up such a capacity, and even in the least developed countries 
there are small groups of people with scientific training and understanding, 
usually acquired abroad. In the aggregate, however, the world's now 
massive research and development effort is concentrated in the few highly 
industrialized countries. 
One may question, of course, whether the existence of a capacity for such 
activities is a cause of economic progress, or a consequence of it. Probably 
both are true to a degree, but it is certain that technological advance has 
been one of the main sources of power and prosperity of the industrialized 
world, and that if research and development are likewise to become a motor 
force of economic development in the global sense, and not merely a means 
for the rich to become richer, all participating countries will require to build 
up the means, the awareness, and the experience which an indigenous 
technological capacity involves. 
If, then, the experience of the industrialized countries is that science and 
technology have been major instruments of economic development, it would 
seem an easy assumption that this would be true, also, for countries at an 
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earlier stage of economic development. Indeed, we might have expected 
that their progress would have been more rapid than in fact has been the 
case, since the technologies and skills already existing evolved slowly, and 
with considerable expense, in the industrialized countries during the two 
centuries since the industrial revolution. Certainly, great advances have 
been made by the direct transfer of skills and techniques: communications 
form a world-wide network; certain devastating diseases such as malaria, 
smallpox and tuberculosis are under control; agriculture in the Third World 
has been greatly assisted by the use of fertilizers, and the introduction of 
high-yielding varieties by genetic selection based on research. Nevertheless, 
on the whole, and especially in the industrial sector, advance has been 
much slower than desirable, if the economic gap between the rich and the 
poor nations is to be bridged in a reasonable time. 
The relative failure of the process of technological transfer is due to many 
causes, in addition to the lack of indigenous technological capacities which 
we stress so strongly; some of these derive from intrinsic ineffectualness of 
the process itself, where the profit motivation of the so-called donors does 
not always harmonize with the basic needs of the receivers; others are due 
to social and political factors in the recipient countries. 
In all developing countries, with the exception of those exceptionally rich in 
resources, a major difficulty is the availability of capital. In Third World 
countries with very little in the way of surplus resources - the classical 
'savings' of the economists - capital is exceedingly scarce and subject to 
greater competition than in the industrialized countries, since it is in urgent 
demand for the building up of every sector. Furthermore, the technology of 
the already industrialized countries has been deliberately evolved to increase 
the productivity of manpower and hence is both capital- and energy- 
intensive. In so many of the Third World countries, on the other hand, 
unemployment and underemployment are widespread, and so a dominance 
of capital-intensive industry is not necessarily to be welcomed. 
Consequently much of the technology 'on the shelf' is not, a priori, 
appropriate to the economic and social needs of the Third World. The 
choice of technologies with new work positions costing, say $5000 each as 
compared with others at $200 per capita may, in reality, be a choice 
between half a million jobs with high economic yield, or eight million jobs 
with a lower per capita outcome. 
A further obstacle to successful transfer of technology is the local lack of 
availability of sufficient skills - managerial, engineering or manual - which 
must be provided through an appropriate, highly developed, and sustained 
educational system. In many countries, the general basis of education is 
insufficiently evolved, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and its building 
up, including the funding of the necessary resources, the training of 
teachers, etc. is a very long business. In addition, there is often a lack of 
47 
both middle and higher technical training, and of facilities for management 
education. 
At present, the main political preoccupation with regard to the use of 
science and technology for development is concentrated on the transfer 
process itself, and on improvement in the access of Third World countries to 
advanced technology. The arguments here have become highly politicized, 
and centre around the effectiveness and motivation of the multinational 
corporations as the main agents of transfer. Governments are obviously not 
themselves skilled in questions of industrial production and management, 
and, especially in the market economy countries, ownership of technology is 
in the hand of industry itself, and its owner shareholders. 
The second citation is from a summary document prepared several years after the 1979 
UN Conference in Vienna on Science and Technology for development. The first part of 
the excerpt covers those resolutions of the General Assembly outlining the mandate of the 
conference, as well as those resolutions emerging from the conference (the Vienna Program 
of Action, or VPA) that have an impact on the utilization of research results. 
Pati, Subas C. 1986. Experiences with the Vienna Programme of Action. A 
Study on the Follow-Up Activities by Developing Countries on the 
Recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology 
for Development (UNCSTD), Vienna, 1979. 84 p. 
The main objectives of the conference as reflected in the General Assembly's 
resolution were as follows: 
(i) Strengthening the technological capacity of the developing countries to 
enable them to apply science and technology to their own 
development. 
(ii) Adopting effective means for the utilization of scientific and [p. 4:1 
technological potentials in solution of development problems of 
regional and global significance, especially for the benefit of 
developing countries. 
(iii) Providing instruments of cooperation to developing countries in 
utilization of science and technology for solving socio-economic 
problems that could not be solved by individual action in accordance 
with national priorities. 
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(...) The Preparatory Committee suggested the following agenda to be 
adopted in the conference: 
1. Science and technology for development: 
(a) The choice and transfer of technologies for development; 
(b) Elimination of obstacles to the better utilization of knowledge and 
capabilities in science and technology for the development of all 
countries, particularly for their use in developing countries; 
(c) Methods of integrating science and technology in economic and social 
development; 
(d) New science and technology for overcoming obstacles to development. 
(p. 19) The Vienna Programme of Action (VPA) adopted at the UNCSTD 
normally had the status of a recommendation to the UN General Assembly. 
During its thirty-fourth session the Second Committee dealt with the 
Programme of Action in great detail. The comprehensive resolution that the 
General Assembly adopted to approve the outcome of UNCSTD represented 
a first step on the way to pulling the Programme of Action into effect. 
The VPA focused on the following three broad target areas: 
1. Strengthening the scientific and technological capacities of developing 
countries; (...) 
(p. 20-21) According to VPA the following recommendations were to be 
implemented at the national level of developing countries: 
Each developing country should formulate a policy on transfer and 
acquisition of technology as an integral part of its national policy for 
scientific and technological development. 
Joint industrial projects with the objective of maximizing the results of 
utilization of their resources, capital and skills should be stimulated 
and established. 
To be implemented at the international level the VPA recommended: 
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Developed countries should support and facilitate the internal efforts 
of developing countries to achieve development through endogenous 
scientific and technological capacities. 
(p. 22) In the second target area, i.e. restructuring the existing pattern of 
international scientific and technological relations, VPA has classified the 
recommendations into four major categories, namely: 
(a) Acquisition and transfer of technology; 
(b) (...) 
The suggestions to be implemented by the developing countries are 
they should cooperate with developed countries in improving the 
conditions and terms for the acquisition of technology; 
The recommendations to be implemented by the developed countries are: 
they should take adequate measures to encourage and facilitate the 
transfer of technology by their small and medium-sized enterprises; 
(p. 23) The recommendations of VPA to the international organizations for 
achieving the objectives of the second target area are: 
Organizations within the UN System should play a more active role 
in informing, advising, assisting developing countries concerning all 
aspects related to the transfer of technology to enable them to obtain 
more favourable terms and conditions. 
They should provide assistance in the formulation, negotiation and 
implementation of projects for the transfer of technology. 
They should assist the developing countries in setting up suitable 
institutions to deal with the transfer of technology. 
Greater use should be made by international organizations of the 
expertise in developing countries including consulting organizations. 
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Of greater interest to us, however, is the survey that the author carried out to see what 
kind of change these resolutions brought about several years after the conference. A 
number of the obstacles or impediments listed here are very much the same ones that make 
utilization and implementation of research in the third world so difficult. 
(p. 32 ) For this purpose enquiries were sent to 230 persons in 94 develop- 
ing countries which had participated in the Vienna Conference. 
The persons to whom queries were sent can broadly be categorised into 
four categories, namely: 
- Focal points of the country for the UNCSTD 
- Persons who participated in the ACAST Colloquium 
- Persons who are presently responsible for formulating and 
implementing the national science and technology policy 
- Other internationally reputed scientists and technologists. 
OBSTACLES IN IMPLEMENTING VPA (p. 61-65) 
In the earlier chapter the answers given by the respondents relating to the 
various obstacles faced in their respective countries were itemized. The 
respondents have mentioned the various types of obstacles faced by them in 
implementing the recommendations of VPA and it is seen that some of 
these obstacles are insurmountable for certain developing countries. Taking 
into account all the replies the obstacles can be summarized and broadly 
classified into following groups: 
(a) General obstacles 
(b) Planning and technical obstacles 
(c) Education and manpower obstacles 
(a) General obstacles: obstacles which arise from the social, political, 
financial, cultural constraints are grouped as fundamental obstacles 
and can be outlined as follows: 
Lack of political will in the country to utilize science and technology 
for socio-economic development. 
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Unstable political situation, changes of government in quick 
successions, ethnic politics hamper the development of science and 
technology in the country. 
War and revolution (both political and religious) prevailing in the 
country. 
Resistance to adopt modern technologies due to cultural barriers. 
Acute shortage of finance for the scientific and technological activities. 
Defective fiscal politics adopted in the country. 
Assignment of wrong priorities in the national development plans. 
Improper distribution of meager funds allotted for S&T activities. 
International political and economic situation. 
Mistrust and conflicts between neighbouring countries over 
implementation of joint cooperative projects. 
Scarce tapping of the national resources. 
Instability in the local economy. 
Inefficient provision of basic needs. 
Excess bureaucratic interference in the research activities of scientists 
and technologists. 
Constant conflicts between the bureaucrats on one side and the 
scientists and technologists on the other. 
Lack of appreciation and reward for the achievements of scientists 
and technologists. 
Lack of awareness for the significance of S&T in socio-economic 
development among the population. 
Other serious local, political and economic problems which are 
diverting the attention of the authorities. 
Attitude of certain developed countries and multinational corporations. 
(b) Planning and technical obstacles: Perhaps the most important and 
significant obstacles the developing countries are facing are in the 
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planning, policy-making and technical spheres. These obstacles can be 
listed as 
Absence of a well-defined national science and technology policy. 
Lack of capability to formulate suitable science and technology policy. 
Non-availability of institutional mechanisms for coordinating, 
integrating and evaluating the scientific and technological activities. 
Absence of expertise and physical facilities for R&D work. 
Absence of proper planning of R&D activities in terms of national 
needs and priorities. 
Random import of foreign technology. 
Inadequate scientific and technological infrastructure. 
Lack of a mechanism to control and influence the choice, terms of 
acquisition and transfer of technology. 
Weakness and deficiencies in the national planning systems. 
Absence of a national S&T information system. 
Lack of information about alternative technologies available in the 
world market and non-availability of access to international scientific 
and technological information. 
Difficulties in getting informations relating to new developments of 
science and technology. 
Weak linkage between S&T research and production sections. 
Non-availability of facilities for proper assessment of technologies to 
be imported. 
(c) Educational and manpower planning: A constant set of recurring 
obstacles in the scientific and technological development of developing 
countries is related to manpower. It includes the education and 
training, the supply and demand, the placement and retention and the 
welfare and job satisfaction of administrative, scientific, technological 
supervisory and other skilled personnel. These obstacles are: 
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Acute shortage of trained and skilled personnel in the field of science 
and technology. 
Lack of training facilities for research workers, technicians, 
professional personnel and entrepreneurs who can play an active role 
in S&T development processes. 
Absence of a comprehensive plan for human resources development 
keeping in view the needs for the future. 
Unsuitable educational policies. 
"Brain-drain" exodus of qualified personnel brought about by political, 
economic and social conditions. 
Lack of proper training system, which led to a lack of understanding 
of science and technology. 
Misdeployment of S&T manpower at different levels. 
Lack of encouragement of S&T personnel by the authorities. 
What follows is a fairly broad bibliographical selection of issues related to science and 
innovation policy in third world countries. This collection of citations and the attached 
abstracts have been excerpted from a very useful annotated bibliography, largely written 
from the perspective of appropriate technology. 
Hurley, D. (ed.). 1987. The Management of Technological Change - An 
Annotated Bibliography. IT Publications in association with the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. Russell Press, Nottingham. 113 p. 
The Hurley reference numbers are identifiedby the notation (DH - no.): 
CLARK, N., The Political Economy of Science and Technology, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1985. 
This is an excellent introductory book which presents a clear overview of 
the major issues in the political economy of science and technology (S & T) 
policy. It first deals with the historical development in Western countries of 
S & T policies and of ideas relating to S & T. Thus the introduction defines 
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the multidisciplinary concept of S & T policy and chapter 2 traces early 
thinking and experiences during the [p. 17:1 transition to capitalism in 
Europe. Chapter 3 reviews ways of measuring the activities of the S & T 
system within a developed economy (e.g. social cost benefit analysis, 
patents, innovations etc.) and more radical contemporary views. 
Chapters 7 and 8 relate these issues to developing countries by first 
outlining various perceptions or theories of underdevelopment and 
development and then specifically looking at technological aspects of these 
processes. Clark has short sections on: technology transfer; appropriate 
technology; learning and technological capabilities; radical technical change; 
rural technology transfer; and indigenous science and science and technology 
planning. These chapters also contain a useful bibliography. (DH - 25) 
JAMES, J. and WATANABE, S. (eds), Technology, Institutions and Government 
Policies, Macmillan series of ILO studies, London, 1985. 
This is a book with an introduction by the editors and 7 readings, split into 
"conceptual" and empirical studies of the impact of government policies on 
technology decisions. 
The introduction sets out the objective of the book; to bridge the gap in the 
literature "between the macroeconomic environment and micro decisions for 
technology". The editors argue that the comparative neglect of macro 
questions has made it difficult for decision-makers to incorporate technology 
issues in planning at the national level. 
The first conceptual chapter by F. Stewart on "Macro Policies for AT: An 
Introduction Classification", is basically a taxonomy of "general government 
policies according to their impact on technology decisions at the micro 
level". Her static model of technology choice assumes technology to be "a 
function of 4 variables: the firm's objectives; the resources available to it; 
the nature of the markets it faces; and the knowledge it possesses about 
technological alternatives". She then links government policies to technology 
choice via its effects on any of these variables. She also takes cognizance of 
the dynamic nature of technology, especially in an international trade 
context, and suggests an emphasis in government policies on the 
development of a dynamic indigenous technical change capacity. 
Enos ("A Game Theoretic Approach to Choice of Technology") argues for [p. 
22:1 changes in the conceptualization of choice of technology from a 
neoclassical microeconomic theory base to a game theory base. There are 
two fundamental respects in which a game theory approach to thinking 
about technology choice may be more appropriate. The first is that "choice 
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of technology should be described as a process which extends through time, 
taking at least a few years, and more likely a few decades, to come to 
completion". The second is that choices are not made by lone individuals 
but by an interacting collection of people and institutions with differing 
power and influence, one of which is of course the government. 
Bruton's essay ("On the Production of a National Technology") searches for 
conditions which could lead to the emergence of an indigenous technological 
capability (ITC). Starting from the perspective of an individual firm he 
concludes that a fundamental condition for ITC to expand from such firms 
for such developments (fiscal policies, legislation, trade etc.). He also looks 
at the conditions for an adequate supply response, one of which is a 
responsive capital goods sector. 
The final conceptual paper by James raises the issue of integrating 
technological considerations into other policy mediums e.g. what role does 
AT play in policies to eradicate certain types of poverty? 
There are two empirical studies which are annotated separately and appear 
as individual entries into this bibliography. They are: 1. "Government 
Policy, Market Structure and Choice of Technology in Egypt" by D. Forsyth; 
and 2. "External Development Finance and the Choice of Technology" by J. 
White. (DH - 32) 
DAHLMAN, C., ROSS-LARSON, B., and WESTPHAL, L., Managing 
Technological Development: Lessons from the Newly Industrializing Countries, 
World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 717, IBRD, 1985. 
These authors draw on their collective experiences of newly industrializing 
countries (NICs) to propose key lessons relating to the management of 
technological development. They first describe the technological 
development of an archetypal firm, using this to define basic concepts. 
They then review "the steps the firm must take in choosing technology", i.e. 
identifying local needs and constraints, collecting information, evaluating 
costs and benefits, incorporating dynamic consideration. 
They then describe how firms augment their technological capability, i.e. 
acquiring experience in production, investment or innovation. This leads 
into a review of foreign versus domestic technological elements including a 
discussion of the different transactions for acquiring foreign technology. 
This includes an analysis of the room for manouvering within each 
transactional mode. 
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Lastly, they assert that the economic environment is crucial. Thus, they 
review various aspects of government policy, e.g. the system of incentives, 
specialized technological agencies and direct government intervention. (DH - 
102) 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE, Science and 
Technology for Development: Planning in the STPI Countries, IDRC 
Monograph, No. 133, Ottawa, 1979. 
Science and Technology for Development: A Selection of Background Papers 
for the Main Comparative Report of the STPI Project, Part A: Science and 
Technology Policy and Development, IDRC Manuscript Reports, IDRC-MR21, 
Ottawa, 1980. 
The Science and Technology Policy Instruments (STPI) project is a large 
collaborative research effort that involved 10 teams from Latin America, the 
Middle East, Southern Europe and Asia sponsored by the IDRC. Its 
principal aim was to examine ways in which developing countries could 
ensure the effective contribution of science and technology to development. 
In this volume they particularly emphasize the process of science and 
technology (S & T) policy design and implementation. 
The reports and essays in this book can be divided into four categories. 
Readings (1), (2) and (16) deal with overviews of S & T and development in 
which issues such as "human resource planning", institution, information 
bases and regional and international aspects, are considered. 
The secondary category (readings (3), (4) and (8) on Argentina, Brazil and 
South Korea) includes analyses of S & T plans within the context of broader 
development plans. The third category comprises descriptions of S & T 
planning experiences. These include: Columbian experiments in sectoral S 
& T planning (5); Egyptian S & T planning over 2 decades (6); Indian S & 
T planning and the process that led to its design and implementation (7); 
and readings (9) and (10) on Mexican and Venezuelan experiences. 
The fourth category contains essays describing methods or presenting other, 
more general, considerations in S & T planning. Reading (11) suggests a 
normative framework for S & T planning. Essays (12) and (13) describe 
planning methods in India and Columbia and (14) and (15) discuss 
anticipatory decisions and resource allocation in S & T planning. 
The paper in Part A introduces the background of research into S & T for 
development and the changes in attitude towards the subject. It then 
elaborates on many of the prevailing views of S & T in development, 
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especially the conflict of "dependency" and more "orthodox" perspectives. 
The last section of this paper reviews the concept and perceived necessity 
for an explicit S & T strategy to form part of an overall development 
strategy. (DH - 29) 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE, Science and 
Technology for Development, The STPI Modules. 
Modules 4, 5, 8 and 9 are described below, as these contain the most 
general discussions of national science and technology policy issues. 
Modules 6 and 7 are annotated separately, and these pertain more to 
specific issues in international technology transfer and indigenous technology 
development, respectively. 
STPI Module 4, The Present Situation of Science and Technology in the STPI 
Countries, IDRC-TS22, Ottawa, 1980. 
STPI Module 5, Instruments to Build Up an Infrastructure for the Generation 
of Technology, IDRC-TS26, Ottawa, 1980. 
STPI Module 8, Policy Instruments to Promote the Performance of S & T 
Activities in Industrial Enterprises, IDRC-TS28, Ottawa, 1980. 
STPI Module 9, Policy Instruments for the Support of Industrial Science and 
Technology Activities, IDRC-TS29, Ottawa, 1980. 
Module 4 describes the S & T policy of each of the STPI countries by 
assessing historical background, the organization of state-influenced S & T 
activities, R & D activities, human resources etc. Each report includes an 
overview of the principal institutions in each area. 
Module 5 reviews 10 governments' efforts to establish institutions to support 
technology generation. By this they primarily mean R & D but also 
diffusion mechanisms. The report looks first at "institution building" in 
Argentina, Brazil, India, Peru and South Korea. This generally involves 
describing the main state and parastatals structures, objectives and activities. 
It does not involve substantial analysis of their effects. 
The second section of the report reviews S & T planning in Argentina, 
Brazil, Columbia, Egypt, India, South Korea, Mexico and Venezuela. This 
involves both a review of actual plans and the formulation procedures. 
The final section looks at financing of R & D and diffusion activities both 
for and through state and parastatal institutions in South Korea, Columbia, 
Brazil, Peru, Mexico and Japan. 
58 
Module 8 focuses on the policy instruments available to governments to 
support the development of local technological capability. The "policy 
instruments described in this module are those directed towards inducing 
industrial firms to perform scientific and technological activities to ensure 
the proper absorption of the technology, whether foreign or of local origin, 
by the industrial sector". 
Module 9 is closely related to module 8, except that it assesses four 
additional categories of policy instruments. These are: "technical norms 
and standards; information centres; manpower development programmes; 
consulting and engineering activities". The structure of the report is very 
much the same as module 8.(DH - 30) 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE, Science and 
Technology for Development: Policy Instruments to Define the Pattern of 
Demand for Technology, STPI Module 7, IDRC-TS34, Ottawa, 1980. 
This paper looks at policy instruments which affect the structure and 
growth of industry and behaviour of industrial firms, thus defining the 
pattern of demand for technology. As such it gives an interesting insight 
into the relationship of technical change and industrial policies, although it 
unfortunately assumes minimal technological determinism, i.e. technology 
decisions are seen as dependent on the "primary decisions" of a company 
(e.g. selection of output mix). Nonetheless, it does reveal many of the state 
influences on technology demand. In this context instruments such as tariffs 
and quantitative controls, industrial policies involving subsidies and other 
supports, legal direction, credit promotional agencies etc. are analysed in 
specific case studies for their effects on technology demand, therefore choice 
and application. (DH - 113) 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE, Science and 
Technology for Development: A Selection of Background Papers for the Main 
Comparative Report of the STPI Project; Part D: State Enterprises and 
Technological Development, IDRC Manuscript Reports, IDRC-MR24, Ottawa, 
1980. 
This report has five essays on state enterprizes and their roles in technology 
policy. The first isolates the main issues involved in making such 
enterprizes promote desirable technological development. The second 
assesses the technological behaviour of selected Brazilian state enterprizes 
and their role in influencing technology policy. Then this section sets up an 
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analytical background for evaluating the potential use of these enterprizes as 
instruments of science and technology policy. 
The third section examines the research and development activities of one 
parastatal PETROBRAS, the Brazilian states' oil monopoly organization. The 
fourth section assesses the role of state enterprizes as instruments of 
technological policy in Venezuela. The conclusions being that "production 
goals" dominate "technology goals" and thus the achievement of the former 
targets leads to "easy" technological options such as acquisition of 
technology in packages. 
The fifth section reviews technological behaviour in the Mexican state oil 
enterprize PEMEX (similar to PETROBRAS in Brazil). It concludes that 
financial constraints and the lack of complementary development of Mexico's 
capital goods sector has forced PEMEX to depend excessively on foreign 
technology. (DH - 180) 
FRANSMAN, M. and KING, K. (eds), Technological Capability in the Third 
World, Macmillan, 1984. 
This is one of the most outstanding recent books relating to the process of 
developing countries' technological change. It contains 21 substantive 
readings and a select bibliography. The readings are split into 5 sections, 
the first 4 dealing in largely abstract terms with key concepts and issues in 
technological change. The fifth section includes 9 case studies relating to 
specific technological issues in various countries. 
The first section is a brief introduction by the editors which places the book 
in its intellectual context. Thus, "formerly research in the area of Third 
World technology focused largely on issues of the transfer and choice of 
technology from abroad but more recently attempts have been made to 
understand how imported technology is assimilated and changed to suit 
local circumstances, and how technological improvements of various kinds 
are brought about". The essays in section TI provide a conceptual overview 
of many of the issues in technological capacity in developing countries. 
Dore attacks the nationalistic self-reliance-as-categorical-imperative syndrome 
(often the implication of dependency theorists), and then suggests some 
reforms particularly of the education system designed to change the 
emphasis from learning foreign technologies to creating indigenous ones. 
Stewart then outlines policy (e.g. trade, industry, education etc.) objectives 
which could complement indigenous technical change (ITC). Ranis also 
takes up this theme by attempting to conceptualise the role of ITC in 
economic development. Katz then takes the specific case of Latin America 
metalworking industries and drawing from their experiences, conceptualises 
the process of technical change which they have experienced. He first 
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outlines the influences on the original choice of technique (e.g. factor prices, 
scale suitability, vertical integration, etc.) which he calls idiosyncratic and 
then examines the path of technological upgrading. He separates firm 
specific and external (e.g. state policies, competition) impetuses to change 
and then outlines responses to these. He also tackles the question of the 
infant industries argument. 
Section III looks in broad conceptual terms at developments in the 
international economy and their effects on technological capability. 
Kaplinsky criticises the concentration on ITC due to its fixation with 
"incremental processes of learning-by-doing supplemented by inputs from 
the S & T system". It thus fails to recognise the recent developments in 
technology and what he perceives as a widening of the technological gap 
between developed and developing countries. Bienefeld stresses in very 
general terms the necessity to avoid a simple "national versus international" 
debate with respect to technological change. Leys re-asserts the non- 
neutrality of technology (i.e. it is intimately related to the social relations of 
production) from a Marxist perspective. Section IV has two articles which 
draw out the key issues in learning new technologies (i.e. learning by doing, 
formal education, searching etc.). 
The case studies of section V, where appropriate, are annotated separately in 
other parts of this booklet (50, 108, 120). 
The select bibliography and the bibliographies attached to each reading are 
a rich source of further references. (DH - 8) 
LALL, S., "India's Technological Capacity: Effects of Trade, Industrial Science 
and Technology Policies," in Technological Capability in the Third World edited 
by Fransman, M., and King, K., Macmillan, 1984. 
This paper attempts to trace the implications of certain policies on India's 
ability to develop indigenous technology. He concludes that the highly 
interventionist policies that characterize India since the 50's have stimulated 
a great deal of technological effort". He points to the development of the 
Indian capital goods industry behind protective trade barriers although these 
same policies have also created restraints to technical change and thus 
"inefficiencies". Lall outlines the restrictive aspects of these policies in terms 
of constrained innovation and growth due to, for example, low levels of 
competition, direct controls on foreign technology imports etc. Lall 
implicitly accepts a strong positive role for foreign technology and stresses 
the need for "liberalization" albeit with a certain level of careful selectivity. 
(DH - 58) 
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STEWART, F., Technology and Underdevelopment, Macmillan, London, 2nd ed., 
1978. 
Stewart, one of the foremost economists writing on the issue of technology 
and development, places strong emphasis on the often negative role of 
foreign technology in developing countries. She criticizes the nature of the 
interaction between such technology and host countries and the inaptness 
(primarily expressed in terms of employment effects) which characterises 
much technology transfer. She links the poor development of indigenous 
capital goods industries to the apparent necessity to import machinery and 
technical knowledge and thus asserts a strong role for such a sector. She 
also attacks the myth of "consumer choice" and claims that consumer 
demand in developing countries is highly manipulated. She recommends 
several measures to control the perceived bad points of multinational 
corporations (e.g. regional economic associations of groups of developing 
countries). She also points to certain objectives of technological 
appropriateness such as labour intensity, linkage creation etc. (DH - 17) 
STEWART, F. and JAMES, J. (eds), The Economics of New Technology in 
Developing Countries, Frances Pinter, London, 1982. 
According to [Hurley] the papers reflect new dynamic concerns of how 
technology changes over time rather than the static question of choice of 
technique (capital vs labour intensive) which dominated research in the 
1960s and 1970s.(...) 
Except for an introduction the book is divided into four parts. The first 
part focuses on the choice of technique. Cooper explores the criteria for 
choice of optimum technique in a theoretical paper using the Dobb-Sen 
approach and applying it to the capital goods sector. The other two papers 
in this section are mainly empirical and are separately annotated. Forsyth 
et al. develop the concept of "technical rigidity" by investigating the 
physical/ chemical properties of production in different industries. Eno's 
paper is more concerned with the selection mechanisms with a case study of 
the South Korean petrochemical industry. 
The second part of the book is concerned with production-efficiency, [p. 12:1 
learning and technical mastery. Pack attempts to assess the extent and 
causes of production-efficiency using data on the textile industry in Latin 
America in 1950. The other two papers are primarily concerned with 
changes in productivity arising from the accumulation of experience. 
Dahlman and Westphal introduce the concept of "technological mastery" 
which they believe arises mainly out of experience. In contrast, the paper 
by Bell, Scott-Kemmis and Satyarakwit describe a case of a steel firm in 
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Thailand where virtually no learning took place. This suggests that learning 
is not automatic and points to the need for research into those conditions 
that lead to learning. 
The third part of the book deals with the development of Third World 
technology. Lall's paper examines technology exports from India and argues 
that these are a general indicator of technical accumulation. Morehouse's 
paper is also concerned with India and shows how production of the Swaraj 
tractor based on local technology is as efficient as production based on 
imported technology. Biggs' paper is an attempt at a more systematic 
appraisal of R & D systems. 
The fourth and final section of the book is concerned with products. These 
two papers share a separate annotation. The paper by James and Stewart 
looks at the welfare impact of new products in developing countries using 
the Lancaster framework. The paper by James looks at the question of 
products standards (which is an important part of product's policy) and 
their applicability to developing countries. 
Although the book does not have a separate bibliography the references 
found at the end of each paper give a good guide to the literature. The 
introduction to the volume also gives a good overview. (DH - 19) 
JAMES, J., and STEWART, F., New Products: A Discussion of the Welfare 
Effects of the Introduction of New Products in Developing Countries, in 
Stewart, F., and James, J. (eds), The Economics of New Technology in 
Developing Countries, Frances Pinter, London, 1982. 
This paper by James and Stewart analyses the welfare impact of new 
products in developing countries using the "Lancaster framework" of 
economic analysis, which sums products characteristics rather than utility. 
They theoretically distinguish situations in which the product has either 
egalitarian or non-egalitarian consumption effects. Eight short case studies 
are presented and in one (soap), the new product is shown to have purely 
negative effects on choice, on distribution and on production technology. 
Developing countries are advised to have an active products policy to 
reduce the undesirable effects of new products. (DH - 54) 
FORSYTH, D., MCBAIN, N., and SOLOMON, R., Technical Rigidity and 
Appropriate Technology in Less Developed Countries, in Stewart, F., and James, 
J. (eds), The Economics of New Technology in Developing Countries, Frances 
Pinter, London, 1982. 
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This article investigates the physical /chemical properties of production 
processes in order to develop the concept of "technical rigidity". The 
authors construct an "index of technical rigidity" (ITR) which summarizes an 
engineering based assessment of the opportunities for substituting labour for 
capital in manufacturing subprocesses. Eight fundamental physical barriers 
to this substitution include the use of high or low process temperature, the 
application of fluid pressure on materials in process and so on. The ITIZ is 
then applied to a number of industries in five developing countries. The 
results are complex - while the TTR helps to explain substitution (or its 
absence) in some industries, in some countries the effects are not uniformly 
in the same direction. 
Their overall conclusion is rather pessimistic - arguing that 'corrective' 
policies (e.g. removal of factor price distortions, wider dissemination of 
information on available techniques, legislation on technology choice by 
multinational corporations) "will have at best a marginal effect as adjustment 
of technology is already widespread in developing countries, and as the 
drift of innovation is tending to raise minimum economic levels of scale 
and, hence, increase technological rigidity". (DH - 110) 
BIGGS, S., Institutions and Decision-Making in Agricultural Research, in 
Stewart, F., and James, J. (eds), The Economics of New Technologies in 
Developing Countries, Frances Pinter, London, 1982. 
Biggs attempts a systematic appraisal of research and development (R & D) 
systems in order to explore the scope within R & D for benefitting the rural 
poor. He contrasts an "ideal" R & D system, with appropriate two-way 
links between R & D institutions and local producers and international 
scientists, with the "normal" system which is beset by "imperfections", and 
where dominant influences on R & D often produce dysfunctional research. 
He compares and contrasts three schools of thought about the direction of 
technological change in developing countries: the induced innovation theory 
stressing factor prices; the structuralist view which sees technological change 
as the outcome of dominant class interests; and the institutional view (of 
which this study is an example) that it is determined by interest groups and 
arrangements in R & D institutions. 
This leads to the enumeration of a number of criteria for reducing 
imperfections in national R & D systems. These refer both to the research 
goals (e.g. "justifying research against national development goals") to 
research methodology "client group oriented research", "specific problem- 
solving research", "interdisciplinary analysis") to research procedures and 
rewards (of integrated field and experiment station programmes") and to 
monitoring and evaluation. (DH - 133) 
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COOPER, C., "Policy Interventions for Technological Innovation in Developing 
Countries", World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 441, IBRD, 1980. 
Cooper uses a wide definition of innovation; "the introduction of a process 
or product that is new to an economy of a developin country, regardless 
of whether it has been used before elsewhere". This p. 18:1 includes 
modifications or adaptations of processes or products that are new to the 
economy. With this in mind the paper assesses the "potential social payoff 
of alternative measures that might be taken to promote innovation in mainly 
non-agricultural sectors of a developing economy". 
Part 1 describes the process of innovation - search activities, adaptations of 
production techniques or development of new techniques etc. Part 2 notes 
some of the special problems that developing economies encounter in 
building up innovative skills - he argues for example that the availability of 
foreign technologies, apart from commonly cited problems, also inhibit the 
development of indigenous skills. 
Part 3 draws together some of the main policy implications both in terms of 
mediating imports and stimulating indigenous innovative activity. Part 4 
"analyses the pattern of innovative activity that might be needed in 
developing economies"; "with an emphasis on the potential importance of 
local machine-making in innovation in industries that mainly use mechanical 
technologies as opposed to chemical, electrical or electronic technologies". In 
conclusion he proposes a strategy of "selective control over technology 
imports accompanied by measures to encourage the growth of local 
innovative skills". (DH - 27) 
SAGASTI, F., National Science and Technology Policies for Development: A 
Comparative Analysis, in Ramesh, J., and Weiss, C. (eds), Mobilizing 
Technology for World Development, New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1979. 
This short paper reviews some of the issues involved in science and 
technology policy formulation in developing countries, based on a five-year 
association with the Science and Technology Policy Instruments (STPI) 
Project. Explicit and implicit science and technology (S & T) instruments 
are discussed and 6 general characteristics of S & T policies are summarized 
for seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Korea, Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela). The six characteristics refer to i) the role of the state in 
orientating the industrialization process; ii) reliance on positive or negative 
control mechanisms; iii) the mode of state intervention; iv) characteristics of 
the array of policy instruments; v) coherence of S & T policy and degree of 
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integration with industrial policies; and vi) recent trends and changes in 
government industrial or S & T policy. (DH - 34) 
KATZ, J., "The Creation of Technology in the Argentine Manufacturing Sector", 
IDB/ECLA Research Programme in Science and Technology, Working Paper No 
1, UNECLA Buenos Aires Office, July 1978. 
The main concern of this paper is domestic technological learning and its 
relationship to research and development (R & D) investment, technology 
imports and dynamic comparative advantage. This is carried out through a 
study of the Argentine manufacturing sector. 
The author argues that there is a complementary relation between importing 
technology from abroad and generating technology locally. He analyzes the 
forces causing the flow of internal technological efforts and differences 
between industries in domestic technological expenditure. 
The author argues that a significant proportion of the internal technological 
effort is concentrated in the engineering groups of local subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations. This raises important questions related to 
appropriateness of the results of technological learning in developing 
countries and to technological dependence. (DH - 57) 
LALL, S., Developing Countries as Exporters of Technology, Macmillan, 1982. 
This book reviews the experiences of India as a developing country exporter 
of technology. The principal conduit for these transfers examined is large 
corporations in the industrial sector. Lall provides "a tentative explanation 
for this by arguing that official protection of local "learning", while fostering 
varying efficiencies, has enabled local enterprises to accumulate substantial 
stocks of technical know-how". (DH - 90) 
HERRERA, A., 'The Generation of Technologies in Rural Areas", in World 
Development, Vol. 9, pp. 21-35, 1981. 
The author first criticizes the weakness of attempts to generate and diffuse 
appropriate technologies (AT) due in his mind to the lack of a coherent 
concept of development as a reference point and the assumptions or 
paradigms emanating from rich countries which underlay current attempts. 
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He then proposes an interactive research and development procedure with a 
premium on communication with rural dwellers and more emphasis on 
traditional technologies at least as contributors to new solutions to social 
problems or objectives. He also stresses the need to understand the 
dynamic socio-economic elements in which a technological problem is 
always immersed. (DH - 171) 
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4. RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION AS A MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
This section covers some of the most important literature on ways of managing research 
and the utilization process. The underlying hypothesis is that research organizations, be 
they private or commercial, or public and governmental, are organizations just the same, 
subject to human principles of leadership, motivation, reward and performance. A lot of 
the literature has focused in industrialised countries. Some pioneering effort has been 
achieved at MIT, in Cambridge, Mass, with the works of Ed Roberts and Tom Allan. Not 
very much has been written on the research process in developing countries, where 
conditions, as noted by PATI in the previous section, in reporting on the failures of the 
recommendations from the 1979 Vienna UN conference, are less than ideal. 
We will start by documents indicating that there is official concern about the performance 
of research efforts in developing countries. 
(For IDRC, the best document outlining this concern is PPR X, which notes the 
difficulties of finding "success" stories from past research efforts, and outlines six 
types of outputs one should expect from a research project: 
hard technologies (handpumps, dehullers) 
biological products (new seed varieties) 
health products (contraceptive vaccine) 
knowledge (relation between sanitation and health) 
policy advice (structuring macroeconomic policy) 
the introduction of new elements of public debate. 
PPR X advocated a number of initiatives that IDRC could undertake to increase the 
utilization of research results, including the idea of experimenting with new approaches in 
managing projects. 
Another organization that has expressed similar concern is SAREC, the Swedish Agency 
for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries: 
Kihlberg, Mats (ed.). 1987. SAREC's First Decade: Swedish Support for Research 
in Developing Countries - A Progress Report with Some Guidelines for the 
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Future. SAREC (Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing 
Countries), Stockholm. 62 p. 
(p. 2-13) The first Annual Report [of SAREC in 1975] discussed what should 
be included in the term national research capacity. The field of operations 
was described and specified and a fairly broad definition was arrived at. 
Research capacity involves: 
The ability to independently identify and define research tasks and 
their relationship to problems and development activities; 
The ability to select, plan and carry out important research, or to 
commission and direct such research which cannot successfully be 
undertaken with domestic technological, financial and human 
resources; 
The ability to assess, sift and adapt research results for domestic 
application; 
(p. 13) The ability to offer the countryes own research workers an 
environment which is sufficiently stimulating to counteract migration 
to technologically advanced countries; 
The ability to disseminate and apply research results; 
The ability, in terms of finance and staff, to utilize and participate in 
the opportunities offered by international research co-operation. 
It is important to devote attention to all these aspects in research co- 
operation. 
(p. 24-25) In reply to an external review of its own operations, 
commissioned by parliament in mid-1984, SAREC made the following points 
regarding international research programmes: 
"One of the major problems with international 
programmes has been to disseminate and apply the 
results research has produced. Hitherto few studies have 
been concerned with this. The "Impact Study of the 
CGIAR" is an attempt to investigate the impact of 
research results at a national level through a review of 
the international agricultural research institutes. It 
followed a Swedish initiative and SARK intends 
encouraging further studies of this kind. 
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One way in which SAREC can contribute to the 
dissemination of research results is to support direct 
contacts between international centres and national 
institutions in programme countries. Such contacts can 
also be utilized for the training of researchers. To some 
extent this is already occurring within the WHO and 
CGIAR programmes. To promote this type of co- 
operation, and directly utilize international and regional 
centres to support national research environments, are 
central to the African programmes now in preparation. 
(p. 25) Some of the evaluations which have been 
undertaken indicate that research within the international 
programmes is often of high scientific quality, but that it 
sometimes is so restricted to a single discipline that, in 
the short-term at least, it is difficult to find applications 
transferable to the developing countries. 
The conclusion is that there are important reasons for 
continuing to support international research programmes. 
Often highly qualified research produces results in fields 
of immediate concern to developing countries. But more 
should be done to promote the dissemination and 
application of these results at the national level." 
One of the pioneer researchers in the Technology Management area is 'T'omes Allen, 
now at the Sloane School at M7. 
Allen, Thomas J. "Managing the Flow of Technology: Technology Transfer and 
the Dissemination of Technological Information within the R&D Organization" 
M.I.T. Press, 1984, Cambridge, Mass. 
In this classic book, Allen reports on over ten years of research, observing with great care 
how research scientists communicate with themselves and with the outside world. He used 
twin pairing of development research projects to measure sources of information, and their 
effect on the evolution of technical innovations. It also provides a good analysis of the 
difference between the scientist and the engineer. In it he also has his famous chapter on 
the "gatekeeper" within a laboratory context, always on the lookout for relevant 
" information for his colleagues. He also evolves techniques for mapping of "information 
networks, and how to manage them constructively. 
While Allen concentrates primarily on communication within the scientific establishment, 
and how that affect efficiency, Ed Roberts, also at the Sloane School, examines the process 
of innovation as a strategic weapon in the hands of a company. His analysis is very 
much from the perspective of a corporate captain, who has to master the research and 
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technological innovation process to gain a technical advantage over his competitor. 
Because of the importance of this notion, detailed excerpts from one of his most recent 
review books are presented here. The book "Generating Technological Innovations" 
contains several major papers published over the history of MIT Management of 
Technology program. The excerpts are from the introductory chapter, authored by Roberts: 
Roberts, Edward B. 1987. Generating Technological Innovation. Oxford 
University Press, New York, NY, USA. 299 p. 
INTRODUCTION: (p. 3-5) 
Managing Technological Innovation - A Search for Generalizations 
Edward B. Roberts 
The management of technological innovation is the organization and 
direction of human and capital resources toward effectively (1) creating new 
knowledge; (2) generating technical ideas aimed at new and enhanced 
products, manufacturing processes, and services; (3) developing those ideas 
into working prototypes; and (4) transferring them into manufacturing, 
distribution, and use. Technologically innovative outcomes take many 
forms: incremental or radical in degree; modifications of existing entities or 
entirely new entities; embodied in products, processes, or services; oriented 
toward consumer, industrial, or governmental use; based on various single 
or multiple technologies. Despite obvious variations in managerial issues, 
across these differences in intended outcomes and settings, a number of 
consistent generalizations emerge from over twenty years of systematic 
managerial research. This introduction seeks to identify those 
generalizations (shown below in italics), and this book aims at providing 
more depth, detail, and illustration of them. 
The first generalization is innovation = invention + exploitation. The 
invention process covers all efforts aimed at creating new ideas and getting 
them to work. The exploitation process includes all stages of commercial 
development, application, and transfer, including the focusing of ideas or 
inventions toward specific objectives, evaluating those objectives, 
downstream transfer of research and/or development results, and the 
eventual broad-based utilization, dissemination, and diffusion of the 
technology-based outcomes. 
Invention is marked by discovery or a state of new existence, usually at the 
lab or bench. Innovation is marked by first use, in manufacturing or in a 
market. This distinction is critical, because for too many years related 
research writings and even managerial practice have focused only on 
managing "creativity," with relatively too much attention devoted to the 
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lives of great inventors [p. 4:1 or famous scientists and their radical 
breakthroughs. Yet most organized scientific and engineering activity, 
certainly within the corporation, is beyond this idea-generating stage and 
produces not radical breakthroughs, but rather a broad base of incremental 
technological advance, sometimes leading cumulatively over time to major 
technical change. 
The next two generalizations about technological innovation [relate to the ] 
process of how technological innovation occurs. First, technolwcal 
innovation is a multistage process, with significant variations in the primary 
task as well as in the managerial issues and effective management practice 
occurring among these stages. [There are] six stages, but the precise 
number and their division are somewhat arbitrary. (...) What is key is that 
each phase of activity is dominated by the search for answers to different 
managerial questions. 
At the outset, for example, emphasis is on finding a motivating idea, a 
notion of possible direction for technical endeavour. Coming up with one 
or more technical and/or market goals that stimulate initiating a research, 
development, and/or engineering (RD&E) project is the task undertaken 
during stage 1. The relevant managerial question for this stage is, How do 
more and better targets get generated? Which people, which structures, 
which strategies can be employed toward more effective idea generation for 
these objectives? Good managerial practice at this stage frequently involves 
loose control, "letting many flowers bloom," fostering conflict or at least 
contentiousness, stimulating variety of inputs. At a later stage, the stage 5 
commercial development as an alternative example, the task involves in- 
depth specification and manufacturing engineering of ideas that have by 
now already been reduced to an acceptable working prototype. The 
managerial issues in this stage involve coordinating a number of engineers 
of different disciplinary backgrounds toward achieving, within previously 
estimated development budget and schedule, a predefined technical output 
ready for manufacture in large volume, reliably, and at competitive 
production costs. Effective managerial practice in this stage might well 
involve tight control, strong financial criteria for resource use, single-minded 
adherence to plan, especially in regard to those resources - in many ways 
the opposite of what is encountered in stage 1. 
The next generalization [embodied in the schematic presentation] is that 
innovation occurs through technical efforts carried out within an internal 
organizational context but involving heavy interaction with the external 
technological as well as market environment. Proactive search for technical 
and market inputs, as well as receptivity to information sensed from 
external sources, are critical aspects of technology-based innovation. All 
studies of effective innovations have shown [p. 5:] significant contributions 
of external technology and awareness of customer needs and competitor 
activity. 
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SUMMARY OF SIX POINT FLOW DIAGRAM: 
1. Recognition of opportunity 
2. Idea formulation 
3. Problem solving 
4. Prototype solution 
5. Commercial development 
6. Technology utilization and/or diffusion 
The details of Figure 1.1 [NOT INCLUDED HERE] specify a set of key flows 
and decision points that occur during the process of innovating. A number 
of major managerial elements that are embodied in those details will be 
treated in the discussion that follows. Two aspects of the diagram, 
however, are potentially misleading and deserve immediate mention. First, 
for ease of presentation, all stages are shown at equidistant intervals, 
inappropriately suggesting perhaps the similarity of these phases from a 
time duration and/or resource consumption perspective. This is by no 
means true. In particular, stage 5, commercial development, usually takes 
as long as the several earlier stages combined and requires more resources 
than most of the other stages together. Second, for simplicity sake no 
feedbacks are pictured in Figure I.1 from later stages back to earlier ones. 
Yet, inevitably, these feedbacks exist and cause reiteration to occur among 
the stages. For example, involvement in the problem-solving process, stage 
3, generates new insights as to alternative idea formulations, stage 2; and 
efforts at transfer into manufacturing as part of technology utilization, stage 
6, often create new requirements for problem-solving, stage 3. Thus the real 
process of technological innovation involves flows back and forth over time 
among differing primary activities, internal and external to the dominant 
innovating organization, with major variations in tasks, managerial issues, 
and managerial answers. 
Three dimensions provide a framework for synopsis of factors affecting. 
successful innovation: staffing, structure, and strategy. (...) For each 
dimensions a number of managerial generalizations can be identified, 
supported by the research literature and the selected articles contained in 
this volume. 
STAFFING 
Two primary questions arise in regard to staffing the technological 
organization: What kinds of people need to be involved for effective 
technical development? And what managerial actions can be taken to 
maximize their overall productivity? In regard to people requirements, as 
explained by Roberts and Fusfeld (1981) in Chapter 1, a number of "critical 
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behavioral roles," not just technical skills must be practised by the people 
involved in a technical development. Roberts and Fusfeld identify five key 
roles for achieving successful innovation, although others have since added 
to this list (e.g., Maidique in Chapter 2 argues for six key roles). 
STRUCTURE (p. 10-11) 
The design of organization structures that will enhance technological 
innovation requires focusing on both the organization's inputs and its 
outputs. Effective RD&E organizations need appropriate technical and 
market information inputs, and their outputs need to be integrated toward 
mission objectives and transferred downstream toward their ultimate users. 
MARKET INPUTS 
Managerial research has repeatedly demonstrated that 60 to 80 percent of 
successful technical innovations seem to have been initiated by activities 
responsive to "market pull," i.e., forces reflecting orientation to perceived 
need or demand. The studies less frequently indicate how technical 
organizations uncover these needs. As mentioned in Chapter 1, market 
"gatekeepers" frequenter aid the technical organization to understand better 
its customers' requirements, priorities, and preferences. Organizing to gain 
meaningful market inputs for research and engineering use may depend 
upon explicit assignments of such responsibilities to cooperating marketing 
staff or to RD&E people themselves. The product development cycle should 
be organized , as suggested in Figure 1.1, to bring market inputs into design 
repeatedly during the early product specification stage and again during 
prototyping through active involvement of selected customers. Depending 
on the company and industry, the manufacturing organization of the 
developing company is anywhere from one- to two-thirds of those eventual 
"customers." Manufacturing will (or won't!) "buy" the developed 
improvement in materials, components, manufacturing equipment, or overall 
[p. 11] production process for its own internal "consumption." That 
prospective "customer" needs at least the same degree of involvement with 
the design and development process as does an outside firm or individual. 
Rather than seeking collaboration to provide market information to the 
RD&E process, many companies have substituted marketing-oriented control 
of RD&E. Organizational subordination of research and engineering to 
"product managers" (inevitably marketing or sales people) or tight budgetary 
control of RD&E by these units may force market-based criteria to dominate 
technical project selection. But this is usually accompanied by short-term 
quick-fix orientation, erosion of technical capability, and gradual destruction 
of product/process competitiveness. Analyses by Souder (1978) have 
demonstrated that strong and positive relations between R&D and marketing 
organizations significantly improve the track record on new product 
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introductions. In my view this is best achieved by welding partnerships 
among equals, rather than by compliance from subordinates. 
Market-research techniques have long been used to help define consumer 
preferences in new product designs (Urban and Hauser, 1980). These 
methods have been less helpful for developing industrial goods. Recently 
von Hippel (1986) has demonstrated that Rotential industrial customers 
whose needs 121ace them along the leading edge of technological demands 
can be used to specify detailed desired performance characteristics and 
features for as yet nonexisting_products. Urban has suggested that the R&D 
organization itself should include the staff capabilities t apply these new 
methodologies (1986). 
OUTPUT TRANSFERS (P. 14-16) 
But in addition to generating outputs, the technical organization needs to be 
designed to enhance output transfer downstream toward eventual customers 
and users. Downstream is where innovation takes place and where benefits 
are realized! Studies of major research laboratories, among other RD&E 
organizations, have indicated high degree of dissatisfaction with the extend 
and effectiveness of transfer of results to potential recipient groups. Three 
different clusters of bridging approaches were found helpful in increasinz 
transfer - procedural, human, and organizational. Most organizations used a 
variety of these approaches, often several simultaneously. Roberts' findings 
have been supported by recent comparative case studies of IBM (Cohen et 
al., 1979) and Union Carbide (Smith et al., 1984), among others. 
Procedural methods include joint planning of RD&E programs by 
performing and expected receiving organizations (often resisted by R&D as 
an "invasion" of its turf); joint staffing of projects, especially pre- and 
posttransfer [p. 15:1 downstream; and joint project appraisal after project 
completion, done cautiously if at all after failures in order to avoid 
destructive fingerpointing. 
Human bridges are the most effective transfer mechanisms, especially the 
upstream and downstream transfers of people. Movement of people 
upstream (1) brings with them information on the context of intended 
project use; (2) establishes direct person-to-person contacts that will be 
helpful in later posttransfer troubleshooting; and (3) creates the image that 
the project eventually being transferred has involved prior ownership and 
priority inputs from the receiving unit. Later movement of people 
downstream: (1) carries expertise for posttransfer problem solving; and (2) 
not unimportant, conveys the risk-reducing impression that the receiving 
unit will not be stuck with solving posttransfer problems by itself. Other 
human bridges that are widely used include rotation programs, market 
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gatekeepers, joint problem-solving sessions, and other formal and informal 
meetings. 
Organizational techniques for enhancing transfer are complicated to design 
and implement and consequently are left as last in this discussion of 
alternatives. "Integrators," sometimes called "transfer managers," or 
integrating departments are frequently appointed to tie together the sending 
and receiving organizations. This person or unit is given the responsibility 
for moving the project from the sender into operating condition in the 
receiver organization, either lacking authority in one or the other 
organization or being matrixed between both. 
More ambitious organizational approaches include dedicated transfer teams, 
established solely for the period during which technical results are being 
transferred to their "customers," done especially for moving purchased 
process technology. The "design and demonstration organization" described 
by Frontini and Richardson (1984) is another type of temporary organization, 
set up to show project feasibility at a scale beyond pilot plant level, to help 
reduce resistance to later full-scale implementation. In Chapter 6 Quinn 
(1979) discusses the organizational issues facing the major corporation 
seeking to create new businesses and suggests parallels between the 
individual entrepreneur's approaches and the means by which a large 
corporation can achieve growth and change. Quinn's article anticipates the 
multifaceted discussion of corporate entrepreneurship in Part III of this 
book. 
STRATEGY 
Strategic management of technology includes both strategic planning and 
strategic implementation aspects at either of two levels: (1) over-all, for the 
entire technology-dependent firm, government agency, division or product 
line; or [p. 16:1 (2) more focused, for just the technology 
development/ acquisition process/department/laboratory of the entire 
organization. As recently as ten years ago, neither of these levels of 
strategy was the subject of much serious scholarship, or even of 
management-consulting practice. Few researchers carefully studied the 
overall management of the technology-intensive company. And fewer still 
addressed the questions of how to incorporate technological considerations 
into overall business strategy. 
Strategic planning focuses upon the formulation of an organization's goals 
and objectives, and upon developing the policies needed to achieve those 
objectives, including identification of the organization's primary resources 
and priorities. But developing corporate strategy with such a global 
perspective, including technological dimensions, is quite new. Indeed, the 
evolution of corporate strategic planning as a field of practice is divisible 
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into three decades: the 1960s, during which multiyear budget projections 
became the earliest forms of financial planning, sometimes labelled "long- 
range planning"; the 1970s, when market growth/share matrices and market 
attractiveness considerations added a new dimension to strategic analysis; 
and the 1980s during which technology as a strategic factor became so 
widely acknowledged as to cause firms and even countries to realize that 
financial, marketing, and technological considerations needed to be 
integrated in overall strategy development (Roberts, 1983). 
(p. 17-18) Each stage of a technology is associated with different strategic 
implications. [p. 18J The earliest stage in a technology's life cycle tends to 
feature frequent major product innovations, heavily contributed by small 
entrepreneurial organizations, often closely tied to lead user needs. The 
intermediate stage of a technology may include major process innovation, 
with continuing, product variation, with increasing numbers of competitors, 
both large and small. The late stage of a technology features less frequent 
minor product and process innovations, contributed primarily by large 
corporations, motivated mostly by cost-reduction and quality!-improvement 
operational objectives (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). These key 
dimensions of a technology should strongly influence choices made by a 
firm or government agency in developing its technological strategy. 
These excerpts should give the reader a sense of the power of some of the concepts 
underlying management of technology and innovation. Another area of research, again 
spurred largely from North American business research is the new products literature, a 
subset of the marketing discipline, of which one of the better known authors is a Canadian, 
Bob Cooper. Here are some highlights from his recent book, "Winning with New 
Products". New Product introduction is the lifeblood of market-oriented companies. It is 
also a very risky game. Cooper outlines in a businessman's language actions which can be 
taken to reduce the risk of failure in introducing a new product on the market. 
Cooper, Robert G. 1987. Winning at New Products. Gage Educational 
Publishing Company, Toronto, Ontario. 273 p. 
THE NEW-PRODUCT GAME PLAN (p. 35-37) 
1. New-product development and commercialization is a high-risk but vital 
endeavour of the modern corporation. 
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Of every seven new product ideas, only one becomes a commercial 
success. 
Of every four new products that are fully developed, only one 
becomes a commercial success. 
One out of every three new products actually launched into the 
marketplace fails commercially. 
Almost half the resources that U.S. industry devotes to the 
development and commercialization of new products is spent on 
products that fail or are cancelled. 
2. There are no easy answers to what makes a new product a success. 
3. Companies that follow a new-product game plan do better. 
4. New-product success is amenable to management action. (p.37) 
5. A strong market orientation is needed in new-product development. (p. 
38) 
6. The nature of the product is central to its success. (p. 39) 
7. More homework must be done before product design and development 
are undertaken. 
8. Better, more consistent, and more systematic product evaluation is 
required. (p. 40) 
9. A well-conceived, properly executed launch is vital to success. (p. 41) 
10. Organizational structures that provide for multi-functional inputs and 
internal communication and coordination foster successful new products. (p. 
42) 
A SEVEN-STAGE GAME PLAN (p. 48) 
Idea; preliminary assessment; concept, development, testing, trial, launch. 
THE FINAL PLAY: INTO THE MARKET (p. 183) 
The Marketing Plan 
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The marketplace is the battleground on which the new product's fortunes 
will be decided. Thus, the plan that guides the product's entry to the 
market is a pivotal facet of the new-product strategy. In this chapter, we'll 
look at the factors involved in developing a marketing plan for your new 
product. 
First, what is a marketing plan? It's simply a plan of action for new- 
product introduction or launch. It specifies three things: 
the marketing objectives; 
the marketing strategies; and 
the marketing programs. 
The Market Analysis (p. 189) 
The market analysis lowers the microscope on the market for the new 
product. A good market analysis covers the important topics: 
Market overview. What are the quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of market size, growth, and trends? 
Market segments. What market segments are aimed at? How is each 
segment unique? What are the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
their size, growth, and trends? 
Buyer behavior (in the segments in question). The who, what, when, 
where, why, and how of the purchase process are set out. Who 
buys? Who are the purchase influencers? What do the buyers buy, 
and when, and where? Why do they buy what they buy? What are 
their choice criteria and what are their preferences, wants, and needs? 
Competition. Who are the competitors? In which segments? What 
are their strengths and weaknesses? How good are their products? 
How does the customer rate their products? What are the compe- 
titors' strategies in pricing, advertising, and distribution? How well 
are they doing in market share and profitability? Why? 
There are two points to remember: First, much of this market information 
will not be readily known at the outset of the new-product project. By the 
time the project is entering the product-development stage, however, market 
studies should have been undertaken and a thorough market analysis, with 
action implications, should have been completed. 
The second point is that a good market analysis goes a long way toward 
charting a winning market strategy. If the market analysis lacks insight and 
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information, the marketing plan probably will be vague and not very hard- 
hitting. A sound market analysis is the foundation upon which a winning 
launch plan is built. Don't skimp at this stage. 
The Macroenvironmental Analysis (p. 190) 
A macroenvironmental analysis looks beyond the immediate marketplace for 
the new product. Trends and factors that He outside the firm and the 
product's market that may impact on the market and product are analyzed: 
the economic situation; 
the political, legislative, and legal situation; 
demographic trends; 
social trends; and 
technological developments. 
The next work offer a first-hand analysis of how some major research organizations have 
gone about to ensure maximun utilization of research results. The three authors, Lane, 
Beddows, and Lawrence, develop an interesting set of models for managing laboratories. 
To prove their case, they compare two different very large American institutions, the 
National Health Institute, and AT&T's Bell Laboratories. In the process, they develop 
useful models for analyzing research structures: 
Lane, H.W., Beddows, R.G., Lawrence, P.R. 1981. Managing Large Research and 
Development Programs. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, USA. 
166 p. 
The two contrasting attitudes on how best to manage research can be 
summarized as follows: (p. 7) 
FOCUS: Society's Problems vs. Science's Problems 
ORIENTATION: Maximize Output (Applied Research) vs. Maximize 
Knowledge (Basic Research) 
TIME HORIZON: Short Term vs. Long Term 
LOCUS OF CONTROL: Managers/Administrators Evaluate (External) vs. 
Scientists Evaluate (Internal) 
DEGREE OF CONTROL: Tight Control vs. Autonomy 
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The Two Organizations (p. 8-9) 
We studied programs in two very large, complex, highly visible and unique 
institutions. NIH, with a budget of approximately $2 billion, is perhaps the 
wold's focal point for biomedical research support. Its organization is as 
complex as its scientific mission. It is a non-profit organization that can be 
characterized as polycentric and relatively open to political pressure. Each 
Institute is essentially a centre of power revolving around a central 
administrative and policy core. The programs we studied were contained 
within these semi-autonomous institutes. AT&T, on the other hand, is 
profit-oriented and is a much more highly integrated organization displaying 
more central coordination and control than NIH. Bell Laboratories, the (p. 
9:1 primary locus of research and development activity in the Bell System, 
is, in its own right, unique in size and accomplishments. Its budget exceeds 
$600 million and it employs more than 16,000 people including some Nobel 
Laureates. 
Another difference that was dramatic, but not extremely important for our 
purposes, was the number of personnel directly employed. All the NIH 
programs had very small staffs compared to AT&T programs, for the simple 
reason that the NIH program staff only provided senior management or top 
level guidance to the program; almost all of the technical work and its 
direct supervision was "bought" elsewhere by grants and contracts. In 
contrast, the AT&T efforts were all "in house." 
We compared two very different sites and found some very similar 
processes across the gap of "incomparability." The focus was the 
management process and our findings, we believe, can increase under- 
standing of the management of large research development programs, 
particularly in the balancing of technical and political considerations. In 
most instances, these processes took place at a program level with NIH; and 
while many of these issues also were addressed at the program level at&T, 
some were addressed at the corporate level. 
The Bell Laboratories Organization (p. 100) 
Bell Labs is a mission-oriented research organization structured (...). 
Areas 10 and 20 are the science and technology generators of the Bell 
System. The research area (Area 10), oriented primarily toward discovery, is 
organized by scientific disciplines: physical research, materials research, 
chemical research, mathematics, behavioral sciences, communication sciences, 
and operations research. Electronics technology (Area 20) does fundamental 
and applied research on the usefulness of new technological concepts, as 
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well as in the field of manufacturing design. Areas 30, 40, and 50 were the. 
organizational homes of the two exploratory development and two 
development programs we studied. Bell Labs is a complex organization that 
must manage and integrate a wide range of disciplines, orientations, and 
geographical locations. 
Managing Knowledge Transfer (p. 102-104) 
In addition to managing activities within each of the organization's areas, 
Bell's executives had to manage the transfer of knowledge through the 
stages of the technical logic. These stages, discussed in Chapter 3, are 
shown again in Figure 18. 
Figure 18:The Technical Logic of R&D 
Discovery (1,2,3) 
Exploratory Development (4) 




Our research suggests that a continuum of uncertainties faces R&D 
organizations, (...). 
Mansfield et al (1971) stated that R&D "is an activity which is aimed at 
reducing uncertainty ... aimed at learning. Each subsequent stage of the 
technical logic deals with a different mix of uncertainties - generally a 
decreasing degree of scientific, engineering, and production uncertainty and 
an increasing degree of market and political uncertainty. 
There are implications for management. First, programs should be 
organized to reduce the appropriate uncertainty. This means defining the 
research focus to represent a realistic assessment of the existing state of 
knowledge. As one individual at Bell Labs pointed out, it does not make 
sense to develop production specifications for something you don't 
understand. Mounting an engineering effort to solve an uncertain scientific 
problem is ineffective and inefficient, as was seen in the artificial heart case. 
A realistic assessment of the research problem also should provide an 
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indication of the time and resources required to resolve the relevant 
uncertainties before the program can proceed to the next stage. 
Second, the organization has to be differentiated to handle the various areas 
of uncertainty with which it must deal, and be able to shift [p. 103:1 
responsibility to the sub-unit best equipped for the task. The organizational 
structure at AT&T reflects the different orientations, or technical sub-logics, 
which must be part of the R&D process. As the organization reduces the 
scientific and technical uncertainties, it increasingly turns to the relevant 
social and political uncertainties. In the Bell System, following resolution of 
any remaining technological problems in the exploratory development phase, 
overall responsibility for the program often shifts to Western Electric or to 
some marketing group, for example. It marks a crossover point where the 
Bell System organizationally recognizes the shift in task focus. Such 
crossover points recognize the growing dominance of a new sub-logic, better 
suited to removing the remaining uncertainty. 
Our study also suggests a change in dominant orientation from a scientific 
to an engineering focus as one moves from discovery to exploratory 
development and into engineering design; and a shift toward the other pole, 
implementation, beginning around the development of production processes 
stage. Organizationally, the development stage appears to reflect a type of 
cross-over point (...), which we will describe in more detail shortly. 
A strong desire for appropriate management of both research activities and 
system development programs, along with a concern for the transfer and 
use of knowledge, was apparent throughout the Bell Labs. An interest in 
application [p. 104:1 in Area 10 seemed to dispel any notion that successful, 
renowned research scientists ignore application. There also was a positive 
orientation toward implementation in exploratory development and 
development programs. In fact, strikingly consistent in the interviews with 
various people deployed along the technical-logic continuum was their 
understanding of their respective orientation and role in the organization, as 
well as the orientations and roles of groups at other positions on the 
continuum. The descriptions that follow illustrate Bell's approach to 
organizing for technical tasks and to managing the continuum. 
Linking Tasks and Organization (p. 119-120) 
Bell Labs has been quite successful in generating knowledge and producing 
technology. Without claiming to be the only reason for this success, we 
believe the organizational arrangements of the type described in this chapter 
make a significant contribution to that success. Not only were specialists [p. 
120:1 groups in place to resolve problems specifically related to the stages of 
the technical logic, but the importance of linking these groups to ensure the 
transfer of relevant information and skills was emphasized. It was clear to 
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us from interviews with Bell's executives that organization, as well as 
technical specialties, mattered to them. Knowledge and organization were 
necessary components in developing and producing communication systems. 
The link between Bell's task and its organization is reinforced by the 
concept of the Bell System as one system with physical and organizational 
components. 
The physical component is the telephone network itself and programs had 
to be justified in terms of the total operating communication system. All 
parties - researchers, developers, and managers - were fully attuned to this 
governing image of a single system. Bill Warters, the man who probably 
had the largest and biggest stake in pressing on with the millimeter 
waveguide development, said it all in commenting that the most recent 
delay was "personally disappointing but not disappointing from a Bell 
System standpoint. If it's not economical, it is not right". 
The "one-system" concept emphasized technical and market feasibility of 
each project before funding full-scale development. There also was 
emphasis on acquiring and using intimate knowledge of all segments of the 
environment bounding the system under development. The end result 
would be a product designed to fit into and enhance the existing network. 
New technology created waves lapping Western Electric, often creating 
difficult times and tension. The more successful Bell Labs was in creating 
technology, the fewer people were required by Western Electric which relied 
on Bell Labs for its product specifications. As Western Electric added a 
person to build electronic devices to increase telephone line capacity, it 
might lay-off three building cables. Both the development of tightly 
integrated circuit-board components, requiring mounting of fewer elements, 
and the convergence of telephone technology with computer technology, 
bringing competition by many qualified component suppliers, could 
significantly affect Western Electric's direct labor requirements. 
Organizations must adapt to these changes. As one Bell Labs executive 
puts it: 
Our organizational arrangements are dictated by the things we 
do and are dependent on the technology involved. You have 
to build your arrangements around the physical phenomena. 
The organization has to mirror this. 
The one-system concept provided managers throughout Bell with a powerful 
image that forced them to recognize such interdependencies and to 
understand actions aimed at balancing the organizational system. The 
manifestation of this type of thinking was seen in the array of structures, 
systems, and interpersonal processes used to face-off organizational units to 
a particular stage of knowledge development and, simultaneously, to tie 
them together. 
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(p. 121) A strength of the Bell system is the degree to which it distinguishes 
differing task situations and matches its administrative processes to fit them. 
The mirror metaphor and the one-system image were in active use in the 
Bell system. Both seemed to function as heuristic aids for fitting the 
organization to its task and environment and as criteria for managerial 
action. 
What can the Bell experience teach other R&D organizations like NIH? The 
Bell System is more highly differentiated and integrated than NIH. It 
simply has more organizational units focused on the various stages of the 
innovation process and on linking them together than does NIH. It is 
organized specifically to move knowledge and equipment through this 
pipeline. NIH is primarily a research institution that is not organized for 
development and implementation processes, although we have been that it 
becomes involved in these areas, often with less than positive results. If the 
political system wants NIH to get fully into the development business, it 
will have to give thought to ways of organizing to achieve this purpose. 
And it will have to be more realistic in its expectations. We have seen that 
the process of moving knowledge from discovery to implementation is 
complex and time-consuming even when you are organized to do it. The 
Bell experience illustrates the important relationship between technology 
generation and organization. The successful R&D organization will be 
conscious of the different orientations necessarily embodied in it and will 
organize to reduce internal barriers to promote transitions in technical 
stages. 
As a final comment, it should be noted that management in developing countries adds 
some distinct complications. Some have already been alluded to in PATI's review of the 
impediments to the Vienna Program of Action. Another short article by Dahl reviews 
some of the differences in relating to third world people. 
Dahl, O. Development as cross cultural communication Uppsala? 
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984 10 p. paper presented at the 
conference Religion, Development and African Identity Uppsala 16-21 Aug. 
1984 
In this paper, Dahl provides insightful analysis of cultural filters of a westerner 
and an african, how each one perceives the values of the other. 
(*** Also refer to Henri Bougoiun's book, " lL'Afrique Malade de Management", in 
which he compares African styles of management in companies, with those in 
America, Japan and the Scandinavian countries.) 
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(Also refer to James Austin forthcoming book, "Strategic Management in 
developing countries", where he develops a framework to encompass cultural, 
environmental, political and religious factors, over and above the normal 
management functions found in a typical company. The book, to be published 
this spring, looks at the problem in a very pragmatic way, from a user's point of 
view. The user, in this case, would be a North-American businessman wishing to 
invest in a third world country.) 
Finally , here is a good overview of what managing research in India entails. The 
aricle is part of of a book edited by Wad, and in Wad's words, contains some 
sobering facts: 
(p. 8) Falguni Sen's contribution focuses on the problems of managing R&D 
in India, a country with a sizable scientific and technological base within the 
third world. It raises a fundamental issue; even in a situation where there 
are adequate resources and structures made available for R&D, why is it 
that the output of useful technological knowledge in developing countries is 
still so low? Sen points to bureaucratic obstacles, inadequate management 
resources and skills, personality issues and inadequate recognition to 
scientists for their work as some of the problems. He suggests a more 
efficient system for the management of scientific and engineering personnel, 
more flexibility for researchers and more encouragement of creativity as 
possible measures to overcome some of the present problems. 
Falguni Sen, THE DILEMMA OF MANAGING R&D IN INDIA, in Wad, A. 
(ed.). 1988. Science, Technology and Development. Westview Press, Inc., 
Boulder, CO, USA. 315 p. 
Introduction (p. 279-281) 
Management of research and development (R&D) has emerged as a separate 
field of academic inquiry in the past decade. This is, in part, due to a 
recognition of some of the peculiar nuances within R&D as an activity, 
which add complexities to its management. Some of these nuances arise out 
of the high levels of capital investment required for modern R&D, coupled 
with extremely high levels of uncertainty. This uncertainty lies with the 
probability of success, both technical and commercial, of the outputs of R&D 
and with the understanding of the process of doing R&D itself. The 
management of R&D is further complicated by the fact that its success is 
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contingent upon the effectiveness of a large number of other sub-units 
which have to implement the results of R&D. Typically, R&D units have 
little or no control over these sub-units. R&D's success may depend on its 
ability to effect change without having any authority to do so. Thus, the 
management of uncertainty and the management of "interfaces" between 
R&D and other sub-units are two of the most important aspects of R&D 
management. The third area of management, vital to R&D, is the 
management of creativity. The success of a scientific research establishment 
is directly related to the number of useful ideas that are generated by its 
people. A successful R&D organization is one that can strike the right 
balance between "flexibility" to enhance creativity and "control" to make the 
creative ideas compatible with the goals of the organization. In trying to 
carefully manage these three issues of uncertainty, interfaces and creativity, 
an R&D manager can either become overly cautious, resulting in a sub- 
optimal allocation of resources which does not allow a critical mass to [p 
280:1 evolve within R&D and results in little or no output, or become highly 
risk-taking and lead to expectations from R&D which it may not be able to 
fulfill. 
Managing R&D in a Developing Country 
The nuances of managing R&D discussed above exist irrespective of the 
organization or country within which the R&D activity is being performed. 
The major differences may lie in the degree of the problems and the 
possibilities for solutions. In a developing country, however, a number of 
additional nuances may exacerbate these issues. Capital availability is scarce 
and may give rise to greater pressures to demonstrate results from 
investments in R&D. On the other hand, investment in R&D may be viewed 
as a way to maintain an elite group of scientists and, therefore, as an 
expense item requiring little demonstration of results. Scientific 
establishments may be viewed with "national pride" requiring no further 
justification for their existence. The situation can get really complicated 
when all three views are simultaneously in existence. 
The degree of uncertainty underlying the likelihood of commercial success 
of R&D's results in a developing country is likely to be more, due primarily 
to the greater uncertainty regarding the availability of capital for 
implementation of R&D's results. The degree of technical uncertainty may 
be higher or lower depending on the peculiarities of the project in question. 
A lot of the R&D being done in a developing country is not at the state of 
the art but is a duplication with the purpose of indigenization of already 
existing know-how; thus one would assume that the degree of technical 
uncertainty would be lower. However, such a duplication is often done 
either to by-pass existing patents and, therefore, come up with essentially a 
new process or to use locally available materials to achieve the same 
efficiencies, or even to scale-down the process. It turns out that the degree 
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of technical uncertainty in many cases, can be as great as developing the 
process from scratch. 
There is a tendency for organizations in developing countries to be more 
centralized. Where top management commitments to an R&D project exists, 
this centralization can be helpful in gaining compliance of the sub-units to 
implement results and provide general cooperation. Complex techniques of 
managing "interfaces" may not be needed. On the other hand, where top 
management commitment does not exist, even the most sophisticated 
"interface management" [p. 281:1 techniques may not help in the 
implementation process. In such situations the most effective managerial 
strategy may be for the R&D unit to try to gain power within the 
organization. 
Managing creativity has always been a complex issue. Availability of slack 
resources is one of the characteristics usually attributed to creative 
organizations. This slack, it is claimed, allows for flexibility in the 
organization and the introduction of a culture where "errors" are not 
penalized. Flexibility and tolerance of errors are intrinsic to creativity 
management. Efficient management of creativity then succeeds in channelling 
these creative outputs into organizational goals, thereby reducing the 
wastage of resources. This channelling of the outputs without losing the 
flexibility necessary for creativity, it is claimed, is best achieved when 
individual scientists "self-manage" their own work in such a way that they 
are intrinsically working for the goals of the organization without the feeling 
of being controlled. This is usually possible in organizations where the 
scientists have a high degree of commitment. This commitment, in turn, is 
affected by a sense of commitment. This commitment, in turn, is affected by 
a sense of job satisfaction, a feeling of security and a sense of pride in the 
organization. Job satisfaction and a sense of pride in the organization can be 
very low in many R&D organizations in developing countries. While 
bureaucratic personnel policies can virtually guarantee job security, the high 
degree of centralization in the organization can make the top management's 
perceptions so crucial to a scientist's survival and growth that the 
guaranteed job security usually takes second place. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of these issues of managing 
R&D in a developing country. It is proposed to do this by looking at the 
issues and attempted solutions in the management of R&D in India. 
(p. 284) R&D management theories, which have evolved in the developed 
world, are usually based on two assumptions of effectiveness. These are the 
assumption that new product development for competitive market-share 
reasons is a necessity and the assumption that cost-reductions to aim at 
becoming the lowest-cost producer in the industry are another way of 
providing competitive advantage. Government R&D provides a "nation" with 
the same competitive edge. The different expectations from R&D in a 
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developing country like India, discussed above, lead to different definitions 
of effectiveness. There is a lack of competitiveness-based expectation from 
most R&D organizations in India. Even cost reduction, except through 
material substitution, does not seem to be a focus. Thus, the management 
problems for the different R&D organizations in India are different. 
Issues in R&D Management in India (p. 284285) 
The following issues are usually discussed as being central to the 
management of R&D in India: 
1. The appropriateness of a bureaucracy in managing an activity like R&D 
is usually questioned. Most governmental R&D units in India are managed 
by bureaucratic structures which are intimately connected to the national 
bureaucracy. The uncertainties inherent in the R&D process make a 
bureaucracy very slow in responding to the needs of research or of the 
researcher. At times, the rigid rules of a bureaucracy simply cannot 
accommodate the specific needs of research since the rules were designed 
for non-research organizations. Further, the uncertainties in research make it 
impossible to write down a new set of rules. (This becomes especially 
apparent during requisitioning specialty materials or equipment where the 
rules governing tenders and bids introduce inordinate delays and often 
result in suboptimal quality material.) 
The bureaucratic style of managing also does not provide the necessary 
flexibility to reward or motivate the scientist into better and more relevant 
research. In a bureaucratic system responsibility for actions lies with the (p. 
285:1 system rather than the individual manager. In a developing country, 
where resources are scarce and all actions of top management can be under 
intense scrutiny, the bureaucratic system can provide a protection against 
allegations of corruption, neoptism, etc. And yet, bureaucratic managers 
cannot provide that leadership, strategic direction, sense of commitment to 
the organization -- all of which are vital to the management of activities 
with high levels of uncertainty. 
(p. 291) The managerial controls and the strict guidelines have played their 
part. As discussed above, all the techniques which have been implemented 
have resolved some problems but created new ones. Managing science and 
technology for development in India has really been a dilemma. No answers 
exist on exactly how science should be managed for development. Maybe 
the time has come when the only management should be "self-management"; 
where scientists would internalize the organizational criteria and make them 
their own; where pride in working for their organizations would be 
sufficient to make this internalization possible; where scientists will initiate 
change through an adoption of innovations by working closely with the 
users and not dictating change by the powers of some superior rationality 
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vested in them; and where small contributions but numerous ones will be 
rewarded rather than waiting for the single major discovery. It should be 
noted that the decentralized, highly flexible scientific organization may 
produce a large number of minor innovations but may not be conducive to 
producing major discoveries. But then, small innovations in a large number 
of sectors may be precisely what India needs at this point in its economic 
and historical development. 
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5. THE CASE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY AND APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES: 
We now move to examining the utilization of specific technologies and innovations. The 
case of renewable energy and appropriate technologies is worth reviewing. These 
environmentally-benign technologies for producing energy from renewable sources, solar, 
wind, biogas, wood, received a lot of attention in the late seventies and early eighties, 
primarily in response to environmental and anti-nuclear movements, and to the first 
OPEC oil crisis. Renewable energy technologies are a classical case of "technology push". 
The initiative came not from the user, who (at least in a number of western industrialised 
countries) still had the option of using the more convenient petroleum or electrical energy, 
but from the broad coalition of innovators, entreprenurs, and environmental agencies who 
were convinced that these technologies formed a better alternative for society. 
To date these technologies have enjoyed only a marginal success, with some highly 
regionally specific exceptions. What makes this literature interesting from our viewpoint 
(and hence worth reviewing), is the extraordinary zeal that some of the renewable energy 
proponents have demonstrated in getting these technologies widely adopted. In so doing, 
they have probed quite effectively most of the channels through which these technologies 
could be disseminated, including political pressure. From this literature, we can get a very 
good sense for the various strategies which should be adopted to promote a technological 
innovation. We start with some of the classics in approipriate technology: 
CARR, M., The AT Reader: Theory and Practice in Appropriate Technology, 
Intermediate Technology Publications, UK, 1985. 
This book includes extracts from over 200 notable development writings. 
These are integrated into the text which is divided into ten chapters. The 
first reviews literature dealing with the concept and history of Appropriate 
Technology (AT). Thus, for example, the arguments of Schumacher, Nyerere 
and Robertson are presented and the critiques deriving mainly from the 
dependency /neo-colonial school are countered. The chapter ends by tracing 
the evolution of the AT movement. Chapter 2 takes up the issue of 
technology choice. After arguing the case for AT by drawing on such as 
Stewart and Chambers she then reviews some key issues (e.g. scale of 
production) and ends by taking specific examples of technology choice. 
Chapter 3 to 7 essentially comprise case studies of "technology for 
development". Most of these studies have been completed since 1980 and 
tend to be post-facto socioeconomic analyses of the application of particular 
technologies. Chapter 8 reviews key literature on the generation and 
transfer of technology. The first section concentrates on the issue of 
indigenous technological change (e.g. rural innovation in Indonesia) and the 
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second on the relationship of aid and multinational corporations to 
technology transfer. Chapter 9 first extracts sections of articles analysing 
technology policy (or the lack thereof) in China, India and Kenya and 
articles reviewing the role of technology policy in planning. It then extracts 
from articles dealing with technology diffusion especially via extension. The 
final chapter concentrates on education and training. The first section 
assesses the concept and role of formal education and the second reviews 
case studies of alternative education/ training methods (e.g. Botswana's 
Brigades). It ends with a brief review of the role of advanced 
communication technology in basic education.(DH - 4) 
ECKHAUS, R., Appropriate Technologies for Developing Countries, National 
Academy of Sciences, Washington DC, 1977. 
The book emerged out of the Board of Science and Technology for 
International Development (BOSTID) panel investigation (and study by Prof. 
Eckhaus) into the interrelationships between technological choices and 
economic, social and political aspects of the development process. The 
objective of the report is to arrive at generalizations about the character and 
consequences of microeconomic technology choice decisions. However, as 
one of its panel members remarks in a dissenting appendix, the report is 
marred by its narrow, mechanistic conception of technology as mere 
technique, a view which ignores important issues such as material 
requirements, scale, and the appropriation of knowledge and skill for 
sustained technological innovation. As a result, the choice mechanisms 
outlined by the author do not consider some fundamental objectives, such as 
national self-reliance, stemming rural-urban migration, and ensuring the 
acquisition of local technical capacity. 
The report begins with a general examination of the interactions between 
technological decisions and the development process. It then proceeds to 
examine a number of criteria of technological appropriateness (net output 
maximization, cost minimisation, employment maximization, self-reliance etc) 
and their interrelationships (complementary, mutually exclusive etc). 
The remainder of the book is concerned with technological decisions and 
how they are made. As such, Chapter 4 examines the role of information 
and its diffusion through various means. Chapter 5 examines the 
determinants of technological decisions and their aptness at a general level, 
looking at the effect of various institutions such as national and 
international, private enterprises, the government, bilateral and multilateral 
donors. Chapters 6 and 7 then look at these questions at a sectoral level, 
focusing on agriculture and small scale service enterprises respectively. The 
final chapter elucidates policies for promoting appropriate technological 
choice. These focus on three areas: 1) incentives through policy; ii) 
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expansion of knowledge of appropriate technological alternatives and iii) 
institutional changes to improve the dissemination of technological informa- 
tion. (DH - 6) 
SCHUMACHER, E., Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People 
Mattered, Blond and Briggs, London, 1973 (hardback), Abacus, London, 1974 
(paperback). 
In this seminal work Schumacher argues from an explicitly moral position 
that Western and Soviet obsession with economic growth has created a 
dangerously fast depletion of non-renewable resources, environmental 
pollution and a technology which prevents the attainment of human 
fulfillment especially by causing unsatisfying work to appear necessary. 
By brilliantly exposing the historical mechanisms by which these undesirable 
trends, centred on the maximization of productive effort, have come about 
Schumacher makes a formidable critique of "materialistic" civilization. From 
this he makes arguments for an economic system with the objective of 
maximizing human happiness by the optimal pattern of consumption, with 
socially desirable production methods. 
Schumacher emphasized the concept of intermediate technology (IT), i.e. 
somewhere between traditional and modern but making use of the best of 
both. His intellectual promptings (and his own practical work) encouraged 
the establishment of hundreds of IT (or appropriate technology) 
organizations and contributed powerfully to the thinking of planners with 
respect to the role of technology in society. (DH - 15) 
McROBIE, G., Small is Possible, Jonathan Cape, London, 1981. 
This book is written as a sequel to Schumacher's "Small is Beautiful" and a 
"Guide for the Perplexed" and was intended to show how these concepts 
can and have been implemented. 
The first section of the book is Schumacher's last speech: "On Technology 
for a Demographic Society" where he combines a critique of the technology 
implicit in aid and trade (amongst other things), which the rich would give 
to the poor world, and also of the inappropriateness of advanced technology 
within the rich world. He summarizes the central ideas of his work and 
argues again for intermediate and appropriate technology (AT) which among 
other things would have truly democratic connotations. 
93 
McRobie picked up Schumacher's idea for the book and then attempted to 
write it. Part I traces the formation and development and objectives of the 
Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) based in the UK. It 
then traces the activities of the group in areas like building, water, 
transport, etc. Finally it details the development of a growing international 
network of related organizations. Part II switches to AT in rich countries 
and after reviewing some of the conceptual issues (the destructiveness of 
certain new technologies) he then reviews AT movements in Britain, the 
USA and Canada. Part III has two sections: the first looking at the 
achievements of AT groups in specific areas of the Third World, and the 
second a review of AT effects in the UK. 
The end of the book contains lists of organizations concerned with AT and 
further reading on AT for rich and poor countries. (DH - 11) 
STEWART, F. (ed), Macro Policies for Appropriate Technology, Westview, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1987. 
This outstanding book of readings encapsulates much of the best of recent 
thinking on technology and development and the role of government 
therein. Most of the readings are annotated separately elsewhere in this 
bibliography. 
Chapters 1 and 10 by Stewart place policies for appropriate technology (AT) 
in a very interesting framework. AT is viewed in terms of "special 
characteristics" but takes on board a broader and more dynamic view of its 
implications than the earlier views. Thus, AT is seen in dynamic terms, i.e. 
in terms of the social implication of technological changes including initial 
start-up investment decisions. Furthermore, the objectives of AT are 
broadened to include the social impact of all types of producers. 
This is most clearly elaborated when she discusses the role of government 
"macro policies" in influencing the path of technological change. Thus, she 
views "firms" as including all productive units - public or private, foreign or 
local, cooperatives, family farms, etc. Each of these "firms" makes decisions 
about technology which are determined by 4 main factors: their objectives; 
their resources and the prices of these; their market form; and their 
technological knowledge. Governments can influence decisions for 
appropriate technological change by affecting any of these variables. 
Furthermore, by adjusting the distribution of resources (e.g. a land reform) 
the state can also affect technological decisions. (DH - 18) 
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We now present three long excerpts from three books on renewable energy. Baumgartner 
and Burns review cases in seven countries, and present an interesting analysis based on 
power politics: energy prices are not the only indicator of the competitiveness of energy 
technologies. There are also some powerful vested interests, such as electric utilities and 
the petroleum industry, whose status is protected by laws, taxes, and other institutional 
measures. Introducing new technologies must address these factors, as well as 
technological performance. 
The National Research Council's Board on Science and Technology for International 
Development's (BOSTID) study on Biomass energy examines the question from a diffusion 
and design point of view, and also has an insightful analysis of the equity issues that arise 
from the itroduction of new technology. 
Finally, Szekely's review for the UN agencies brings home yet again the necessity of 
government involvement at all stages when bringing in new technology systems. 
We begin with Baumgartner and Burns' analysis based on political power and vested 
interests: 
Baumgartner, T., Burns, T.R. (eds.). 1984. Transitions to Alternative Energy 
Systems: Entrepreneurs, New Technologies and Social Change. Westview Press, 
Boulder and London. 292 p. 
FOREWORD: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (p. xiii) 
by Denis Hayes 
(p. xv-xvi) There is, of course, already a fairly well developed literature in 
the field of technology diffusion. The rapid market penetration of 
automobiles, jet airplanes, television, and computers have been examined 
with care by other books. But energy sources in general, and decentralized 
energy resources in particular, possess characteristics that deserve the kind 
of detailed attention this volume provides. By probing beneath the surface 
in several different countries, the authors add breadth to a field too long 
dominated by U.S. experiences. 
Is there a simple lesson to be distilled from this volume? I think so, 
though the authors never explicitly draw a 'political' conclusion. 
What the book makes clear to me is the fact that the 'free market' approach 
to energy being taken by the Reagan and the Thatcher governments stands 
no chance of success. Although the price of fuel is the most important 
single determinant of energy usage, ultimate decisions are often shaped by a 
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combination of other elements. An energy policy that ignores institutional 
issues, environmental effects, social impacts, and political consequences can 
produce bad results, but will more likely produce no results at all. 
To be sure, free market rethoric has its attractions; moreover, the track 
records of most public sector energy efforts have been deplorable bad. There 
is perhaps no stronger argument for the free market than the complete 
botch being made by the Reagan Department of Energy. 
Yet it is impossible to reconcile a free market approach with a field in 
which oil production is governed by a global cartel and in which oil 
transportation and oil refining are dominated by an oligopoly. When Adam 
Smith [p. xvi:] formulated his concept of the marketplace, he was not 
thinking of such 'natural monopolies' as electric utilities. If there is 
something to be learned from experiences in the environmental field over 
the last decade, it is that market signals will not by themselves internalize 
the costs of pollution, nor assign appropriate future rents to depletable 
resources. These necessary chores must be performed by governments. 
The governments of the world, then, do not have the option of piously 
washing their hands of the energy crisis. They must be involved; they must 
pursue wise policies; and they must prove far more effective in the future 
than they have in the past. Through its careful analysis of past programs to 
promote renewable resource development, Tom Baumgartner's new book 
provides the public sector with precisely the kind of guidance it needs. 
PREFACE (p. xvii-xix) 
[p. xviii:] In our view the context for new energy developments in early 
1984 is no better, in some ways even worse, than that prevalent during the 
1970s, the period covered by our empirical studies. 
The production and use of alternative energy technologies remain largely 
marginal, with partial achievements only in a few narrow, specialized 
market niches. The developments in the 1970s, particularly those associated 
with the second oil price shock of 1979 and 1980 were to some extent 
encouraging. Entrepreneurs, change agents, and users interested in 
developing alternative energy technologies found conventional energy price 
and supply developments favoring risk taking and investment efforts, both 
essential to new energy developments. 
(p. xix) Thomas Baumgartner and Tom R. Burns 
(p. 5) The research reported here investigated alternative energy innovations 
and the development of new energy systems through a series of case 
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studies. These describe and analyze several of the key technical, socio- 
economic and political processes whereby new energy technologies have 
been introduced and systems producing and utilizing them have been 
established and have grown [Footnote: We distinguish three main elements 
in discussing alternative energy technologies: (a) The energy flows and 
materials (solar, wind, forests, petroleum, uranium, etc.) which are 
potentially available for exploitation as energy sources. (b) The technologies 
designed to tap energy flows and materials and to transform them into 
usable energy (in boilers, generators, collectors, heat pumps, windmills, etc.). 
(c) The socio-technical systems -- with a certain social organization, 
organized knowledge and expertise, and occupations and professions 
involved - which produce technologies, distribute them and use them in the 
exploitation of energy flows and materials. Spencer (1983) suggests a 
somewhat similar set of distinctions.]. 
Two types of technological innovation were investigated: the introduction, 
development and use of technologies (1) to provide energy to households 
and small buildings, and (2) to exploit new energy forms on a relatively 
large scale for the production of heat and electricity by utilities and industry 
[Footnote: Wood and peat are not "new" energy sources but the technologies 
which our case studies look at are.]. 
The case studies reported on are the following: 
(1) the introduction and wide-spread use of solar water heating in Israel; 
(2) the emergence and development of solar water heating in California; 
(3) the introduction and diffusion of small windmills for the production 
of electricity in Denmark; 
(4) the growing production and use of heat pumps in West Germany; 
(5) the history and recent development of geothermal electricity 
production in California; 
(6) the increasing use of wood for the cogeneration of steam and 
electricity by utilities and factories in Northern New England in the 
USA; and 
(7) the development of peat for cogeneration in Finland. 
(p. 5-6) The studies provide insight into the factors facilitating and blocking 
the introduction of new energy technologies and the emergence of new 
markets and entirely new industries. A general overview of the studies 
suggests that not only physical infrastructures but institutional and cultural 
97 
contexts - and the power of different interest groups -- are critical factors 
determining the fate of such innovations and developments. Moreover, social 
agents who control and provide know-how and information play a strategic 
role in determining the speed of adoption [p. 6:] and diffusion of new 
energy technologies. In general, failure to develop adequate information and 
knowledge systems - technical as well as commercial - and to provide 
complementary service systems can retard if not block new and useful 
energy developments. 
The introduction of a new energy technology - or any technology for that 
matter - is not simply a matter of taking an invention and producing it for 
someone to use somewhere. It involves ultimately the shaping and 
development of social and technical systems for producing, distributing,and 
utilizing the technology. In many instances, existing socio-technical systems 
can be adapted and exploited in establishing and developing the new. 
Invariably, system development entails a historical process, the making of 
many different decisions and the solving of a variety of technical, economic, 
and socio-political problems. Multiple actors and groups are directly and 
indirectly engaged in such historical developments. 
(p. 241-242) Generally, the introduction of a new technology entails a 
complex of innovations rather than a single technical innovation. Typically, 
some of these are of an organizational and socio-political character, for 
instance changing certain administrative rules and procedures or 
reformulating government policies. For instance, taxation rules and building 
codes had to be changed in connection with solar energy developments in 
both Israel and in California. 
Even if technological innovation is based largely on old elements -- as in the 
case of heat pumps and peat cogeneration -- new elements or combinations 
of elements are involved. In the case of heat pumps in Germany, it meant 
designing and producing small units and selling them to a new buyer 
group, owners of single or small multi-family houses. The use of peat for 
the generation of steam and of electricity in Finland involved a scaling up 
of the production and transportation of the resource. This implied a 
different method of harvesting peat, requiring new types of equipment as 
well as railroad rate changes to make the whole venture worthwhile. It also 
required the organization, for the first time, of large-scale peat production in 
one place. 
Technological innovation always involves some risks, even if the proponents 
believe that these are minimal or even non-existent. The proponents of 
nuclear power have discovered this but so have the producers of heat 
pumps in Germany who find themselves with substantial unused [p. 242:1 
production capacity, contrary to all forecasts. Demand is stagnating if not 
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(temporarily?) falling partly due to disappointments with early heat pump 
models, partly due to the slump in housing construction, and possibly also 
because buyers wait for the appearance of the often announced new types 
of heat pumps. 
Our studies suggest that one cannot know for certain beforehand if the 
innovation(s) will succeed or not. The uncertainty and risks are greater the 
more radical the new technology or the more socio-technical systems 
organized around its production, distribution and use deviate from 
established socio-technical systems. In these instances, change agents are 
likely to encounter more substantial and difficult to solve problems of a 
technical, economic, and socio-political nature. 
Of course, powerful actors or coalitions of actors with ownership rights, a 
political mandate or technical authority may push the new development 
because they can effectively mobilize resources, economic as well as socio- 
political. Ben Gurion, the Israeli prime minister during the 1950s and 1960s, 
assured funding for solar energy research which was far ahead of its time. 
High-level political commitment to peat helped to push aside barriers 
blocking the development of peat use in Finland. The exploitation of 
geothermal energy made a step forward only when the large electric utilities 
and oil companies became interested and involved. In short, radically 
different technologies, requiring substantial changes in existing socio- 
technical systems, are very difficult to introduce and develop without 
powerful backing, at least if the technology is to succeed within short spans 
of time. 
(p. 242-244) 
(1) Our case studies of the emergence and development of new energy 
technologies suggest that progress is being made. However, there have been 
no major developments, certainly no indications that a transition to 
alternative energy systems is taking _yl! are. In the countries of our 
investigation, the developments described, while promising, remain only 
marginal. This is, in part, because nowhere are all the key actors fully 
committed to the development of the technologies. They fail to support such 
developments in a coherent manner. 
(2) Nevertheless, one may draw some satisfaction [p. 243:1 from the modest, 
although rather isolated, achievements in the development of alternative 
energy systems described in the case studies. Many of the technologies we 
have investigated were said to be too "expensive" or not commercially 
interesting. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs experimented, solved problems, 
developed production and marketing strategies, increased efficiency and 
managed to establish infant industries. Knowledge has been accumulated. 
Some diversification of energy production and energy saving systems has 
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been achieved. This will be particularly important when energy problems 
will become once again more prominent on the political agenda than at the 
present, and efforts will have to be once more intensified to find new 
energy sources and to improve energy economizing. 
(3) A complex of different actors, policies, laws, and rules as well as 
technical and economic conditions influenced the shaping and development 
of the new industries and related socio-technical systems described in our 
case studies. The social agents involved played different roles: inventors and 
scientists, entrepreneurs and technicians, banks and financial intermediaries, 
government agencies, politicians, and socio-political movements, as well as 
users and consumers. 
In a complex social system, there are few generalists. There must be 
communication and various forms of cooperation across the boundaries of 
specialization and the various phases of introducing and developing new 
socio-technical systems. Linkages among different types of actors occurred 
through market networks, business and ownership structures, through 
industry and public organizations, as well as through research and technical 
networks. Progress was especially marked -- for example in California and 
Denmark -- when movements interested in alternative energy technologies 
managed to cooperate with business interests in the interest of common 
lobbying and effective marketing of the products to sceptical consumers. 
In some instances, the connections were initially weak or non-existent, 
thereby slowing down or blocking the technological developments. We 
found examples of weak connections between those designing and 
producing the new technologies and ultimate users (e.g. in the early phases 
of solar energy developments in California); between policy-makers, on the 
one hand, and producers and users, on the other (e.g. heat pumps in 
Germany); between entrepreneurs and technical experts capable of solving 
critical problems (in the early phase of geothermal development in 
California). In our view, weak linkages and, in general, barriers to 
communication and mutual learning and cooperation among the various key 
actor groups are among the critical factors slowing down or blocking 
technological developments. As we shall discuss in Chapter 12, a major [p. 
244:1 challenge to entrepreneurs, policy-makers, administrators and other 
change agents seeking to bring about new technological developments is to 
develop strategies to shape forums and networks for communication and 
mutual learning, with feedback across different spheres and on various 
levels. A related question concerns strategies to establish institutions for 
improving coordination, reducing transaction costs, and minimizing 
unnecessary risks. We argue later that the genuine risks in technology 
development cannot be eliminated prematurely, but must be accepted as 
part of the challenge. Nevertheless, communication and cooperation are one 
way to help minimize risks. 
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(4) The motivation for introducing and developing new energy technologies 
varies considerably among the inventors, entrepreneurs and change agents 
involved. It may derive largely from economic considerations, the hope for 
economic gain through the exploitation of new sales opportunities or the 
possibilities for cost reductions. Other motives may be the challenge of 
technical problems and the opportunity to solve interesting problems, the 
desire for social recognition, political motives, ideal interests (anti-nuclear 
feelings, environmental concerns, worries about oil dependence and 
vulnerability). 
(p. 245) 
(5) Relative energy prices provide signals, but they are not always very 
reliable or valid signals (...). 
(p. 246) 
(6) Laws, norms, rules and policies shape and influence the ways new 
energy systems can be built up and used, how well they fit into established 
energy systems, and how effective they can be operated. In some instances, 
such constraints retard or prevent the adoption of the new energy 
technology (...). 
(p. 247) 
(7) The preceding points strongly suggest the importance of policy-makers 
and government agencies making changes -- or in preventing changes -- 
which can facilitate new energy developments. In some instances, the 
changes introduced, although small, even trivial, had substantial impacts on 
the trends and rates of development. 
(p. 250) 
(8) The shaping and development of alternative energy systems typically 
requires not only economic resources but sociopolitical power. In many 
instances the actors (small businessmen and entrepreneurs) who are 
prepared to take initiatives and to try to shape new systems have very 
limited access to either adequate economic resources or political influence. 
For successful or rapid development of new energy systems, entrepreneurs 
and change agents must often struggle to change laws, rules and policies 
which block or hinder such development. Also, they may have to contend 
with hidden or even open opposition of powerful vested interests. A utility 
company, for instance, with its special technical culture and its interests to 
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protect its investments and profit opportunities may act to obstruct the 
introduction of a new energy technology or they may try to shape it so that 
it falls naturally under its control. This is so unless utility decision-makers 
have a strong professional interest in it or have few or no alternative ways 
to expand and grow in the future. 
In some instances, certain government agencies and socio-political 
movements ally themselves with entrepreneurs to change policies and laws. 
This has been true for the ecological and anti-nuclear movements in 
Denmark and California. But most often the small entrepreneurs lack access 
to or influence in the corridors of central power. They are compelled to 
operate marginally and to do the best they can under difficult 
circumstances. This can be observed in the development of solar energy in 
Israel in the 1950s and 1960s, and of wind energy in Denmark. Or the small 
entrepreneur is forced to sell out to larger companies with the economic and 
political clout to bring about change. This has happened in the case of the 
geothermal development in California where oil companies took over and 
managed to get the minerals leasing act changed in ways favorable to 
geothermal development. 
(9) Our research suggests that, in general, utilities are key actors in 
facilitating or hindering new energy developments. 
(10) Environmental, conservationist, or other socio-political movements can 
play a major role in the introduction and spreading of new alternative 
energy systems. They play such a role through engaging themselves in the 
concrete processes of shaping a normative climate, and [p. 252:1 through 
exercising or applying political pressure to create laws, rules and policies 
which facilitate the emergence of new energy systems. The case of wind 
energy in Denmark points up that a social movement can work together, 
directly and indirectly, with entrepreneurs and producers of alternative 
energy technologies and thus contribute to changing public opinion and to 
influencing government policies (and countering in part the policies of 
utilities). Similar cooperation helped to accelerate the spreading of solar 
energy in California. 
(11) Our case studies point up that it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to know beforehand or to predict the specific designs the new 
technologies were to take and the form and character of the socio-technical 
systems in which they developed. Among other reasons, this is because: 
A variety of possible or potential alternative energy systems may 
emerge, not a single, predetermined one. 
The energy production, distribution and use systems emerging tend to 
develop special characteristics as a function of the societal contexts in 
which their development is taking place. 
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(p. 255) Systems for producing, distributing and using a new or different 
technology must be either adapted from existing systems or established as 
new systems. Such systems are not mere ad hoc collections of elements. 
They are organized socio-technical systems. Entrepreneurs and other change 
agents engaged in the concrete process of adapting or building up and 
integrating the various relevant PDU [production, distribution and use] 
systems: for instance, the production of generators, towers, blades and other 
components for electricity generating windmills, setting up and operating the 
windmills, and ultimately distributing the electricity and making use of it in 
appliances and other electrical equipment. 
(p. 255-257) In the process of trying to establish and operate PDU systems, 
technical, production, marketing and utilization problems are discovered and 
solutions attempted. [p. 256:1 Some attempts may succeed. Considerable 
uncertainty is typical about such matters as costs, quality, reliability, market 
demand, and so forth until actors have worked through the planning and 
practical activities. Many problem solving efforts end in failure. A few may 
result ultimately in 'marketable' ideas (in the broadest meaning) and the 
establishment and development of new industries and patterns of 
consumption around a new technology. 
Our framework points up that technological development does not simply 
concern improvement in a furnace or a windmill but development of the 
systems to produce and distribute the furnace or windmill as well as those 
which utilize such 'products'. Competing systems, rather than competing 
products, is a central concept in our framework. Products as such compete 
only when they can be distributed and utilized more or less in the same 
systems. 
Change Agents, Problem-Solving, and Social Learning 
A strategic factor in technological development is the availability or absence 
of entrepreneurs and other change agents to engage themselves in the 
process of introducing and developing new technologies. Actors in diverse 
roles are involved in this complex, collective problem-solving process: 
inventors, scientists, technicians, businessmen, bankers and other financial 
experts, marketing experts, consumers, politicians and administrators. 
Typically, these come into development processes in different ways and to 
some extent in different phases of the development process. 
(1) A person or a group has an 'idea' or a concept of how to solve a 
problem or class of problems. The idea may be realized in the form of a 
technology design or model. In the world of technical ideas, we refer to 
such persons as inventors, for instance, engineers or scientists who invent a 
new technology. Even in the social and political worlds, it is appropriate to 
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speak of social and political inventors, respectively, who come forth with 
social inventions, new organisational forms and institutional innovations as 
well as cultural elements. 
(2) Entrepreneurs are social agents - individuals, groups, and social 
organizations - which implement an idea or put it into practice, for 
example, they produce and sell it on markets. In many instances, 
entrepreneurs attract capital for establishing and developing production and 
distribution systems; they do this through their connections, position of 
authority, or charisma. Administrative entrepreneurs in government agencies 
and networks play a similar role in developing technology production and 
distribution systems within the government sphere. 
[p. 257:1 (3) Entrepreneurs and other actors with managerial and technical 
skills organize labor and production processes, often adapting the innovation 
into forms which can be more readily produced and marketed (identifying 
or discovering these forms is often a complex learning and trial-and-error 
process). 
(4) Actors with marketing and organizational skills deal with problems of 
distribution and selling. Often this entails influencing and educating 
consumers and potential users. 
(5) Political leaders and movements as well as government agents, play a 
role in many instances in shaping laws, policies or rules which facilitate the 
technological development. 
A complex of technical, economic and socio-political problems must in many 
instances be solved -- and multiple decisions made -- in the process of new 
technological developments. Some solutions are realized in technical 
networks, others in more business-oriented and financial organizations, 
networks and markets, still others in political and administrative institutions 
and arenas. Indeed, in the context of such organizational, network and 
market frames, the various special types of actors pointed out earlier are 
linked together, although many are formally independent: through market 
processes (flows of commodities and money), social networks including 
networks of formal agreements and contracts, as well as through formal 
organizations such as enterprises, government agencies, political institutions. 
Thus, on the one hand, a technical-economic system such as electricity 
supply based on hydropower links together waterfalls, power stations, 
electricity grids, and electric equipment and appliances in factories and 
households, respectively. On the other hand, market, network and 
organizational frames connect together diverse types of actors in both 
building up and operating such economic-technical systems. An energy PDU 
system is not usually based on a single social organization but a network of 
organizations (Lonnroth, 1978b). 
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(p. 258) Any given innovation or technological development is likely to 
activate multiple, in many instances incompatible norms and values. Often 
these are experienced as dilemmas by some of the actors involved. For 
example, energy substitution or conservation goals may be contradicted by 
aesthetic or environmental objectives, as pointed up in the case of 
developments making use of peat or coal as fuel. Such problems reflect the 
fact that innovation and technological development have multiple effects. 
These include effects directly related to actors expressed goals or the 
problems with which they set out to deal. They also have unintended 
effects. Thus, the introduction and development of new energy technologies 
leads to non-energy consequences, such as environmental effects and socio- 
political reactions. Similarly, non-energy developments in society will 
typically have direct and indirect impacts on energy matters. 
(p. 261) The phase structure outline above is a highly simplified picture 
of technological development in a market or mixed economy system. One 
moves from ideas and conceptions which are translated into 'solutions' in 
the form of a particular technology, to producing marketable or useable 
designs, selling them (or in the public sector budgeting them) and bringing 
them into use. It should be stressed that the different phases do not follow 
a linear sequence but overlap and feed forward and back between one 
another. A group of users, for instance may take an initiative to invent and 
produce a technology to solve a problem they have encountered. Later, they 
may come to produce the technology for others. Or a technology used to 
solve a specific type of problem may become a 'solution looking for 
problems'. Its producers or users realize that it can be used for quite new 
problem sets, and this contributes to its further spread and development. 
Thus, the technology may come to be utilized and developed in ways which 
go far beyond the problem set with respect to which it was originally 
conceived and developed. 
Entrepreneurs and the Mobilization of Social Power (p. 266-268) 
The development of new technologies, particularly radically new ones, 
requires the mobilization and exercise of economic and socio-political power, 
learning and social restructuring; in shaping new enterprises, new markets 
and industries, in establishing new public policies and laws, and so forth. 
Social power structures are critical factors in technological development for 
several reasons: 
(1) Social power, whether based on technical authority, command of 
economic resources, administrative power, or political influence, is essential 
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to bringing about many of the changes -- technical, economic and socio- 
political -- entailed in new technological development. 
(2) Established power structures and vested interests in [p. 268:1 
conventional technologies may block new developments, or, at least, they 
may distort or reorient them away from optimal forms. For instance, 
technical innovations are accepted or rejected on the basis of their degree of 
consistency with established concepts, norms and socio-political interests (in 
the latter case, for instance, in terms of the degree to which they are 
perceived to reinforce established positions of power and authority). Hence, 
public utilities tend to support large-scale energy innovation proposals, 
which fit into the existing systems under their control or which would be 
logical extensions of these systems. In Sweden, for instance, electric space 
heating was up until the 1950s not acceptable. When nuclear power was 
introduced, a key proponent, the Swedish State Power Board, won the 
support of the building industry for this. Plumbing engineers and related 
groups in opposition lost out, in part because they were disorganized. In 
this way, the rapid expansion of nuclear power was combined with new 
electricity utilization systems which supported the rapid growth of nuclear 
electricity generation (Lonnroth, 1978a). 
Lonnroth, M. 1978a. "The Oil Peak and Beyond." Stockholm: Beijer Institute 
and Secretariat for Future Studies. 
Lonnroth, M. 1978b. "Energy Futures for Sweden." Stockholm: Secretariat for 
Future Studies. 
The excerpts selected from the Board on Science and Technology for International 
Development (BOSTID) 's study focus more on the diffusion aspect, with a section on 
equity issues, and how one should manage an extension service - advice for the 
practitioner. 
Board on Science and Technology for International Development, Office of 
International Affairs, National Research Council. 1984. Diffusion of Biomass 
Energy Technologies in Developing Countries. Second edition. National 
Academy Press, Washington, DC, USA. 120 p. 
1 DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (p. 12) 
Diffusion is the process by which innovations spread to the members of a 
social system over time. Diffusion studies are concerned with messages 
about new ideas, whereas communication studies encompass all types of 
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messages. Because the messages are new in the case of diffusion, there is a 
degree of risk and uncertainty for the recipient, leading to somewhat 
different behavior than if the messages were about routine ideas. The 
"classical model" of the diffusion of an innovation consists of the innovation, 
defined as an idea perceived as new by an individual, which is 
communicated through certain channels, over time, among members of a 
social system. 
Diffusion and Social Inequii1y (p. 13-14) 
During the 1960s and 1970s, applications of the classical diffusion model to 
development programs in developing countries was criticized for increasing 
socioeconomic inequity. Critics point out that in development programs, the 
nature of the social system in which the innovations were introduced and 
the quality of the innovation have often been disregarded. They say that 
the socioeconomic structure has considerable effect on the innovation 
behavior of individuals and that it usually favors adoption of new ideas and 
technologies by richer people. 
Most observers agree that the major problem in many developing countries 
today is the unequal distribution of such resources as income, lands, skills, 
and information that perpetuates inequality. Critics stress that technical 
change results in a skewed distribution of benefits; individuals who have 
greater resources usually benefit more from the innovations introduced by 
development agencies than individuals with fewer resources, thus widening 
the benefits gap. 
In addition, some of the basic assumptions of the diffusion model have been 
criticized: (1) that communication by itself generates development, 
regardless of socioeconomic and political conditions; (2) that increased 
production and consumption of goods and services constitute the essence of 
development and that a fair distribution of income and opportunities will 
necessarily derive, in time; and (3) that the key to increased productivity is 
technological innovation, regardless of whom it may benefit or harm. 
Critics of these assumptions point out that the main inhibitions to 
development may be mainly structural rather than informative and that 
restructuring of a society may be needed to make the diffusion of 
innovations more effective in the development process. 
The social structure has been found to be a powerful determinant of 
individuals' access and response to the mass media. The more privileged 
farmers who own land and enjoy a higher socioeconomic status have more 
communication opportunities and are the most likely to adopt new 
agricultural technologies. A farmer's failure to adopt innovations may be 
due more to a lack of opportunity than to resistance to change. Farmers 
with more land, money, and knowledge can more easily obtain the credit 
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and information they need to adopt technical innovations. Most of the 
poorer and less progressive farmers in developing nations lack such 
resources. 
Development agencies tend to provide assistance to a relatively small 
number of wealthy, educated, and information-seeking farmers; following 
this progressive (or "easy-to-convince") farmer strategy leads to less equitable 
development. 
Some critics have also argued that innovations may be uncritically viewed 
by development workers as "good" for all farmers. The social [p. 14:1 and 
economic consequences for the community as a whole have not always been 
considered, such as whether a technological innovation is appropriate for 
everyone, or whether it favors some groups of individuals at the expense of 
others. 
Decentralized Versus Centralized Diffusion (p. 1415) 
In addition to the centralized diffusion model, an alternative model of 
decentralized diffusion also exists. Schon pointed out that theories of 
diffusion have characteristically lagged behind the reality of emerging 
systems. He particularly criticized the classical diffusion theory, which he 
termed a "center-periphery model," and which rests on three basic premises: 
that the innovation to be diffused exists fully realized in its essentials, 
prior to diffusion; 
that diffusion is the movement of an innovation from a center out to 
its ultimate users; and 
that directed diffusion is a centrally managed process of dissemi- 
nation, training, and provision of resources and incentives (Schon, 
1971). 
The traditional centralized diffusion model not only prevails in theoretical 
writings, but has become the "dominant normative model for diffusion." 
The best-known example of a center-periphery model of diffusion is the 
Federal Extension Service of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), which coordinates with he state agriculture extension services. This 
program (with an annual budget of more than $350 million) represents the 
largest public investment in a diffusion system in the world. 
[p. 15:1 In their early days, extension services in the United States identified 
and then disseminated the agricultural practices followed by the most 
successful farmers. In later years, a superstructure of agricultural research 
was connected to agricultural extension services to serve as a source of 
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innovations. Most extension workers tended to forget that innovations 
could come from farmers' experience as well as from formal research and 
development. 
Agricultural innovations stem from R&D activities by the USDA and by 
state agricultural experiment stations. The agricultural extension services 
operate in close collaboration with these organizations through state 
extension specialists, who are stationed in state agricultural universities. The 
responsibility of these extension specialists is to convey information about 
agricultural innovations to county extension agents, who in turn diffuse 
these innovations to farmers. Thus, the agricultural extension services 
represent a centralized diffusion system. Not only has this diffusion model 
been widely copies in agricultural extension services in developing nations, 
but it has served as a basis for the design of several other U.S. diffusion 
systems, in such varied fields as vocational rehabilitation, mass 
transportation, energy conservation, and education. 
Schon's main criticism of this centralized diffusion model is that it may 
apply to certain classes of innovations "lying near the periphery," but that it 
fails to capture the complexity of innovations that evolve as they diffuse 
(reinvention) and that thus originate from numerous sources (not just the 
center). The diffusion process should not consist only of centrally 
developed information, but should also be shaped by user demands and 
solutions to problems from other users. 
In many developing countries, agricultural extension agents have low status; 
they are often drawn from agricultural colleges at which they have had 
relatively undistinguished careers, failing to be selected for scholarships for 
further study abroad or for the more prestigious positions in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Few are from the rural areas or are particularly motivated to 
solve rural problems, and seldom do the training courses prepare them for 
communicating convincingly with farmers. They usually find that the 
farmers know more about agriculture than they do, and they become 
demoralized and ineffective. Giving them additional responsibilities for 
energy is unlikely to be any more successful, yet the prospect of erecting a 
parallel extension structure for rural energy is daunting. 
An alternative model of diffusion, based on decentralized, horizontal 
diffusion of innovations among adopting units depends mainly on peer 
networks for transferring technological innovations among local-level units. 
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Table 1.1 Characteristics of Centralized and Decentralized 
Diffusion Systems (p. 19) 
Centralized Diffusion Systems 
Centralized control of decisions 
by national government officials 
and technical experts 
Diffusion from top down from 
experts to local users 
Innovations come from formal 
R&D by technical experts 
Low-risk innovations with 
relatively high advantage 
Projects that are of low priority 
to local organizations 
Technology-push, emphasizing 
needs created by the availability 
of the innovation 
Low degree of local adaptation 
and reinvention 
Decentralized Diffusion Systems 
Local control by community 
officials/ leaders 
Peer diffusion through horizontal 
networks 
Innovations come from local 
experimentation by non-experts 
High-risk innovations with 
relatively low advantage 
Projects that are of high 
priority to local organizations 
Technology-pull, created by 
locally perceived needs and 
site-specific problems 
High degree of local adaptation 
and reinvention 
Diffusion Networks (p. 20-21) 
One of the key elements in the decentralized diffusion systems is that of 
communication networks, defined as the interconnected individuals who are 
linked by patterned flows of information. It has long been recognized that 
interpersonal communication channels from peers are most important in 
persuading individuals to adopt new ideas. 
Most individuals do not actively seek technical information from the most 
competent sources. Instead, they tend to seek information about 
technological innovations from sources that are local, easily accessible, and 
interpersonal (usually from neighbors). 
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The diffusion, or the lack of diffusion, of renewable energy technologies is 
influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the following groups of 
individuals within a country: 
Policymakers, Planners, Politicians. Central government authorities play an 
important role in disseminating technologies. In many countries they are 
the key to approval of a technology initiative or to its funding. Often, 
however, renewable energy technologies as an entire category may not be 
perceived at this level as a serious alternative to conventional energy 
technologies. In other cases a critical decision may be taken to promote 
certain technologies as a matter of national priority - fuel alcohol in Brazil, 
for example. 
Industrial Entrepreneurs. Industrial entrepreneurs may influence diffusion 
by adopting a technology and producing its key elements: stoves, gasifiers, 
and stills, for example. Their decisions affect diffusion by making essential 
components available, by influencing public and commercial perceptions of 
the technologies, and by supplying capital for their development. However, 
in many countries there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to become 
involved; there may be no profit opportunities among poor people, or no 
special role for entrepreneurs where many can manufacture inexpensive 
devices. 
Provincial Government Officials. There may be a difference in perceptions 
of the value and feasibility of energy technologies between planners and 
officials at the national level and those at the provincial level, particularly 
concerning regional versus national priorities. 
Private and Nongovernment Organizations. These voluntary organizations 
frequently have a key role to play because of their close contact with 
potential recipients and their ability to recognize needs, identify 
opportunities, and motivate the recipients. 
Local Government Officials. These officials have an important role in 
diffusion because they are responsible for conveying national policy or 
reporting local needs to the national government. They may include 
important personnel such as extension agents and public health officials. 
[p. 21:1 Village Leaders. Traditional social leaders may also be important in 
diffusion as arbiters of consensus for or against innovation. Their role in 
organizing community use of the technology or land resources may be 
crucial. 
Family. In many cases perceptions at the family level will determine the 
extent to which a given technology will be adopted. 
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Individuals. There may be different responses to technologies at the 
individual, as opposed to the family, level. Wives may have a different 
perception of the need for fuelwood from husbands; wives may welcome an 
innovation that leads their husbands to play a larger role in helping them 
(running a biogas plant for the house), or may resent an intrusion into their 
affairs (building a mud stove). 
Schon, D. 1971. Beyond the Stable State. Temple Smith, London, Engla 
nd. 
3 NEEDS OF THE POOR (p. 27) 
The immediate beneficiaries of biomass energy technologies should be the 
poor, both rural and urban, in developing countries. Their energy needs 
give this study its focus, not because biomass-based technologies can 
entirely resolve their nations' difficulties with escalating petroleum prices, 
but because of the immediacy of their energy needs. Their overwhelming 
reliance on biomass for fuel - principally on firewood, crop residues, and 
dung - gives the diffusion of improved biomass-based technologies critical 
implications for alleviation of their energy problems. 
Most rural people rely principally on human and animal muscle power in 
their work as subsistence farmers, herdsmen, fishermen, cash cropping 
smallholders, and plantation laborers. Clearing and plowing the land; 
planting, cultivating, and harvesting; and threshing, pounding, grinding, and 
storing are all done largely by hand, with some help from draft animals and 
a few simple tools. Most crops are transported from field to household and 
to the local market on foot or animals. Firewood, used mainly for cooking, 
is the principal fuel. 
Technology in Context (p. 30-33) 
Successful diffusion of biomass energy technologies in developing countries 
depends upon understanding how the poor are accustomed to organizing 
their productive activities, regulating their social relationships, keeping order, 
and maintaining the normative beliefs that are essential to social stability 
everywhere. It is into this sociocultural context that new biomass energy 
technologies must be introduced. If [p. 31:1 they do not fit, they will not be 
diffused, regardless of their technological promise. 
Many of the rural poor meet most of their needs, including their need for 
fuel, outside the money economy. Often patterns of exchange operate 
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within the context of the kin group, through associations, or through other 
community structures to allocate rights to land and tools, to organize work, 
and to structure the distribution of the products of work. 
However, money and markets are becoming more important. Cash is 
required to meet a growing number of subsistence needs, including fuel. 
For people accustomed to having most of their material wants satisfied 
through cooperative work with their kinsmen and neighbors, who do not 
customarily trade their labor for cash and who would never think of selling 
their lands, this new requirement for money is frequently hard to meet. For 
unskilled migrants from rural areas where fuelwood is still free, the need to 
purchase fuel for cooking and heating is often an unexpectedly harsh 
requirement. Nevertheless, the commercialization of energy eases the 
diffusion of technology to solve supply problems. 
Many productive relationships among rural people in developing countries 
are still structured by kinship. The introduction of innovations designed to 
utilize biomass energy more effectively must take this into account. Rights 
and obligations derived from position in the family remain a major 
organizing principle in the life of the individual and community. Ties of 
kinship based on marriage or descent are often crosscut by associational 
links - membership in age grades, voluntary associations, and mutual aid 
societies - which lend added strength to the fabric of traditional society and 
determine the organization of most economic activities. Among the poor in 
urbanizing areas, such associational ties often serve as a valued alternative 
to familial relationships that are hard to sustain in an urban setting. 
Still other factors affect the structure of the economic order. Age and 
gender play a major part in determining both the division of labor and the 
right to make economic decisions. In stratified social systems, class or caste 
position usually determines the worker's prerogative to control the products 
of his work and his place in the overall system by which economic rights 
are determined and benefits distributed. 
The political organization generally derives its structure from the kinship- 
based social system that must be understood if community decision makers 
are to be effectively mobilized. This is particularly characteristic of Africa 
and Asia, though rural communities are increasingly being absorbed into 
national bureaucratic structures. Typically, village elders and other 
community leaders are selected from among the eldest responsible male 
members of the community's leading families. The poor in most countries 
play only a peripheral role in politics and are frequently excluded almost 
entirely from participating in those decisions - including decisions on 
technology and on the [p. 32:1 definition of their own economic best interest 
- that most affect the work they do and how it is rewarded. 
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The system of relationships that characterizes this sociocultural setting is 
invariably sanctioned by the prevailing system of beliefs and practices that 
defines right and wrong, states social norms, and generally justifies the 
existing order, usually on the basis of religion. Natural events often are 
perceived as the manifestation of religious or magical forces, sometimes 
leading to a fatalism that may lessen enthusiasm for innovations that 
promise to correct problems seen as beyond human control. This belief in 
supernaturally based systems of cause and effect can critically influence the 
outcome of energy interventions that fail to take these perspectives into 
account. 
In most developing nations, these traditional societal structures are overlaid 
by new governmental institutions, which vary in the particulars of their 
form but are almost universally marked by weakness and instability. 
Generally these institutions lack both the sustained financial and human 
resources, especially the managerial and technical labor power, necessary to 
plan and maintain complex, capital-intensive, long-term development 
programs. Too much time and effort is necessarily absorbed in simply 
keeping up with current operations and forestalling economic and political 
collapse. Inefficiency and corruption lead to lack of inputs and marketing 
failures. Reliance on external economic support is almost invariable. 
National administrations are generally dominated by males drawn largely 
from the elite. Politically, their powers are often democratic in principle, 
but authoritarian in practice. Outside major population centers, they 
frequently lack the personnel and material support necessary to maintain 
even routine administrative control. Their capacity to supervise and support 
development projects is generally even more limited. Because of this 
institutional weakness, assessment of national resources, including critical 
energy resources, is often very difficult. The situation is paradoxical. For, 
as Dickinson candidly puts it, "Developing countries, even though they are 
poorer than we [the developed countries] and cannot support our 
institutions, want to obtain for themselves the apparent result of our 
institutions" (Dickinson, 1977). 
Sensitivity to efforts to export "appropriate" (perceived as second-rate) 
technologies can be keen. It is important to ensure a more accurate view of 
the problem. For, as Singer writes, "critics of the concept (of appropriate 
technology) sometimes argue that it in effect establishes two different 
standards and will therefore create and perpetuate a technological gap. This 
is a misconception. The gap exists in the fact that some countries are poor 
while other countries are rich. The task is to reduce or eliminate this M - 
the economic M. Different technologies will serve to reduce the economic 
gap and hence, ultimately, to eliminate the need for different technologies... 
If we misdefine the problem by declaring that the gap is a technological gap 
and then try (disregarding the economic gap) to apply exactly the [p. 33:1 
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same technology to the two groups of countries, the real economic gap will 
widen further instead of narrowing" (Singer, 1977). 
The Issue of Equity (p. 33) 
The rural and urban poor in developing countries do not have equal access 
to their societies' available fuel resources. However, in rural areas where 
society is less stratified and the majority of people are engaged in 
subsistence farming, inequality of access to cooking fuels is less marked. 
New fuelwood projects imply changes in land use and, often, controlled 
access. Plantations to supply urban fuel can compete with supplies from 
the landless poor and jeopardize their livelihood. 
(p. 34) In some countries whole sectors of the population, members of 
different ethnic or tribal groups, may be excluded from participating equally 
in development programs of political regimes that are either indifferent or 
hostile to their interests. Regions such as the Senegal River Valley in 
Mauritania, West Irian, The Brazilian Northeast, and the territories of tribal 
or "national" minorities in India and China may fit this category. Such 
populations are often among the poorest in their nation, and their energy 
needs are frequently most severe and least likely to be met. 
References (p. 35) 
Dickinson, H. 1977. Transfer of knowledge and adoption of technologies. 
In: Introduction to Appropriate TechnolgZy, edited by R.J. Congdon. 
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Factors that Promote Acceptability (p. 45-46) 
From an analysis of the literature and the results of a number of project- 
sponsored site visits, the following six factors appear to [p. 46:1 enhance 
chances for technical and economic acceptability of biomass-based renewable 
energy innovations in developing countries: 
1. Structural simplicity and scale 
2. Use of familiar materials 
3. Employment of familiar techniques 
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4. Functional discreteness 
5. Integration with existing technology 
6. Ability to meet locally perceived technical and/or economic needs 
within a locally acceptable time 
This list has several characteristics important to its use as a framework for 
assessing the likely acceptance of innovation: 
The characteristics related particularly to innovation at the level of the 
poor individual or community. 
The importance of the six basic factors varies according to situation or 
location, particularly with respect to knowledge or skill levels and in 
relation to current perceptions. 
Interactions among the six factors, or their mix in a given setting, 
may be more significant than any one or all taken separately. 
The factors are all dependent on the degree to which local control, or 
participation in the selection, of the technologies is organized. 
6 CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC ACCEPTABILITY (p. 52) 
The traits of a society - its patterns of adaptation to the environment and its 
economic organization, social and political institutions, and beliefs system - 
will all affect the acceptance and diffusion of biomass-based energy 
technologies. The influence of these variables will have to be assessed in 
the context of each local culture into which a technology is to be 
introduced. However, some generalizations can be proposed about those 
aspects of society and culture that play an important role everywhere in 
determining a biomass energy technology's acceptance or rejection. 
The following conditions appear to increase chances for acceptance: 
1. Adjustment to the system for allocating productive goods 
2. Compatibility with the existing work organization 
3. Adaptation to existing patterns of distribution 
4. Integration with the social structure 
5. Accommodation to authority 
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6. Harmony with prevailing values and ideology 
As with the six main indicators of technical feasibility, judging the effects of 
diffusion from any one of these cultural variables will lead to 
oversimplification. The interaction of these factors with each other is 
extremely complex. 
Diffusion of Information (p. 92) 
Although the focus of this report is on the diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies for the benefit of the poor, analysis of the factors affecting this 
process indicates that decisions are made at all levels of society (and indeed 
outside of the society, by international development technical assistance 
agencies and multinational corporations) that affect diffusion in many ways. 
At the highest level, policymakers and planners may require evidence that 
any type of biomass-based technology is practical and economically feasible. 
Successful diffusion almost always involves a national commitment. 
Development-assistance and funding agencies cannot independently institute 
or support energy technology diffusion projects where there is little or no 
national receptivity. Where a national commitment exists, the agencies also 
must be convinced of the economic justification of the project and its 
relative importance. 
Private and voluntary organizations and government extension agencies have 
related roles to play in the diffusion process, since both are in direct contact 
with the intended recipients. However, they may have different strengths; 
private organizations usually are more attuned to local perceptions and 
sensitivities, but may have limited technical knowledge and resources, while 
government agencies may have adequate information and resources but 
limited sensitivity. 
A principal conclusion, therefore, concerns the manner in which information 
about the technologies is compiled and conveyed to planners and 
policymakers, government and private agencies, and funding organizations. 
Extension Agencies (p. 94-95) 
Operation guidelines for government agencies and private and voluntary 
organizations should stress the following points: 
A survey of locally perceived energy needs should be among the first 
steps in planning. 
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Representatives of the local population, the donor agency, and the 
implementing group should collaborate in planning and implementa- 
tion. 
Planning and implementation should allow for regular monitoring and 
the early identification of problems. 
The probable sociocultural consequences of biomass-based energy 
technologies should be studied. 
Demonstration in a neutral context should precede wide dissemina- 
tion. 
The social status of initial innovators may be critical to successful 
diffusion. 
Subsidies or short-term incentives should be provided when the 
benefits of a technology are deferred. 
In many cases, energy technologies may have to be labor-intensive 
and require minimal local capital investment. Tasks should be 
structured in accordance with local patterns of work organization, 
capitalizing on existing technical skills and ingenuity. 
Existing management structures - rather than imposed organizational 
models - should be employed, so long as equity and efficiency are 
not jeopardized. 
Women should be explicitly assured of equal participation in the 
benefits of these projects whenever possible. 
The need to minimize costs may justify acceptance of lower levels of 
efficiency. 
[p 95:1 Existing systems for the allocation of land should be analyzed 
for possible impediments to technology diffusion. 
Information on renewable energy projects must flow from extension agencies 
to their funding sponsors, and also among these agencies themselves. 
Technical journals are excellent for this purpose, but slow; newsletters are 
particularly helpful. The use of audiovisual aids, particularly videotapes, 
may be justified to circumvent language barriers, as well as to communicate 
excitement and enthusiasm along with the technical information. 
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We now look into more depth into the adoption strategies of one particular region: Latin 
America. What emerges from this particular perspective, is the critical role that 
government and government policies play in the adoption of technology systems. 
Szekely, F. (ed.). 1983. Energy Alternatives in Latin America. A study 
sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations 
Environment Programme, and the Latin American Energy Organization. Tycooly 
International Publishing Limited, Dublin, Ireland. 85 p. 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION (p. 1) 
Over the past few decades, however, increasing attention has been given to 
the possible use of alternative sources of energy. In the developed 
countries, studies have intensified on the use of nuclear fission and fusion 
energy, magneto-hydrodynamics and renewable sources of energy (for 
example, solar, wind, geothermal, tidal and biomass). 
Due to the effects of the 1973 'energy crisis', interest in renewable sources 
of energy in the developing countries has grown, especially in decentralized 
systems and their applications. At present, the need to study the potential 
of these energy sources in Latin American countries has become necessary 
in view of the substantial increase in oil prices; the danger of exhausting oil 
reserves over the next few decades; the fact that only six countries of the 
Latin American region are self-sufficient in oil production; the fact that the 
style of development adopted in the region has deprived a large majority of 
the population from sharing its benefits, since third levels of energy 
consumption place them below minimum levels for satisfying basic needs; 
and the fact that the prevailing model of development, in addition to 
making existing economic and social problems more acute, has given rise to 
other problems, such as deterioration of the environment due to the 
exhaustion of certain resources and to the unleashing of pollution processes 
that have proved difficult to control. 
(p. 2) Consequently, this study is limited to the assessment of the region's 
potential for using the following sources of energy: direct solar, wind, plant 
material, biogas and small waterfalls and water flows. In view of the 
impossibility of studying all Latin American countries, the following were 
selected: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, 
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Peru, Trinidad and Tobago. They were considered to be representative of 
the region's efforts which are being realized in this field. 
(p. 2-3) The study is concerned essentially with the rural sector, since a 
reasonable increase in the availability of energy could play an important role 
in improving the [p. 3:1 quality of life of rural inhabitants and in affecting 
agricultural productivity. It is in this sector that the greatest deficit of 
energy is found in Latin America and it is here that decentralized energy 
systems could be widely used to complement conventional sources of 
energy. 
Factors Determining the Penetration Process (p. 63-68) 
The penetration process of technologies using renewable sources of energy is 
determined by diverse factors that variously influence these different kinds 
of technology. The following discussion presents a list of these factors, 
which, for presentation purposes, are classified as technological, economic, 
social, cultural and political. In practice, all are closely interrelated. 
[p. 64:1 Technological Factors 
Design: An important aspect of the design of equipment is its simplicity of 
use and maintenance, since such equipment is normally used by people of 
relatively low educational level and in isolated places where technical ser- 
vices do not exist for supervising the functioning of the equipment or 
making any required repairs. Since users value convenience, equipment 
must satisfy the need for energy with the least effort and concern on the 
part of the user. This is precisely one of the reasons consumers prefer 
electric power, although the cost per kilowatt hour is higher than that of 
other energy sources. The convenience element, for example, has led to 
solar collectors often being manufactured with automatic equipment to 
operate electrically when the temperature drops below a certain point. 
Manufacturers who have not included this feature have lost a certain 
amount of competitiveness. [Footnote: This is the reason why a certain 
portion of the public in Mexico continues to buy solar collectors imported 
from the United States despite the fact that they are also manufactured 
domestically.] 
Related to simplicity of design is the autonomy of the equipment, its 
capability of being used independently of other forms of energy. This is an 
important factor for certain uses. In some cases, design should consider 
specific characteristics of the places in which the equipment is to be used. 
Such is the case of solar collectors in areas with very hard water where it 
may be necessary to use different materials. 
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Quality: The quality, maintenance and reliability of equipment greatly 
influence its degree of acceptance by potential users. Cases have been 
known of unscrupulous manufacturers who have sold equipment of poor 
quality, insufficient duration and deficient operation to the detriment of the 
penetration of such equipment. Strict quality control is therefore extremely 
important. In some countries, considerable importance is being given to this 
aspect: for example in Argentina, the Argentine Solar Energy Association 
(ASADES) plans to set up a testing bank; in Brazil, quality guarantee 
certificates accompany such equipment. In most cases, the question of 
useful life and economic viability of equipment is a problem of materials 
technology that obliges countries either to import materials or to expend 
considerable research efforts to improve domestic materials. 
Availability of the Resource: Certain factors limit either the degree of 
penetration inherent in the resource itself or in its technological 
development. Obviously, one of these factors is the intermittency of the 
resource, which makes it necessary to find economical methods for its 
accumulation or to limit its use to those who do not require constant 
availability of energy. 
Level of Technological Development: In other cases, limitation derives from 
the fact that technology has not progressed sufficiently to make the 
manufacture of [p. 65:1 equipment commercially viable. This is the case, for 
example, with regard to solar energy to produce high temperatures of 250 
C or more. 
It may also happen that manufacturers have not made efforts to make 
changes in their equipment that would definitely increase their penetration. 
For example, wind-chargers could have a relatively larger market if it were 
possible to increase their power, which does not appear to be too difficult 
from a technical standpoint [Footnote: Interview with Mr. Pablo Brosens, 
partner of the SRL agro-industrial firm in Buenos Aires]. 
Unfortunately, with regard to research in Latin America, scientists are 
usually reluctant to perform research on soft technology, preferring to 
devote their efforts to more complex and sophisticated problems associated 
with concerns of the scientific community in the industrialized countries. 
This is compounded by a lack of contact between universities and the 
production sector, which means that research is rarely directed toward 
solving concrete problems - in this case the energy problems - of large 
sectors of the population [Footnote: Interview with a salesman from the 
Leopard, SA firm, manufacturers of windmills]. 
Economic Factors 
It has been stated previously that the economic viability of equipment is a 
necessary, although not sufficient, condition for penetration of a technology. 
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We will now analyze the factors that contribute towards increasing the 
economic viability of equipment. 
Production Cost: The determining factor here appears to be the production 
cost of equipment, although some researchers interviewed felt that this was 
a secondary factor, since substantial support is required from government to 
be able to introduce such equipment on the market. However, this 
argument is not valid since subsidies or any other kind of incentives are 
ultimately paid for by the entire community; consequently, if mass 
consumption is desired, the equipment must be produced at the lowest 
possible price. 
Economy of Scale: It is important to bear in mind that a kind of vicious 
circle exists with regard to cost since one of the important variables 
determining the cost of a specific piece of equipment is the volume of 
production, which in turn is determined by the degree of penetration of the 
technology, further influenced by the production cost of equipment that uses 
the technology. Overcoming this vicious circle requires clear-cut policies to 
support the development of the energy sector. 
Operation Cost: The economic viability of equipment and consequently the 
penetration of a technology are strongly influenced by the operation cost of 
alternative equipment, which is principally determined by the cost of 
conventional [p. 66:1 energy. The cost of energy for users is a political 
variable that depends essentially on the rate policies of the government 
concerned. If gas or electricity are inexpensive - as is the case in Trinidad - 
it is highly unlikely that equipment using renewable sources of energy will 
be competitive - except, of course, in areas of the country that are not well 
supplied with conventional energy [Footnote: A manufacturer of solar 
collectors in Argentina said his firm had decided not to attempt to introduce 
this equipment in the city of Buenos Aires since it was difficult to compete 
with gas heaters because the city was well supplied with relatively cheap 
and efficiently distributed gas]. Such dependence of the price of energy on 
political factors makes it possible for the situation to change suddenly, so 
that equipment that is competitive today may cease to be so tomorrow and 
vice versa. 
Cost of Transfer of Technology: The cost of equipment using renewable 
sources of energy manufactured under licence requiring the payment of 
royalties or patents may be higher in accordance with the arrangements 
made for the transfer of the technology in question. In countries with 
balance of payments problems, the situation may be aggravated by the 
scarcity of foreign exchange. 
Intensity of Use of Equipment: Another factor that often makes it difficult 
for equipment to be economically viable is inadequate use. Such is the case 
with cereal driers which are only used for a few months in the year. An 
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example of this may be found in the Salta region of Argentina, where an 
attempt has been made to manufacture solar tobacco driers. However, in 
order to encourage farmers to use them, some alternative use must be found 
that will make it possible to use them for longer periods; otherwise, an 
inordinate amount of time is required to amortize their cost. 
Marketing Network: Another factor having an influence on the penetration 
of such equipment is the need for an adequate marketing network that will 
make it possible to inform rural inhabitants of the possibilities offered by 
the use of non-conventional sources of energy and to have them observe 
how such equipment functions without the need to travel to urban centres. 
An adequate marketing network would also make it possible to provide 
appropriate technical servicing to the users of such equipment. 
Distribution of Income: The distribution of income in a given country is 
another factor that influences the prospects for the penetration of such 
equipment since, in addition to other factors, the size of the market is also 
important. On several occasions during the course of the interviews, it was 
noted that solar collectors at present can only be acquired by middle- and 
high-income sectors. 
Existence of Support Infrastructure: The use of certain non-conventional 
sources of energy requires support infrastructure to facilitate the work of the 
user. For example, the development of a programme of alcohol fuel would 
not be viable if it did not include provisions for supply stations that would 
fulfil the function of the (p. 67:1 gasoline stations presently supplying spent 
fuels. Establishment of such an infrastructure would probably require heavy 
investment and, therefore, support from the state is essential. 
Social Factors 
Resistance to Innovations in the Rural Sector: Technological innovations in 
the industrial sector usually encounter little resistance since, within the 
framework of economies of scale, their essential objective is to increase 
profits, which is relatively easy to achieve. In the rural sector, however, the 
situation is different since it is much more difficult to perceive the 
relationship between the innovation involved and the increase in production 
or improvement in the quality of life that may be obtained. In addition, a 
general lack of confidence exists with regard to innovations. 
Resistance to Innovations in the Public Sector: Resistance to new 
technologies also exists in the public sector. Certain government officials 
regard the use of renewable sources of energy with great scepticism, since 
such innovations are not to be found within the framework of technological 
pluralism and are consequently considered almost second-class technologies 
to which countries seeking development cannot assign great importance. 
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Structural Factors: Land tenure structures and the degree of organizations 
of small farmers are other factors that influence the penetration of these 
technologies. Landless campesinos or small landowners have no energy 
alternative other than human or animal energy or that of depredating the 
soil. Obviously in such cases, the possibility of using other energy sources 
arouses great interest. Certain equipment using renewable sources of energy 
are commercially justified if they can produce an amount of energy larger 
than the requirements of a single family. For this reason, a certain degree 
of campesino organization is essential in order to be able to use some of 
this equipment jointly [Footnote: Experience has been accumulated in India 
regarding the use of individual or collective biogas plants. Many of the 
difficulties encountered are not of a technical nature but rather are derived 
from lack of community organization]. 
Examples of Cultural Factors 
Cooking and Eating Habits of Users: This factor should also be considered 
in designing solar energy equipment, particularly solar kitchens. An 
example of how the failure to consider this aspect has been detrimental to 
the penetration of solar kitchens - one that is often criticized in the literature 
on this subject - is the case of a design for kitchens to be installed in the 
open air that was not accepted by the [p. 68] community because 
housewives were accustomed to cooking inside their homes. The case also 
exists of kitchens using biogas, which were also rejected because the food 
cooked in them bore a taste to which the users were unaccustomed. 
External Status Symbols: In some communities the possession of certain 
equipment or implements associated with urban domestic life may constitute 
status symbols, for example gas or electric stoves instead of wood-burning 
stoves, or conventional water heaters. This situation may constitute an 
additional difficulty for the penetration of certain equipment in some 
communities. 
Political Factors 
Government Attitudes: The penetration of this equipment is substantially 
determined by governmental policies. To date, the development of 
renewable sources of energy has generally been looked upon with little 
interest by governments since these sources will produce only long-term 
results and governments are under heavy pressure to deal with short-term 
problems. 
A determining factor in government attitudes is their development concepts. 
Governments that include among their principal development objectives that 
of attempting to satisfy the basic needs of the population more likely will 
give much greater priority to renewable sources of energy than those whose 
main objective is to increase the per capita income growth rate. 
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Attitudes of Certain Groups: At times, economic interests among certain 
groups of society may encourage them to frustrate the development of 
renewable sources of energy. During the Seminar on Energy in Guaruja, 
Brazil, the instance was mentioned of certain agricultural co-operatives that 
had opposed the introduction of solar soybean driers since it was felt that 
they would provide greater negotiating power to campesinos who would no 
longer feel pressured to sell this product [Footnote: Address by Professor 
Meyer of the University of Campinas]. 
Attitudes of Large Corporations: During the same seminar, several 
participants were of the opinion that in some cases opposition from large 
transnational corporations operating in the field also existed, since the 
multiplication of decentralized systems would diminish the great power they 
yield at present. 
Policies Directed Towards Increasing the Level of Penetration (p. 72, 74-76) 
Almost all of the studies that have been made on the possibility of 
increasing the use of renewable sources of energy agree that an essential 
requisite in so doing is Government support that can be translated into 
implementing the politics formulated for this purpose. This opinion was 
repeated on many occasions by people interviewed during the present 
study. 
The support the State must provide for the development of these energy 
sources cannot be indiscriminate. It must be centred on sources that use 
the natural resources possessed by the country in question and are most 
adaptable to its social and economic realities. Feasibility studies must be 
carried out in order to select those technologies with the most potential for 
producing a positive impact on the economy [Footnote: In this regard, 
awareness is being created on both national and international levels. For 
example, the Agency for International Development (AID) plans to initiate a 
support programme for extensive feasibility studies to determine future lines 
of renewable sources of energy]. 
Projects related to the development of renewable sources of energy cannot 
be evaluated simply on a private cost basis since the positive effects of such 
projects benefit the community as a whole. Consequently, project evaluation 
methods should be used that take into consideration the social, 
environmental and other effects such projects may bring about - methods 
such as cost-benefit analysis and the methodology recently developed by 
Technology Assessment. Cost-benefit analysis offers the advantage of not 
considering private costs or benefits but rather social ones, which are 
reflected in their opportunity cost. 
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It is interesting to note the conclusions of an evaluation of biogas plants 
using this methodology (Barnett, 1976). These conclusions may be applied 
to other renewable sources of energy. The principal conclusion is that 
biogas plants are most feasible in the following situations: (1) when diverse 
inputs have a low opportunity cost, that is when they have practically no 
alternate use; (2) when the [p. 74:1 efficiency of plant operation is 
inadequate and (3) when the alternatives to the products manufactured have 
a high opportunity cost. 
These conclusions are also applicable to other renewable sources of energy, 
and consequently the State should support their development in situations 
when this is most feasible. 
With respect to the first situation, an analysis is needed of what alternative 
uses there are of capital, labour, natural resources and other inputs that are 
employed to produce energy from renewable sources. Normally, natural 
resources (sun, wind, organic wastes) have no alternative uses; however, in 
some cases they do. One instance that demands careful study is the 
production of alcohol fuel from agricultural products, principally from sugar 
cane. In this case, the problem arises whether one can justify using land 
resources to produce energy instead of food. 
In the second situation, it should be noted that the study of plant efficiency 
is essentially technical. In some cases, efficiency may be increased by using 
hybrid systems, such as fossil fuels plus solar energy. For example, using 
solar collectors as fuel 'economizers' may be much more attractive than 
using complete systems based on this kind of energy. 
Lastly, the third situation depends on the opportunity cost of conventional 
energy. Here, it is important not to consider the price of the fuel which 
may be subsidized, but rather its opportunity cost - the real cost in 
resources of having that fuel available for the country in question. 
Once it has been determined which technologies using renewable sources of 
energy would have the most positive effects by being developed, the State 
should assume responsibility for carrying out whatever policies are 
necessary to foment such development - in other words, to increase 
penetration. Policies oriented towards increasing penetration may be of 
diverse types and, for the purpose of study, may be classified according to 
the objectives they aim to fulfil. 
Policies Directed Towards Promoting Technological Development of 
Equipment Using Renewable Sources of Energy 
The State may make a decisive contribution to the development of 
technologies concerning renewable sources of energy by assisting in 
financing research and encouraging such research to solve problems of a 
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practical nature. This may be accomplished within the general framework of 
governmental scientific and technological policy. Governments must attempt 
to establish some kind of control over the quality of equipment to ensure 
that it complies satisfactorily with the function for which it is designed. 
Current levels of technological knowledge are relatively high and it 
consequently appears more appropriate to devote greater efforts to seeking 
practical applications of already-known technology than to develop new 
technologies. Efforts should be concentrated on improving certain 
technological parameters - such as windmill power or obtaining higher 
temperatures by means of solar energy - which would make it possible to 
increase the market for such equipment. 
[p. 75:1 Policies Directed Towards Increasing the Economic Viability of 
Equipment Using Renewable Sources of energy 
In this respect, several parallel tactics may be adopted as a means of 
achieving, inter alia, the following objectives: 
(a) diminishing the cost of production of equipment: this may be 
achieved by means of furnishing technical and economic support to 
producers either by assisting them in acquiring inputs or by co- 
operating in their efforts to increase productivity; 
(b) expanding the market: a few measures that may contribute to 
achieving this objective are: 
purchase of equipment by the public sector; 
financial support to users to assist them in making the initial 
investment; 
elimination of legal restrictions that in some countries prevent the free 
use of renewable sources of energy. 
(c) increasing the intensity of use of the equipment: this will make it 
possible to reduce the amortization period; 
(d) co-operating in the organization of a marketing network; 
(e) increasing the competitiveness of equipment using renewable sources 
of energy: this may be achieved by means of exemptions or incentives 
designed to reduce the operating cost of new equipment, although 
this may be difficult since this cost normally is in itself quite low. 
Another possibility is to attempt to maintain the price of renewable 
energy as close as possible to its opportunity cost, which generally 
means increasing its price. A more drastic alternative consists of 
directly restricting the use of conventional energy by limiting the sale 
of fuel or in some way establishing strict environmental controls. 
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Policies Directed Towards Diminishing Resistance to Innovation 
An important role may be played by campaigns oriented towards obtaining 
greater acceptance of innovations by both users in rural areas and 
government officials on various levels. 
Generally speaking, there is a lack of information available concerning the 
real advantages and limitations of the use of renewable sources of energy as 
compared with the use of conventional sources. This lack of information, 
which must be remedied, limits penetration. 
Existing agricultural extension services may be useful during information 
campaigns. Other instruments may also be used, such as the construction of 
pilot plants or equipment as a means to demonstrate the advantage offered 
by the use of renewable sources of energy. 
[p. 76:1 Policies Directed Towards Considering Cultural Factors 
It is most important for the technicians - who are responsible for designing 
equipment to use renewable sources of energy - to understand cultural 
limitations clearly and to adapt the characteristics of such equipment to 
cultural realities. Often the problem is presented improperly by attempting 
to see how the cultural patterns of eventual users may be modified so that 
they will accept the technology in question. In reality, the matter should be 
dealt with by attempting to determine how cultural factors may be 
considered in designing such equipment. These policies may only be 
implemented insofar as governments fully assume the role they can play in 
the development of renewable sources of energy. 
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Energy, Energy Policy and Renewable Sources of Energy 
(p. 78) 
The development of renewable sources of energy demands singular 
awareness and concern on the part of those who make decisions in the 
energy sector in order to translate such decisions into well-defined policies. 
It is important that explicit policies - those laid down officially for the sector 
- should not contradict implicit policies - those defined by other sectors that 
impinge upon the energy sector. It may happen, for example, that the 
explicit policy calls for reducing the consumption of fossil fuels; however, 
such a policy will have little chance of success if, at the same time, implicit 
policies exist that contradict this objective, such as a policy entailing 
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artificially low fuel prices or a transportation policy based fundamentally on 
the development of highway transportation. For such concordance between 
energy and the policies promoted by other sectors to exist, some kind of 
high-level machinery must also exist with genuine authority to enforce 
established policies and resolve any differences that may arise with other 
sectors. 
(p. 78-79) In almost all the countries visited, organizations exist with 
functions related to the production or the consumption of energy. There are 
electric power companies responsible for the development of electrical 
systems and mining, energy and hydrocarbons departments or ministries 
responsible for exploring and exploiting oil or natural gas deposits and for 
the commercialization and distribution of fuels. In addition, there are 
transportation and industry [p. 80:1 departments or ministries that supervise 
activities that consume fuel and, lastly, organizations that are concerned 
with agricultural and rural developments, for which an adequate supply of 
energy is important. The multiplicity of organizations engaged in one aspect 
or another of the energy problem makes it essential to establish some kind 
of institutional machinery at the national level to co-ordinate the activities of 
such institutions and to assist in formulating energy policy criteria that 
consider the problem in its totality. 
Science, Technology and Institutional Machinery (p. 81) 
Institutional machinery to provide support to the scientific and technological 
sector may be of great importance in the development of renewable sources 
of energy. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the technologies for using 
these sources is an essential prerequisite either for transferring the most 
appropriate technologies to local realities or for developing new 
technologies. The problems involved in scientific and technological 
development are intimately linked with general problems of development 
and are relatively similar in any given field of research, such as housing, 
agriculture or energy. Generally speaking, one may say that analysis of 
scientific and technological systems may be carried out by considering three 
subsystems: information, education and transfer of technology. 
Information 
One of the recurring topics in the interviews with researchers in the field of 
renewable sources of energy was the need for more information on research 
being performed on this subject both within the region and in the 
industrialized countries. At present, such information may be obtained from 
scientific publications or by attending congresses or seminars on this topic; 
however, in both cases the information is obtained with a certain delay that 




The sine qua non condition for the success of any line of research is the 
existence of a 'critical mass' of researchers working in a single area. One of 
the first tasks to be carried out by countries interested in the development 
of renewable sources of energy is to form a basic nucleus of people 
specialized in the various sources involved. Scientists must be encouraged 
by appropriate incentives to choose renewable sources of energy as their 
main interest area. In view of the diverse aspects involved in the 
development and introduction of such sources of energy into the rural 
sector, which demand consideration of the social, cultural and economic 
characteristics of the potential users, it is necessary to organize 
interdisciplinary research groups that take these factors into account. 
Transfer of Technology (p. 82) 
One of the factors that has contributed to the inability of developing 
countries to respond appropriately to the challenge of technology has been 
the conditions under which the technology developed in the industrialized 
countries has been transferred to them. In recent years, thanks to the efforts 
of UNCTAD and other United Nations organizations, much greater 
awareness has been created with respect to the problems associated with the 
transfer of technology, such as the cost of such transfer, the various clauses 
that are generally included in transfer contracts and that prevent the 
developing countries from obtaining significant benefits and the negative 
long-term effects resulting from the purchase of inappropriate technologies 
and the ensuing inhibition of national technological development. These 
problems will emerge again in the transfer of technology to the use of 
renewable sources of energy if steps are not taken to develop national 
technological capacity. 
The problem is all the more serious in view of the large amounts of 
resources the industrialized countries have been allocating for some time to 
the development of renewable sources of energy, such as solar energy 
programmes or projects for constructing high-powered windmills to be 
hooked-up to power grids. 
(p. 83) In order to minimize the problems associated with the transfer of 
technology using renewable sources of energy, various Latin American 
countries have begun to establish instruments for controlling such transfers. 
In this respect, it is interesting to note the Brazilian experience in this area 
and Mexico's National Registry of the Transfer of Technology, which is 
empowered to review all contracts for the transfer of technology subscribed 
to by Mexican entrepreneurs with foreign companies. So far, these countries 
have not registered any transfer contracts for equipment using renewable 
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sources of energy, an indication that the same is probably true for the entire 
region. 
Manufacture, Marketing and Distribution of Equipment Using Renewable 
Sources of Energy (p. 83-85) 
The development of renewable sources of energy in Latin America demands 
that its countries be able to design and manufacture equipment to transform 
such sources into thermal, mechanical or electrical energy. The industrial 
capacity to produce such equipment exists in most of the countries in the 
region, albeit in varying degrees. Obviously, it will require much greater 
effort to increase quality as well as reduce costs, which in reality means 
increasing the capacity of local engineering to improve the design of this 
equipment. If this is not accomplished within a few years the region will 
see the introduction of mass-produced equipment in the industrialized 
countries, probably in kit form. 
In certain cases - for example, with regard to solar equipment - the problem 
consists not so much of a lack of knowledge about solar technology per se, 
as of improving materials technology to increase the useful life of such 
equipment. Thus, although capacity exists in these countries, an enormous 
amount of ground still remains to be covered in order to perfect equipment 
using renewable sources of energy. This problem has obvious institutional 
implications insofar as it will be necessary to secure much closer 
collaboration between researchers and the universities on the one hand, and 
the manufacturers of equipment on the other, in order to solve existing 
design and materials problems jointly. 
The existence of factories for the manufacture of equipment using renewable 
sources of energy in large urban centres does not ensure its distribution and 
marketing in rural sectors, precisely the area in which such equipment is 
most necessary. In the case of almost any commercial product, demand 
normally becomes the incentive for setting up distribution points throughout 
the national territory, without the need for institutional support to create 
such a network. However, the situation is different in this case, in which it 
would be in the interest of the State to publicize and promote the 
installation of equipment using renewable sources of energy, since the 
advantages of their use are perhaps not [p. 84:1 fully realized by potential 
users. This situation makes closer collaboration necessary between 
government organizations responsible for rural development and 
manufacturers or researchers desiring greater distribution of the equipment 
they are producing, whether on a commercial or experimental level. If it is 
hoped to promote greater use of this equipment, a marketing strategy must 
be formulated either by using already existing channels, such as agricultural 
banks and extension services, or by creating entirely new channels 
specifically for this purpose. 
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Another aspect related to distribution is the legal situation prevailing in a 
given country with respect to the use of some of the sources of energy 
discussed in this study. For example, in Brazil, the use of small waterfalls is 
controlled by the government; farmers wishing to use them must request a 
concession. Limitations of this kind may also exist in other countries. 
Means of Communication and Responsible Institutions 
An essential factor in the capacity of countries for developing renewable 
sources of energy is the belief by all sectors of the population - especially 
rural sectors - in the prospects and advantages offered by such sources. This 
requires intensive efforts in which both public and private means of 
communication should play an important role. For this purpose, high-level 
organization of a commission responsible for designing and implementing a 
publicity campaign on the advantages of renewable sources of energy may 
prove to be effective. Researchers working in this field should strive to 
translate the results of their efforts into ordinary language easily understood 
by people with little education so that the advantages and savings that may 
be obtained through the use of such equipment will be readily grasped. 
Certain organizations already existing in almost all countries, such as 
agricultural extension services with experience in introducing new 
agricultural technologies, could be instrumental in carrying out this activity. 
The development of pilot projects as demonstrations may also help to 
awaken interest in this equipment. 
Institutional Machinery and Financing 
All the institutional mechanisms mentioned require substantial financial 
support. Consequently, all the elements constituting the chain of 
development of equipment using renewable sources of energy - researchers, 
manufacturers, distributors and users - would benefit from access to 
financing that would assist them in researching, manufacturing, selling or 
buying this kind of equipment. The State should investigate special 
financing methods and mechanisms to develop this equipment since, 
although private investment in its development may not be highly 
advantageous, the social benefits to be derived are quite evident. Also, the 
principal problem involved in installing such equipment may be more a 
financial [p. 85:1 than an economic one since, although the savings achieved 
may be great, the users may not possess funds to make the required 
investment. 
The various problems outlined here demonstrate that development of 
renewable sources of energy requires creating or improving diverse 
institutional machinery, so that formulating and implementing the policies 
required to achieve this objective will be more feasible. 
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Lastly, one more reference should be listed for completion: 
Agarwal, B. Diffusion of rural innovations : some analytical issues and the case 
of wood burning stoves, World development Oxford : v. 11, no. 4 p. 359-376 
1983 
Based on larger study titled The woodfuel problem and the diffusion of 
rural innovations done for SPRU. Provides good review of development 
innovation literature. Offers a simple model whereby the effectiveness of a 
particular approach in the diffusion of an innovation depends on the 
technical, the economic and the social characteristics of the innovation. 
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6. THE CASE OF MARKETING POLICY RESEARCH TO DECISION-MAKERS 
An important output of research carried out in developing countries has a significant 
policy component to it. Policy research in the social sciences is generally targeted to 
decision-makers and policy-makers in government, and to community and political leaders. 
Packaging the results of several years of research in a way that will make sense to decision 
makers requires an appreciation of the context within which they operate. This process of 
communicating the results of policy research to decision-makers represents a special case of 
the utilization process, which has yet to be studied thouroughly. We present here some 
bibliographic references which could throw some light on the process, though none of the 
the references specifically address the question of "selling" to decision-makers. This should 
be a fruitful area of research in itself. 
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, Decision-Making in the Public Service for 
Choice of Technology: Report of a Workshop of Senior Officials i Kuala 
Lumpur, Commonwealth Programme for Applied Studies in Government, 
London, 1981. 
This workshop report was part of a programme begun in 1980 to help 
public administrators to improve their understanding and control of 
technological aspects of development. This report includes a summary 
record of the workshop and incorporates the papers reviewed by the 
participants. 
The workshop record has sections which introduce the nature of the 
workshop; summarize the participants' recommendations (action at national 
and international levels and with special attention to the needs of small 
nations). Four special foci were isolated: "policy and infrastructures for 
technology decision-making"; "technology information systems"; "use of 
consultants"; and "training needs specific to technology choice"; and 
summarized the deliberations of the participants. 
There are four background papers, each of which takes a particular issue 
(institutional structures, information acquisition and use, external consultants 
and training for decision-makers), and draws out the conclusions of four 
major country case studies (Fiji-Kiribati, India, Nigeria and the UK). The 
first three of these case studies have been published individually and are 
annotated elsewhere in this bibliography. 
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The background papers in the workshop report are very short and it is 
advisable to refer to the case studies if the reader is particularly interested. 
(DH - 26) 
BHATT, V., Decision-Making in the Public Sector. The Case of the Swaraj 
Tractor, World Bank Reprint Series, No. 96, 1978. 
An excellent detailed study of the process of decision-making and 
implementation of a new 20 horsepower tractor (for small to medium Indian 
farms) using entirely indigenous technology and inputs - i.e. designed from 
the start by Indians for existing local conditions. 
Initially the proposed project (in great detail) was not accepted by central 
government because of a lack of confidence in local technology especially in 
the face of existing tried and tested imports. The author also suggests an 
important interpersonal rivalry between the chief technical planner and the 
central government decision-makers. But it was taken up by the Punjab 
government with great difficulties in financing from the national 
development bank. 
The project was rigorously tested in terms of its economic and technical 
feasibility but no social analysis of its impact was undertaken (i.e. it was 
simply a response to an existing demand). Very good back-up services 
.were built-in to the project which eventually produced tractors at a profit 
and was highly regarded by the users. (DH - 175) 
JAMES, J., Bureaucratic, Engineering and Economic Men: Decision-Making for 
Technology in Tanzania's State-Owned Enterprises, ILO, World Employment 
Programme, Technology and Employment Project, Working Paper No. 125, 
Geneva, 1983. 
James refutes the idea that decision-makers in such enterprizes aim to 
maximize social welfare. He sees more fruit in conceptualizing such 
decision-makers as "bureaucratic men" i.e. lacking incentives to minimize 
costs (cost - plus pricing - no financial rewards for low costs) thus having 
other goals - such as initiating projects, (possibly aid-related and high 
prestige but involving low effort-levels from the state enterprize). This 
leads to easy and "impressive" technology choices; therefore few 
considerations of its aptness are made. The "engineering-man" hypothesis is 
also tested and found to have some relevance. Thus, instead of "economic- 
man" decisions the "engineering-man" decision would lead to "high product 
135 
quality" choices, "a desire to manage machines not men" and a "preference 
for using sophisticated machinery which appeals to his sense of aesthetics". 
Some policy conclusions include: encouragement of pressures to reduce 
costs yet maintain production targets (would lead to more technological 
calculatedness); a technology unit of state departments to prepare handbooks 
and put pressure on state enterprizes; better training including in-house for 
managers; the promotion of products requiring less capital intensive 
production technology; and the promotion of the image of small-scale 
production techniques while recognizing the vested interests against this. 
(DH - 182) 
JAMES, J., The Choice of Technology in Public Enterprise: A Comparative 
Study of Manufacturing Industry in Kenya and Tanzania, in Macro Policies for 
Appropriate Technology, edited by F. Stewart, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 
1987. 
Despite the substantial differences in the political structure of these 2 
countries the evidence on technology choice by their industrial public 
enterprizes shows a remarkable similarity of technological [p. 99:1 behaviour. 
Furthermore, the outcome of this behavioural pattern "appears to diverge 
from many of the most important national development goals of both 
countries". He concludes that these decisions are made with a single 
objective which is also most unimpeded by countervailing pressures from 
either the macro-environment or from other agencies of government. This 
"objective predisposes managers to search for investment projects in which, 
through various mechanisms and with varying degrees of directness, 
developed country patterns of scale, factor intensity and product 
characteristics are invariably closely reproduced". Factors such as pandering 
to "easy" options of foreign aid (including technological implications), poor 
training of managers (e.g. awareness of benefits of appropriate technology 
(AT)), weak measures to control managers of parastatals (finance, specifica- 
tion of AT target objectives etc.), the weakness of government bodies and 
policies to enhance the macro-environment for small-scale operations. (DH - 
183) 
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7. THE CASE OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
Given that over half of the research carried out in developing countries is in the 
agricultural area, it is not surprising that a great deal of interest has been shown in how 
that research is being disseminated. Agricultural innovation, in fact, has been the 
mainstay of such scholars as Rogers. A key vector for disseminating agricultural 
innovations has been the extension system, first instituted in the US at the turn of the 
century. A great deal has been written about extension, and there is even a journal that 
publishes regularly on the topic. We will review one work here, a World Bank evaluation 
of over 120 projects in the extension and technology transfer areas. Extensive excerpts 
will be reproduced, because this evaluation goes beyond just the 120 World Bank projects, 
but reviews the underlying principles of any extension system. It may well be, according 
to the Bank, that there is nothing wrong intrinsically with an agricultural extension 
system, but the financial and centralized management resources required to operate it 
effectively are so high, that few developing countries can afford to run one. 
The World Bank. 1985. Agricultural Research and Extension: An Evaluation of 
the World Bank's Experience. The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA. 110 p. 
PREFACE (p. vii) 
The conclusions in this study are based on a review of the World Bank's 
support for agricultural research and extension (R&E) in 128 projects in ten 
member countries over the period 197480. 
The projects reviewed include agricultural projects with research or 
extension components or both, and freestanding research or extension 
projects. At the time of the study most of the former had been completed 
and the majority of the latter were beyond the midpoint of their 
implementation period. The 128 projects reviewed represented 35 percent of 
the total number of projects that received the Bank's support for research 
and extension; the freestanding national research or extension projects 
reviewed accounted for 55 percent of the projects supported by the Bank. 
The ten countries included in the review were Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Thailand, and Turkey. The countries 
were selected to permit coverage of (1) the various approaches the Bank has 
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followed in providing support for research and extension; (2) all 
geographical regions as defined by the Bank for internal administration; (3) 
major agroecological zones; and (4) countries in which the Bank has 
supported research and extension for a period long enough to permit an 
analysis of the experience. 
MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (p. 3) 
The World Bank's efforts in support of research and extension (R&E) were 
significant and worthwhile, even though the efficacy of the approaches 
followed in various countries to address specific needs differed. This study 
proceeded from the premise that research and extension were related 
functions and examined the Bank's initiatives in this light. The study found 
that the Bank's support for R&E, which is still evolving, has helped 
highlight the importance of strengthening these two functions. 
(p. 4-5) The review found that, regardless of the approach followed in the 
ten countries studied, the level of R&E services needed to achieve the 
countries' development targets far exceeded the level of services provided. 
This gap was a result of the fact that the countries' development objectives 
were not fully related to the means available for achieving them and of the 
fact that R&E services were generally provided in a fragmented manner. 
The Bank's efforts to support the developments of R&E functions were often 
hindered by the limited response it received from [p. 5:1 policy-makers with 
regard to formulating and implementing the necessary actions. This limited 
response had two origins. First, the limited capability in some countries to 
effectively identify, prepare, and appraise R&E components and projects 
meant that they did not fully appreciate the urgent need for policy actions. 
Second, the Bank's suggestions for policy actions in support of R&E 
sometimes failed to reflect realistically existing political, institutional, and 
financial constraints in the countries. 
The study found inadequacies in resource allocation to an between research 
and extension; this reflected weaknesses in planning and monitoring 
processes in the countries. Frequently, development plans and project 
documents showed more concern with the quantity of resources allocated 
for R&E than with the effectiveness and impact of their use. The Bank 
attempted to help countries make better use of R&E resources in several 
ways: through its broad-based direct support to R&E systems, through its 
cooperation with other outside agencies financing activities in support of 
R&E, and through its policy dialogue with members. In some countries 
these efforts were successful; in others they were less so. Broad-based 
support for R&E has created additional demands for scarce budgetary 
resources, which some countries are unable to sustain. On the whole, the 
experience with cofinancing for R&E has been positive, although the 
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amounts involved have been limited. In the policy dialogue, the Bank has 
effectively used R&E components in agricultural and rural development 
projects in several countries as the precursor to freestanding. R&E projects. 
(p. 6-7) In extension components, the Bank's support has been worthwhile. 
The support has helped meet the urgent and realistic needs of developing 
member countries and has increased their awareness of the potential benefits 
of technology transfer. These extension components, however, have tended 
to stress the technology supply and service aspects of the extension function, 
often at the expense of its education aspect. This emphasis has been a 
result of limited correlation between the scope and substance of extension 
components and the state of the research function in the country; it is also a 
reflection of limited emphasis on proper resource management. 
The major strength of Bank-supported extension through agricultural projects 
was its ability to increase the access of groups of farmers, particularly small 
farmers, to an integrated package of technology. The package, which 
included physical inputs, credit, [p. 7:] technical advice, and other services, 
proved especially useful for farmers involved in the production of a variety 
of crops and livestock. Technology could be transferred to these farmers 
under conditions of limited or unskilled manpower and weak national 
research. During the implementation of many extension components, 
however, the provision of inputs and services tended to prevail over the 
actual extension either because there was no need for actual extension, 
owing to the simplicity of the technology used and the farmers' prior 
familiarity with it, or, where extension really was needed, because of the 
lack of suitably trained extension personnel. 
The full-scale extension projects supported by the Bank covered a wider 
area and a larger number of farmers than did the extension components in 
agricultural and rural development projects. The full-scale projects sought 
to introduce organizational change and to improve the performance of 
extension workers. This approach appeared to suit countries with large 
numbers of small farmers at a low level of technological development and 
with abundant but poorly trained and inadequately used extension staff. 
These projects, however, often made unrealistic assumptions about the 
availability and quality of technical and extension specialists. As a result, 
limited effort was made to significantly upgrade the competence of 
specialized personnel and to expand their availability. 
(p. 10) The more successful extension organizations displayed a combination 
of some of the following characteristics: 
Flexible extension methodology to fit the nature of the technology 
being extended, clients' needs, and the means available to the country 
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Close coordination of the extension function with other technology 
transfer functions 
Active participation by extension personnel (subject matter specialists), 
along with researchers, in translating research results into 
recommendations for users 
A formal feedback mechanism that directly reflects clients' points of 
view rather than observers' opinions of what those points of view are 
or should be (this may require training clients to work together in 
articulating their demands more clearly to research and extension 
staff) 
Clearly defined job descriptions for extension personnel, who are 
supervised and evaluated on the basis of these job specifications 
Adequate attention to both the technical skills and the communication 
or pedagogical skills needed by extension personnel in view of the 
technology to be extended and the clients to be served 
Extension projects should emphasize (p. 12-13): 
Formal training for higher-level extension personnel in technical 
agricultural subjects as well as in communications 
job descriptions for extension personnel that are consistent with the 
country's administrative procedures and the existing reward system 
Training that relates to (1) the country's demand for skilled 
manpower, its training capacity, and its budgetary limitations both 
during and after the project's completion, (2) the differences in the 
levels of technology being used by various groups of farmers, and (3) 
the potential for tradeoffs between the use of human resources and 
the communication media for extension 
Formal professional links between research and extension 
[p. 13:] The establishment of channels through which farmers, 
especially the less privileged among them, can influence the form and 
substance of extension being provided. 
(p. 30-31) In Indonesia, Sudan, and Thailand, the early stages of 
development of R&E systems reflected the historical orientation of the 
organized section of their production systems to supply raw agricultural 
materials (such as rubber, cotton, and other commercial crops) to industries 
outside these countries. Policymakers in these countries had to go (or are 
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still going) through a process of trial and error to expand and adjust their 
old systems to serve the needs of the entire agriculture sector. Repeated 
changes in he organization of R&E in Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Turkey 
were indicative of the awareness of policymakers that their systems had not 
been adequately responsive to national needs. One observation, common to 
these countries and others, was that attempts to reorganize the R&E system 
were not comprehensive because they did not address the major factors 
(such as manpower, operating funds, allocation of responsibilities, authority, 
and staff motivation) that accounted for the weakness of the existing 
organization. In addition, policy decisions related to organizational reforms 
often addressed the consequence of the problems (such as ineffective 
organization) rather than the problems themselves (for example, limited 
manpower capability and limited policy priority given to R&E). 
The persistence of weaknesses in the national R&E systems of these 
countries allowed a demand for technology to grow unsatisfied. As a 
result, some R&E clients sought services outside the national system (these 
included agencies responsible for the implementation of rural development 
programs) or produced their own services, often independently of the 
national system (the research on fruits and vegetables in Morocco, for 
example). Because of such reactions by the users of R&E services, there has 
been an increase in the awareness of policymakers of the usefulness of R&E, 
of the inadequacy of national R&E organizations, and of the [p. 31J need to 
rethink their approach to building a permanent national R&E capability. 
There is evidence of that rethinking in the nature of actions taken by 
policymakers: a progressive change in favor of planned and integrated 
interventions in some countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Sudan, and 
Thailand, for example). 
Research Organization (p. 47-48) 
Judging from the case studies, efficiency in the organization of research 
systems was not easy to achieve in smaller countries with simple 
administrative structures. In fact, it was the larger countries in the sample 
that seemed to have more efficient organizations. Six factors emerged as 
common features of the more successful research organizations reviewed: 
A strong central organization with overall responsibility for most 
aspects of national research and with funds to carry out its 
responsibility 
Some degree of autonomy from the routine bureaucratic structure of 
the Ministry of Agriculture 
Good links to the national planners and policymakers despite the 
organization's semiautonomous of autonomous structure 
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Service units - either directly part of, or closely related to, the central 
research organization - that perform important planning, monitoring, 
and evaluation functions 
[p. 48:1 A planned decentralization of regional research 
Active participation in translating research results into recommen- 
dations communicable to users. 
Although there was no single formula appropriate to all circumstances, it 
was dear that any coordinating mechanism must ensure that sound links 
exist among national policymakers, research planners, and clients. If there is 
an umbrella management organization for research (which seemed valuable 
for larger countries), it must have control over research funds and be 
provided with adequate supporting services for planning, monitoring, 
evaluation, economic and statistical analysis, and financial management. It 
was the absence of these factors that rendered coordinating institutions 
impotent and defeated efforts to establish effective national research 
organizations. It is important that the coordination function not be confused 
with that of top-down central control. The latter may be as ineffective as 
fragmentation. 
(p. 57-58) Internal Linkages and Transfer of Research Results. The picture 
in this area is bleak. For instance, the Indian Agricultural Research Institute 
has not produced a comprehensive report of its scientific activities since 
1977. In Sudan, many researchers in the national research organization did 
not even recognize the need to be accountable for their results or to be 
responsible for transmitting the results to potential users. Horizontal 
communications among research institutions were inadequate in most 
countries because of the fragmentation of responsibilities. Weaknesses in the 
mechanisms for communication of research results to farmers were evident, 
even in countries where the Bank supported national extension projects. 
These weaknesses resulted mainly from inadequate communication between 
research workers and extension agents. In several countries, both research 
and extension services transmitted technical information independently and 
separately to farmers. Examples of duplication, and even of conflicting 
recommendations, were found in Indonesia, Thailand, and Turkey. 
The quality of both the information and the means of its transmission was 
often poor. In Brazil, communication was specifically recognized as vital to 
the success of research, and an attempt was made to train staff and to 
establish units killed in the reception and transmission of information; this 
was very much an exception. The importance of communications as an 
essential element in solving linkage problems was not well recognized by 
national agencies or, at times, by the Bank. This lack of recognition [p. 58:1 
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was evident from the fact that the supervision reports made no mention of 
the failure of research and extension training centers to utilize adequate and 
up-to-date equipment, mass media, and teaching methods, even where these 
were financed by the Bank. 
Status of Extension Personnel (p. 61) 
Agricultural extension has historically been perceived as a function of low 
status performed by poorly qualified and poorly equipped persons who deal 
with poor and, frequently, illiterate farmers in remote rural areas. This 
perception has been supported by facts: low salaries, unclear job 
description, poor supervision of performance, and poor quality of work by 
extension personnel. 
Lack of an Adequate Reward System. Salary scale and allowances were set 
by the civil service. The provision for improving salaries across the board 
or on the basis of merit was limited. Prior to the Bank's involvement, there 
was no indication in the countries visited that any type of reward system 
had ever been considered - let alone established. 
(p. 62) Job Description for Extension Personnel. A common feature within 
national extension systems has been the excessive involvement of field-level 
extension personnel in the noneducation aspect of technology transfer. For 
example, in India, prior to the Bank's involvement, village extension workers 
had multipurpose assignments within the Community Development 
Program; they spent only a limited amount of their time on agricultural 
programs and even less time on agricultural extension. In Kenya, Nigeria, 
and Turkey, agricultural extension workers helped run production 
campaigns that were heavily involved in the provision of inputs and other 
services. In Brazil, Morocco, and Thailand, administrative responsibilities 
diluted the role of extension personnel. 
The Bank's approach to this problem, particularly in the full-scale extension 
projects it has supported in Asia, has been to insist that extension personnel 
work full time on the knowledge transfer component of technology transfer. 
(p. 64) Supervision of Extension Personnel. A common problem associated 
with unstructured, multipurpose job assignments for extension personnel in 
the field has been poor supervision of their work. Where it was difficult to 
define the agents' assignments, it was equally difficult to establish criteria to 
evaluate their performances. 
(p. 64-65) Quality of Extension Personnel. The poor quality of field-level 
staff was a problem common to all countries. There was general agreement 
among the countries visited that the poorly educated and poorly trained 
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extension staff were not fully [p. 65:1 equipped to disseminate improved 
technology to farmers effectively. 
Resource Allocation, Development, and Management (p. 66-67) 
The allocation of available resources among various elements of the 
technology transfer system within countries was affected by [p. 67:1 several 
factors. First, the extension (knowledge transfer) element tended, 
historically, to be combined at the operational level with other technology 
transfer functions. This confusion was partly a result of the fact that 
organized extension was an alien concept in most developing countries; not 
enough time had elapsed for them to recognize the importance of, and need 
for, an effective extension service. Second, the extension function depended 
on the availability of knowledge worth transferring. The development of 
such knowledge was slow in most countries. The extension element thus 
had no basis for acquiring recognition as a function. Third, the transfer of 
technology from more advanced countries had created needs for the supply 
and the distribution of marketed inputs and for accompanying services at a 
time when the physical and institutional means available in various 
countries were not sufficient to meet them. Consequently, the extension 
function, which was less tangible and more difficult to perform, was often 
sacrificed in favor of other technology transfer functions. Fourth, various 
technology transfer functions were considered separately for purposes of the 
allocation of resources, particularly of those resources originating outside the 
country. These functions thus competed with one another for resources. 
(p. 70-71) The lesson to be learned from these examples is that an imbalance 
in resource allocation does not have to be corrected by creating an 
imbalance elsewhere, nor does it have to be corrected overnight. Because 
extension was neglected in favor of supply and service functions, countries 
need to balance their support to various functions in such a way that these 
functions remain useful and [p. 71J complementary to one another. Each 
country should be able to afford to provide these services to its farmers; 
this requires, first, careful planning and sequencing of project inputs 
(recognizing the country's limitations) and, second, proper management of 
existing resources and selective development of new resources. 
Extension MethodoloQV (p. 71-72) 
At one end of the spectrum, agricultural extension is a communications task: 
transferring information about new farm practices from research to potential 
users and getting feedback from users to researchers. This is all that would 
be needed if the technological practices being introduced did not require 
major changes in the existing production process. Farmers could simply 
substitute the new practice for an old one and expect a higher output. For 
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example, a crop variety could be rendered more efficient (that is, provide a 
higher yield) by the application of fertilizer or other inputs. 
At the other end of the spectrum, agricultural extension can be seen as an 
education task consisting of both the communications task and the added 
task of helping farmers adapt their production process to take full 
advantage of the technological practice suggested. This role would apply 
whenever the technological practice being introduced led to major changes 
in the existing production process and required farmers to relearn how to 
combine their factors of production optimally. 
The Bank's support for agricultural extension in national projects has 
favored heavy reliance on demonstrations, small group meetings, and farm 
visits [This applied particularly to India, Indonesia, and Thailand, where the 
training and visit technique of extension was utilized. Appendix 5 provides 
a further explanation of extension methodology.] To be properly 
implemented, this approach had to be labor-intensive. But because 
extension workers were often poorly educated, their task consisted, for the 
most part, in transmitting a technical message at regular periods to farmers. 
Therefore, the extension agent became more of a person-to-person 
communicator than an extension agent. This approach appears to have 
worked in two cases: those in which the objective was to [p. 72:1 assist 
farmers in acquiring technological elements that did not substantially alter 
existing production processes and those in which the emphasis in the 
extension agent's job was more on transfer of information than on 
education. 
(p. 73-74) The preceding discussion suggests that extension (communication 
and education) should be regarded as a tool of technology transfer, which 
can be adjusted to serve that end (transfer of technology) under varying 
circumstances (depending on the nature of technology and the characteristics 
of clients). It is the circumstances that determine the extent and the nature 
of adjustment (mix between communication and education) and, 
consequently, the nature and intensity of the extension effort required. The 
extension methodology should be selected to fit the circumstances [p. 74:] 
under which it is to be applied. The opposite approach of attempting to 
change the circumstances to fit the methodology may work under certain 
conditions, but it cannot be viable in the long term. 
Linkages (p. 79-80) 
As part of the technology development and transfer system, an extension 
organization has to (1) be knowledgeable of, and responsive to, the needs of 
its clients; (2) have a source of knowledge to rely on for answering client's 
questions; and (3) have established channels to supply inputs and services 
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that complement extension. The linkages between extension and these three 
elements are reviewed in the remainder of this section. 
Extension-Research Linkages. Bridging the gap between research and 
extension has probably been the most serious institutional problem in 
developing an effective R&E system; this is particularly so in countries in 
which these two functions are carried out by different organizations. 
Historically, attempts at linking R&E have been through individual initiative, 
through formal meetings organized for research and other agricultural 
technical staff, or though coordinating or technical committees. India was 
the first among developing countries to try to establish a formal link based 
on the system of land grant universities in the United [p. 80:] States. More 
recently, attempts at linking extension and research were centered on that 
portion of the R&E continuum consisting of technology testing and 
demonstration. The agricultural technical specialist, who has been referred 
to as the subject matter specialist in the extension literature, became the key 
actor in establishing a bridge between extension and research. 
(p. 82-83) Extension-Client Linkages. Concern over the linkages between 
extension services and their clients stems from the need for feedback to (1) 
determine the usefulness of technologies being extended to clients; and (2) 
ensure that extension approaches are adapted to the specific needs of 
various groups of farmers. 
Extension organizations in the countries visited were traditionally top-down 
institutions; they operated on the assumption that R&E personnel knew 
farmers' problems and goals. Attempts at correcting this misconception 
were concentrated on encouraging the establishment of internal feedback 
channels within extension services through regular contacts between 
extension workers and farmers. This mechanism, although an important 
step in the right direction, still left farmers at the mercy of the extension 
agent's willingness and capability to comprehend their problems and 
transmit them to researchers. The extension organization in such a case lost 
touch with clients and took on its own objectives, which included its 
survival. More positive steps have been taken in some cases. In the dairy 
project in India, farmers' cooperatives at the village level were set up and 
their memberships taught to look after their own interests, including their 
interests in the development and [p. 83:1 transfer of technology. These 
farmers' organizations took an active interest in the relevance and quality of 
the services provided to their members. 
The Bank's support for extension stressed the need for feedback from 
farmers. However, only a few projects in the countries visited had concrete 
proposals and funds for establishing formal structures through which 
farmers could participate in the planning and programming of R&E. In 
most extension projects, the Bank supported reliance on feedback through 
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field-level extension agents, but most of the extension organizations visited 
lacked the capability to check on the quality of such feedback. 
The example of dairy farmers in India illustrated the need to provide 
channels through which the less privileged groups could express their points 
of view and, thus, make the technology transfer function more useful. 
Numerous case studies have indicated that small farmers, in general, and 
women, in particular, had the least say on either the form or the substance 
of extension. 
Because small farmers were more vulnerable to risk than large farmers, the 
former were often perceived as being more resistant to change. Extension 
workers were naturally drawn to those farmers who were likely to find 
their information useful and to appreciate their help; these were, very often, 
farmers with large landholdings. Such actions of extension workers had 
implications on the types of problems fed back to the research system for 
the development of future technology. Moreover, because the extension 
function was often tied closely to the supply of inputs and services, those 
farmers who had their own means or were qualified for credit gained more 
access to inputs and technical assistance. Therefore, if the supply of inputs 
and services was limited, extension agents paid more attention to farmers 
with more economic and political power; these generally were not the small 
farmers. 
Given this rather broad critique of the extension system, let us examine some alternatives 
that are being proposed. There are many such systems and projects being proposed 
throughout the world, it should be noted, and this represents an area of research in itself. 
CHAMBERS, R., and GHILDYAL, B., Agricultural Research for Resource-Poor 
Farmers: The Farmers-First-and-Last Model, IDS (Sussex) Discussion Paper No. 
203, 1985. 
The normal transfer-of-technology (TOT) model for agricultural research has 
built-in biases which favour resource-rich farmers whose conditions resemble 
those of research stations. "A second emerging model is farmer-first-and-last 
(FFL). This starts and ends with the farm family and the farming system. 
It begins with a holistic and interdisciplinary appraisal of farm families' 
resources, needs and problems and continues with on-farm and with-farmer 
research and development, with scientists, experiment stations and 
laboratories in a consultancy and referral role". The authors make the case 
that FFL suits poor farmers better than TOT, but that there are major 
obstacles to its development and introduction. They go on to make 
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suggestions as to how these could be overcome by illucidating four specific 
proposals for FFL systems and analysing their likely strengths and 
weaknesses. From this they stress methodological innovation; 
interdisciplinarity; resources; rewards structures; and training. (DH - 136) 
HERATH, H., Role of Rural Institutions in the Diffusion of Agricultural 
Innovations in Sri Lanka, ILO, World Employment Programme, Technology and 
Employment Project, Working Paper No. 109, 1983. 
This paper is the fourth in a series of papers on the role of institutional 
factors in the generation and diffusion of agricultural innovations. It draws 
on the conceptual paper by Ruttan (Working Paper No. 67), and follows two 
case studies (Kenya, Working paper No. 95, and North Vietnam Working 
Paper No. 98). This study is somewhat narrower than the others in that it 
concentrates on one particular example of technology; namely high yielding 
varieties of rice, (the others deal with a range of technologies). It also is 
the result of detailed empirical investigation. 
As in all ILO WPs on technology and employment, the focus is primarily 
on employment connotations. 
The study was based on two villages (one in a wet zone the other a dry 
zone) and attempted to isolate the effects of institutional factors (farm size, 
land tenure, demographic variables, etc) and formal technology institutions 
(extension services etc). The author found that with respect to the latter, 
informal mechanisms such as word of mouth were more important. He 
also drew out interesting relationships between the former institutional 
factors and the demand for, and ability to receive, new technologies. (DH - 
145) 
MAXWELL, S., The Role of Case Studies in Farming Systems Research, 
Agricultural Administration, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1986. 
This paper discusses the case study method as a useful and cost effective 
addition to the range of research tools used in multi-disciplinary farming 
systems research (FSR). The author argues that the case study as a tool in 
FSR is in danger of being ignored. He provides general arguments for a 
case study approach as well as those specific to FSR. With respect to the 
latter he argues that the case study method provides information that would 
be hard to obtain by other means, as well as an opportunity for close 
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collaboration between social scientists, natural scientists and farmers. (DH - 
148) 
CLARK, N., and CLAY, E., The Dryland Research Project at Indore 1974-80 - An 
International Innovation in Rural Technology Transfer, IDS (Sussex) Discussion 
Paper, No. 222, 1986. 
This paper analyzes an alternative to the conventional model of agricultural 
research and extension (i.e. scientists in research stations establish 
"principles" which are subsequently spread by the relationship of extension 
workers and farmers) by assessing the Indore Dryland Research Project. In 
this project, "scientists from different disciplines work directly with farmers 
in a concerted effort to raise yields in a catchment area of around 2,300 
hectares". Extension agencies played more of a service function. 
This paper, first, describes the structure and activities of the project, then 
assesses the main effects. There was a rapid (especially in the first three 
years) growth of productivity due to increased yields per crop per acre and 
changes in the cropping pattern. These were centrally dependent on 
improved soil and water management. The authors also note a slowing 
down in progress after the initial phase in part due to changes in personnel, 
but also due to the comparative ease of early progress. The overall positive 
picture was also qualified by the recognition of a possible "glass house 
effect" i.e. an intensive concentration of activity by scientists in a limited 
area. 
The authors nonetheless found the experiment to have had largely positive 
effects and they therefore attempt to place the concept within the overall 
field of science policy analysis. They thus trace the development of 
thinking on appropriate technology to an increasing interest in the dynamics 
of technical change in developing countries. Clearly the role of agricultural 
research and extension is closely linked to the processes of technical change. 
The relevance of the Indore project, apart from the local impact, is that it 
shows that more organic models of rural technology transfer can be 
successful. In essence, the authors argue that "the project is consistent with 
a view of the process of technological change which is essentially evolution- 
ary and holistic". 
The paper also includes a bibliography which is a useful guide to recent 
literature on agricultural technology change and the role therein of 
institutions.( DH - 138) 
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RANIS, G., STEWART, F., Rural Linkages in the Philippines and Taiwan, in 
Macro Policies for Appropriate Technology, edited by F. Stewart, Westview, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1987. 
The authors make the general case that rural industries tend to be 
appropriate in that they are more labour intensive and produce more 
appropriate products using a higher proportion of local resources e.g. 
furniture is usually simple, low-cost and uses local materials. Given this 
and the strong links between agricultural and rural industrial prosperity 
they argue for policies which enhance these links and thus stimulate more 
and "better" growth in a "virtuous circle". Using the cases of Taiwan and 
the Philippines they show that despite similarly impressive agricultural 
production growth rates the growth of rural industries has been much less 
impressive in the Philippines. A vast array of policies such as: land 
distribution, prices, credit, research and development, industrial and trade 
policies are shown to influence consumption and production (backward and 
forward) linkages. Most importantly they point out that agricultural growth 
has a very strong off-farm local employment effect (in the Philippines a 1% 
agricultural output increase led to over 1% increase in non-agricultural 
employment). Thus, reversing the decline in agriculture in much of Africa 
"is the single most important aspect of promoting appropriate technology in 
the rural areas". (DH - 152) 
AGARWAL, B., Cold Hearths and Barren Slopes: The Woodfuel Crisis in the 
Third World, London, Zed Books, 1986. 
This book looks at the scale, causes and possible solutions to the woodfuel 
crisis in the Third World drawing on the experiences of East and West 
Africa, Asia and parts of Latin America. The woodfuel crisis is related to 
social and political inequality from the international to the household level. 
The remainder of the book is concerned with solutions to the crisis. The 
main technical aspects of woodfuel innovations - tree planting schemes and 
improved wood burning stoves - are examined. This is followed by an 
analysis of diffusion of rural innovations (Chapter 3 to Chapter 5). Chapter 
3 constructs an analytical typology of rural innovations according to their 
technical, economic and social characteristics. Chapters 4 and 5 evaluate 
factors that lead to success or failure in diffusion of improved wood 
burning stoves, and social forestry and other tree planting schemes 
respectively. An appendix examines the diffusion of improved charcoal 
kilns. 
With respect to wood burning stoves the author concludes that a crucial 
factor in successful diffusion "is the importance of adapting the stove to the 
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users' needs and of involving the potential beneficiaries as closely as 
possible in the designing and building of the stoves". 
For tree planting crucial factors are whether the scheme is "top down", 
access to and control over land and the nature of the implementing agent 
(government/ community or private management). 
The final chapter (Chapter 6) examines how to evaluate woodfuel diffusion 
programmes. Ex post and ex ante evaluations are discussed but it is argued 
that in either case effectiveness will depend on the approach by which 
evaluation is carried out ("top-down") or participatory), by whom (local 
people or outside evaluators) and the method of data collection 
(questionnaires, group discussions etc.). No single method is advanced as 
universally correct and it is argued that the crucial consideration is who 
does the evaluation. 
This book also has a useful and substantial bibliography. (DH - 156) 
HERRERA, A., The Generation of Technologies in Rural Areas, in World 
Development, Vol. 9, pp. 21-35, 1981. 
The author first criticizes the weakness of attempts to generate and diffuse 
appropriate technologies (AT) due in his mind to the lack of a coherent 
concept of development as a reference point and the assumptions or 
paradigms emanating from rich countries which underlay current attempts. 
He then proposes an interactive research and development procedure with a 
premium on communication with rural dwellers and more emphasis on 
traditional technologies at least as contributors to new solutions to social 
problems or objectives. He also stresses the need to understand the 
dynamic socio-economic elements in which a technological problem is 
always immersed. (DH - 171) 
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8. THE CASE OF NEW STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES 
A lot has been written about the importance of strategic technologies in the industrialised 
countries: microelectronics, artificial intelligence, advanced materials, biotechnology. Less 
has been written about these new technologies for developing countries. Here is a selection 
of citations on the topic. 
BHALLA, A., JAMES, D., and STEVENS, Y. (eds), "Blending of New and 
Traditional Technologies: Case Studies", ILO (Monograph), Tycooley, Dublin, 
1984. 
This book attempts to elucidate an emerging trend whereby advanced 
technologies (specifically microelectronics, biotechnology, space satellites, new 
materials technology and solar energy) are being blended with more 
traditional technologies. Blending implies the specific integration of new 
and old technologies in the same production process. The book draws on 
19 case studies from developed and developing countries to highlight the 
actual blending processes. These include: 1. a review of "off-line uses of 
microcomputers in selected developing countries" - 4 case.studies of 
microcomputer application in statistical compilation, development projects, 
financial management and engineering research; 2. "The use of numerically 
controlled machines on traditional lathes in the Brazilian capital goods 
industry" - which very briefly traces the diffusion and economic impacts of 
a particular numerically-controlled lathe; 3. "Electronic lead-controlled mini- 
hydroelectric projects: experiences from Columbia, Sri Lanka and 
Thailand" - examines the application and effects of an electronic device 
which controls the load on hydroelectric plan alternators in the 3 countries; 
4. "The application of biotechnology to metal extraction: the case of the 
Andean countries - bacterial leaching of metals from ores or concentrates 
can reduce the cost of mining [p. 3:1 low-grade metals and prolong activity 
in small and large operations; 5. "Cloning of palm oil trees in Malaysia" - 
traces effects of large-scale application of new technology; 6. "Technological 
change in palm oil in Costa Rica" - again traces a large scale corporation 
application of new biotechnology; 7. "Bio-technology application to some 
African fermented foods" - Kaffir corn (sorghum) beer, Nigerian ogi (pap), 
Gari and Mahewu are all processes requiring fermentation, this article 
assesses the application of effects of new biotechnologies in their 
preparation; 8. "Use of satellite remote-censing techniques in West Africa" - 
two case studies: one of rice production forecasting in Mali and Guinea 
and the other a hydrogeological investigation in Niger (to trace water 
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supplies); 9. "India's rural educational television broadcasting via satellites" 
essentially notes the weaknesses of a series of educational projects by these 
means, especially the commercialization of the television programme; 10. 
"New construction materials for developing countries" - this briefly outlines 
the idea of fibre reinforced concrete which adds flexibility and strength to 
cement as well as having a lower density, better thermal insulation and 
absorption characteristics than more conventional steel or asbestos reinforce- 
ments; 11. "Photovoltaic solar-powered pump irrigation in Pakistan" - solar- 
powered units can provide irrigation for very small farmers who often 
benefit little from more conventional tubewells - this paper review the 
application of 20 photovoltaic solar-powered irrigation pumps in 1981; 12. 
"Photovoltaic power supply to a village in Upper Volta" - examines the use 
of solar cells as a power source for common village tasks with special 
emphasis on womens' tasks. 
This book also contains a select bibliography devoted to the topic of 
blending new and traditional technologies. (DH - 3) 
Here is a later publication by the same authors: 
Bhalla, A.S., James, D. 1988. New Technologies and Development: Experiences 
in "Technology Blending". A study prepared for the International Labour Office 
within the framework of the World Employment Programme. Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, CO, USA. 336 p. 
PREFACE (p. ix) 
Can the developing countries exploit the tremendous potential of new 
technologies in the interests of the bulk of their poor populations, or will 
the poor of the Third World continue to be bypassed by the discoveries of 
technical progress? This question deserves to be at the heart of the current 
debate about the potentials and pitfalls of the new technological revolution. 
This volume poses this question, inter alia, and tries to marshal empirical 
evidence in support of the assertion that, through conscious policies and 
governmental efforts, the new technologies like microelectronics, new 
biotechnologies, telecommunications, remote sensing, photovoltaics, and laser 
technologies can be harnessed for the benefit of the majority of Third World 
populations. This can be done particularly if ways are found to combine 
the utilization of new technologies with the traditional activities and 
methods of production which characterize the urban and rural poor in these 
countries. 
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INTRODUCTION (p. 1) 
The new technological revolution based on microelectronics, new materials 
and biotechnologies, remote sensing, and communications satellites is here to 
stay, and it is likely to change the economic, social, and perhaps political 
spheres of life. Although this revolution has originated in the advanced 
countries (like its precursor, the Industrial Revolution) it is clear that 
developing countries cannot remain disinterested spectators. The 
implications of new frontier technologies are all-pervasive and they are 
going to affect (and indeed, in many cases, they are already affecting both 
the South and the North. Therefore, this one-world opportunity (and at 
times, problem) needs to be well managed and harnessed so that its 
potential can be fully exploited. 
We maintain that the developing countries are most likely to benefit from 
the new technological revolution if frontier technologies are channeled 
consciously and primarily for the satisfaction of essential human needs like 
food, shelter, health, and education. 
1. New Technologies and Blending (p. 1-2) 
The newly emerging technologies are being applied in different sectors of 
economic activity (e.g., agriculture, industry, and services like banking, [p. 
2:] insurance, and transport and communications). The emergence of these 
technologies has widened the scope of technology choice but 
notwithstanding this, it is clear that in many cases, these technologies will 
exist side by side with the conventional and traditional technologies for the 
foreseeable future. 
The diffusion and application of new technologies in developing countries at 
present remains isolated and limited. The knowledge about and 
documentation on the experiences of applications are not easily available. 
For example, data on the diffusion of microelectronics-based innovations in 
the agricultural sectors are hard to find even for the advanced countries, not 
to speak of the developing countries where this sector is predominant. 
Also, the diffusion pattern across sectors is quite uneven. Therefore, 
generalizations become extremely difficult if not impossible. 
Technology Blending (p. 3) 
The term 'technology blending' in a narrow sense refers to the possibility of 
physically combining elements of new and traditional technologies. Defined 
in this sense of retrofitting, (as is also done, inter alia, in Chapter 1 and in 
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micro cases of Como silk industry and French footwear industry in Chapters 
5 and 6) it is not a new concept. In the history of technical progress, there 
have been many examples of this type of blending. On the other hand, in 
a more general sense, it attempts to focus mainly but not exclusively on the 
applications of new technologies to predominantly traditional, small-scale 
activities. In this wider context, this focus on small-scale or traditional 
activities is a recent phenomenon. Thus, the concept is distinct from that of 
the use of frontier technologies which completely replace traditionally 
economic activities in which large populations are engaged. 
Thus, technology blending may be characterized by (1) applications of new 
technologies in traditional activities, (2) technology adoptions by small-scale 
producers or agencies applying them for the overall benefit of small-scale 
sectors, and (3) use of new technologies for the production and delivery of 
basic needs type of goods and services. For example, let us take the case of 
small-scale producers. Many developing economies (particularly in Asia) are 
moving toward more liberalized economic regimes, which implies an 
increase in competition particularly for small-scale producers. It is therefore 
becoming more important than before to explore whether new technologies 
offer these producers an opportunity to improve quality of their products, to 
reduce their prices, and, in general, to respond more easily and quickly to 
changing patterns in demand. In this respect, the experience of developing 
countries is very patchy. It is for this reason, inter alia, that we have 
included in the volume case studies of French and Italian small enterprises 
(Chapters 5 and 6) besides examining the experience of developing countries 
(Chapters 4 and 7). 
1 NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND OLD DEBATES (P. 13-14) 
N. Rosenberg 
It is now widely accepted that the prospects for a substantial improvement 
in economic welfare in developing countries depend upon the successful 
incorporation and exploitation of more effective technologies than are 
presently available in those countries. Thus, critical issues with respect to 
the economic future of developing countries are now perceived to turn upon 
their ability to select more efficient technologies for introduction into their 
economies and the conditions that determine the successful outcome of such 
undertakings. 
It is not difficult to see why the transfer of technologies from advanced [p. 
14:1 countries to developing countries should currently be receiving so much 
attention. There is, first of all, a widespread perception that the rate of 
technological change is very rapid in industrialized countries. There is, 
moreover, substantial evidence that new and improved technologies are 
being transferred more rapidly than ever before from one industry to 
another within the major industrialized countries, and also that new 
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technologies are being transferred between industrialized countries with 
greater speed than previously. In addition, it is widely believed that we are 
in the midst of an industrial revolution - a revolution that will transform 
the nature and the productivity of the economy as much as the steam 
engine, electrification, and the internal combustion engine did in earlier 
generations. The present, ongoing revolution is electronics-based, with 
computers and microprocessors becoming truly ubiquitous [See the long list 
of microprocessor applications by industrial sector in A.S. Bhalla et al. (eds): 
Blending of New and Traditional Technologies: Case Studies, Dublin, 
Tycooly International Publishing, 1984, pp. 5-91, but we are also in a much 
earlier stage of a biotechnological revolution that began with the discovery 
of DNA in the 1950s, with profound implications for areas such as medical 
care and food production. In addition, further technological revolutions 
may also be in the offing in such fields as new materials and photovoltaics. 
Thus, the present situation is one of dramatic, ongoing technological changes 
in the industrial world, and a rapid diffusion there of the benefits of these 
technologies. But it is precisely the failure of these technologies to exercise 
a major impact in the poorer countries of the world that has called attention 
to the possibilities for technology blending. 
(p. 16) Thus a central conclusion of the technological dualism view is that 
the advanced technologies that have been developed by the industrialized 
countries include a bundle of economic characteristics that were generated in 
response to the economic conditions of industrialized economies. Precisely 
for this reason, they generally have little relevance or utility in labor- 
abundant, capital-scarce, low-income economies. In spite of drastic 
oversimplification, including the neglect of the immense variation in 
economic conditions among developing countries, the stylized picture 
captured by the technological dualism hypothesis contains considerable 
validity. The critical questions, of course, are "How much validity?" and 
"What constructive measures can be taken to deal with such a reality?" 
II. Requirements for Successful Technology Blending (p. 16-17) 
A critical but promising feature of this approach is that it attempts to 
identify the conditions that will permit poor countries to derive some of the 
benefits from the newly emerging technologies without having first to 
undergo certain fundamental economic and social transformations. It does 
not compile useless and discouragingly long lists of unlikely "preconditions" 
for successful development. Instead, it poses the question: assuming that 
traditional societies will remain essentially wedded to [p. 17:1 their 
traditional technologies for the foreseeable future, are there nevertheless 
significant opportunities for making selective use of more sophisticated, 
science-based technologies? Thus, the central thrust of the blending 
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approach is to determine how newly emerging, R-&-D-intensive technologies 
can raise the performance of traditional technologies without seriously 
disrupting them. An approach that indicates directions of progress that 
does not require, as a precondition for success, numerous other complemen- 
tary changes, is one that is inherently more likely to succeed. 
(p. 26) To conclude, developing countries can derive some economic benefits 
from new technologies available from the advanced countries. In world of 
internationally traded goods there are a number of other avenues for 
deriving benefits from new technologies. On the one hand, it is possible for 
developing countries to identify components of sophisticated high technology 
products and to produce these components for assembly abroad. 
Alternatively, there are many advanced products that possess labor-intensive 
assembly std (such as electronic components) in which developing 
countries could easily specialize. Such possibilities are particularly 
numerous for product lines in which transport costs are not very significant, 
or where a developing country is advantageously located close to an 
advanced economy (as in the case of Mexico). Finally, if one approaches 
the problem in terms of product life cycles, it is obvious that many 
technologically sophisticated products offer an expanding set of 
opportunities to developing countries as they approach maturity. 
2 SOME CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY ISSUES (p. 28-29) 
A.S. Bhalla, D. James 
[p. 29:1 For a number of years now, work on the development and 
promotion of intermediate technology has been aimed at improvement of 
traditional technology. The development of superior building blocks and 
panels from pressed bagasse and slaked lime in Latin America [W.P. 
Strassmann: '"The Development of Alternative Construction Technologies in 
Latin America," in J.H. Street and D. James (eds.): Technological Progress in 
Latin America: The Prospects for Overcoming Dependency, Boulder, 
Colorado, Westview Press, 1979, pp. 247-257.1, an improved design for a 
small-scale reciprocal coal feeder in India [M. Carr: Developing Small-Scale 
Industries in India: An Integrated Ap rp oach, London, Intermediate 
Technology Publications, 1981.1, and the application of a spiral-shaped 
radiation concentrator for more efficient solar cookers used in Africa are 
illustrative. In his early formulation of the concept of intermediate 
technology, Schumacher [E.F. Schumacher: Small is Beautiful: A Study of 
Economics as if People Mattered, London, Abacus, 1974.1 put forward the 
propositions that new workplaces would be created with low investment 
costs, production methods would make modest demands on skills, and local 
production of the technologies would be possible. 
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(p. 30) The applications of new technologies to traditional activities will 
typically involve capital costs far exceeding those envisaged by proponents 
of intermediate or appropriate technology. While intermediate technology 
can be developed with local knowledge/technology/ materials, with few 
exceptions, blending must rely on the importation of new technologies from 
advanced countries in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the application 
of new technologies to traditional activities, say in rural areas, is also likely 
to raise the dependence of the latter on urban industrial networks in the 
same way as did the Green Revolution. The high-yield variety (HYV) 
technology made the rural producers dependent on the urban industrial 
sector to purchase fertilizers, machinery, and fuel and "to sort out, decode 
and evaluate the scientific and economic messages that reach them from 
bureaucracies, banks and experimental stations." [A. Pearse: Seeds of 
Plenty, Seeds of Want - Social and Economic Implications of the Green 
Revolution, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 159.] This factor is also likely 
to distinguish technology blending from intermediate technology. The latter 
is generally based on local or national self-reliance, which may be eroded 
with the application of new technologies, particularly in the least developed 
countries which do not possess the capability to develop new technologies 
on their own. 
However, there is one sense in which a parallel may exist between the 
concepts of intermediate technology and technology blending. In a 
continuum of technological change, blending represents an intermediate state 
between the conventional and the newly emerging technologies just as 
intermediate technology was conceived as a stage in between traditional and 
modern conventional innovations. 
II. Some Policy Issues and Options (p. 33-34) 
It is generally argued that the new technology applications will exercise 
tremendous influence on the developing countries. Latecomer developing 
countries can take advantage of new technologies to leapfrog without 
necessarily having to go through all stages experienced by the present 
advanced countries. For example, developing countries could move away 
from manual methods directly to flexible manufacturing system without first 
having to introduce fixed automation. Several reasons in support of this 
argument are presented. [L. Soete: "International Diffusion of Technology, 
Industrial Development and Technological Leapfrogging," in World 
Development, March 1985.1 First, competition in the international 
technology market for microelectronics is so keen that prices are falling 
rapidly. This is likely to make access of developing countries to the 
technology much easier. Second, in view of the rapidly changing character 
of the technology, it is difficult to appropriate its benefits through patents - 
this factor should in principle make possible its easier diffusion. Third, one 
of the unique characteristics of the electronics technology is that it is both 
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capital saving [p. 34:] and labor saving. To the extent that it is capital 
saving it should be attractive for developing countries suffering from a 
chronic capital shortage. Fourth, the technology is mainly science-based and 
requires less learning-by-doing and experience (which are scarce inputs in 
many developing countries) and more scientific and technical education 
(which many developing countries, especially NICs, possess). Thus its 
diffusion may not be unnecessarily hindered in the Third World. 
The above argument in support of leapfrogging is based on a number of 
assumptions which may not be valid for many developing countries, 
particularly those at low levels of industrialization. First, it presupposes the 
existence of organizational capacity for producing new products through the 
use of high technology. Second, it assumes that in developing countries 
existing technological capability is already at a level at which "high" 
technology can be assimilated and efficiently utilized. 
In most developing countries, except a few NICs, the above preconditions 
are unlikely to prevail. It is for this reason that in these countries the 
diffusion of "high" technology is at present very limited. Although the cost 
of many "high" technologies is going down, it is still quite high relative to 
the national per capita incomes and foreign exchange availability in most 
developing countries. As long as the infrastructure and software 
requirements in these countries are not met, the "high" technology hardware 
will remain too sophisticated to be used efficiently and at full capacity. 
This is shown in Chapter 9, which focuses on the use of computers in 
education. Although in principle new technologies can (1) raise efficiency of 
the traditional educational system and (2) permit training outside the school 
system (through self-learning), their potential cannot be easily exploited 
because of the lack of adequate software programs. Thus the capacity of 
non-NICs (mainly the least developed countries) to absorb "high" technology 
and leapfrog may remain limited in he foreseeable future. 
(p. 35) The experience of the Green Revolution also suggests that the 
demand for newly emerging technologies may have to be consciously 
stimulated by policy interventions. That is precisely what was done by way 
of introducing technology in the agricultural sectors of developing countries. 
Government financial support, dissemination of information, and various 
training efforts go a long way in explaining the remarkable rapidity with 
which the new technology spread in many regions. The experience of the 
Green Revolution therefore highlights the importance of the government's 
role, direct as well as indirect, in ensuring the application of new 
technologies in different environments and among poor producers who by 
themselves cannot afford to own or utilize the technology to raise their 
productivity and living standards. A conscious effort was made by policy 
makers and administrators to plan and provide for the integration of 
different components of the new technology into a single comprehensive 
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package. The implementation of this package resulted in important changes 
in traditional methods of growing rice and other foodgrains as well as in 
irrigation, planting, and weeding practices. When introducing new 
technologies into nonagricultural traditional production, similar changes are 
likely to occur (see Chapter 20). 
16 SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
THE EXPERIENCE OF WEST AFRICA (p. 223) 
N. Jasentuliyana, R. Chipman 
Remote-sensing satellites have been used for surveying natural resources on 
a large scale since 1972, and the technology can now be considered 
operational, although it will certainly continue to evolve. Applications of 
satellite data, however, have been slow to develop to an operational stage, 
especially in developing countries, despite the apparent potential for 
promoting resource development and management. 
Satellite remote sensing offers a basically new capability in the economic 
systems of most developing countries which have previously not attempted 
to monitor or manage natural resources on a national scale. Therefore, it 
does not replace traditional technologies and cannot slip into an existing 
niche in the economic structure. In this case the problem of blending new 
and traditional technologies becomes the problem of establishing connections 
between advanced technology and traditional agricultural practices, taking 
agriculture in the wide sense to include forestry and water resources, as 
well as crops and soil. Remote sensing also has applications to mineral 
development, urban planning, oceanography, and other fields, but these will 
not be considered here. [For a general description and analysis of remote 
sensing in the Third World, see C.O. Justice, J.G.R. Townshend, 
B.N. Holben, and C.J. Tucker: "Analysis of the Phenology of Global 
Vegetation Using Meteorological Satellite Data," in International Journal of 
Remote Sensing, vol. 6, no. 8, 1985, pp. 1271-1318.1 
V. Conclusions (p. 238-239) 
The management of agricultural resources in many developing countries, 
using the term management in its broadest sense, is primarily carried out by 
millions of rural farmers living in small villages, mostly without electricity, 
paved roads, telephones, or other means of access to modern development 
tools. Most of the decisions that affect agriculture, forestry, or water 
resources are made by these people. Only if remote sensing results have a 
meaningful influence on the multitude of decisions made in the traditional 
sectors can one say that a technology blend has taken place. 
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The social and economic implications of remote sensing are largely indirect. 
It is only as part of an extensive system of resource management and 
development that it will affect significant numbers of people. As an integral 
part of national planning of natural resources including agriculture, forestry, 
water resources, and fisheries, however, the effect may be extremely 
important. Since most West African countries have limited mineral 
resources and limited industry, the economies of the countries and the 
incomes of the great majority of the populations depend on agricultural 
production, both commercial and subsistence. Development, at least for the 
near future, will depend on increasing agricultural production, which can be 
promoted by agricultural extension services based on a knowledge of soil 
types, land use patterns, and other features which can be mapped and 
monitored by remote sensing. The rural standard of living also depends 
strongly on availability of firewood and access to clear water, the 
development of which will depend on governmental programs of 
reforestation, afforestation, well digging, and environmental protection, 
which can also be assisted through remote sensing. 
Rural extension services and economic incentives are therefore the necessary 
links between modern remote-sensing technology and the traditional systems 
of resource management. Clearly, the relationship between modern 
technology, traditional technologies, and extension services is a very complex 
one. While the notion of development implies modification of traditional 
practices, forced changes can be counter-productive as well as (p. 239:1 
morally offensive. Major efforts must therefore go into ensuring that the 
modern technologies, generally imported, and the extension services, 
generally provided by educated urbanites, are adapted to the needs of the 
producers, generally rural people. Developing such a system is a long, 
slow, and often painful process with a certain amount of inevitable 
misunderstanding and conflict between the technical staff, the extension 
agents, and the rural people. 
The problems of integrating modern economic planning with traditional 
rural practices are, of course, not unique to remote-sensing programs and 
are widely considered to be the central problems of promoting development, 
especially in the least developed countries. Since remote sensing is only one 
input, and a very modest one at the moment, it will not be a determining 
factor in attempts to solve these problems. 
However, of relevance here is the perennial argument between the 
proponents of centrally planned development with active government 
involvement in large-scale projects, such as large dams for power and 
irrigation, and the proponents of government incentives to promote 
individual and local initiative, in particular higher prices for agricultural 
products. While satellite remote sensing can be used in both approaches to 
development, the technology will be a centralized government operation for 
the foreseeable future and will tend to have a more important role in large, 
161 
centrally planned projects. The major dam projects underway on the 
Senegal river and its tributaries will require repetitive surveys of large areas 
to plan the use of the resulting irrigable areas and to monitor the resulting 
environmental changes. Since the economic justification for remote sensing 
in development to date has generally been problematic, it might be best to 
concentrate remote-sensing efforts and technical assistance from international 
agencies on such large projects where central planning is a major part of the 
scheme. Where a grass-roots development policy is adopted, remote-sensing 
programs may well not be cost effective, at least at the present stage of 
development of the technology and applications. 
20 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS (p. 287) 
A.S. Bhalla, D. James 
In Section I, we describe specific social and economic: cost effectiveness, 
levels of employment, and distributional impacts (and some conceptual and 
methodological gaps in analyses) that should be considered for assessing the 
impact of new technology applications. There follows in Section 11 an 
attempt to identify policy needs in terms of skills and training requirements. 
Priority areas and the government role in focusing on new technology 
applications in traditional sectors are discussed in Section III. Finally, 
Section IV briefly describes the potential of technology blending in the 
future. 
II. Educational and Training Implications (p. 297-298) 
The successful utilization of new technology implies the need for 
complementary changes in human knowledge, abilities, and capabilities. 
Taking an extreme case, once a technician sets up the system, laser-guided 
land levelling requires such simple skills that anyone who can drive a 
tractor can accomplish the task. Yet, even here there is a need for 
widespread knowledge of the existence of the technology, how to obtain it, 
and what net benefits can be expected from using it. At the other extreme, 
there are new technology applications, typified by remote-sensing techniques 
(both for producing images and using them properly) and RISDA-like 
regional agricultural planning (both for planners and using farmers), for 
which more extensive and formalized training efforts are essential. At the 
present stage of our knowledge, it is not very clear whether training for 
technology blends [p. 298:1 should be different from that for cases of 
straightforward applications of new technologies in advanced sectors. 
Government Role (p. 301-302) 
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As we noted in Chapters 2 and 3, governments have a general responsibility 
for providing an environment that is favorable to the promotion of 
technology blending. In more specific terms, governments can stimulate it 
in at least four ways. First, a state agency may either acquire the new 
technology and make it available to users on a shared basis or encourage 
other institutional arrangements for sharing (e.g., cooperatives and 
subcontracting). Second, governments can also play a key role in promoting 
suitable educational and training strategies, policies, and programs. As 
noted in the earlier section, the use of new technologies calls for flexible 
types of education and training policies that facilitate quick anticipation of 
new types of education/training/requirements. Third, technology blending 
has been conceived as part of an experimental program, which implies the 
need for research, development, and trials. Governments can promote 
relatively inexpensive trials of the application of newly emerging 
technologies in cases where the scientific and technological problems have 
already been solved. This may be done in several ways - e.g., through 
assistance in undertaking feasibility studies, partial financing of costs of 
experimental trials, or direct subsidies to firms taking new initiatives. 
Fourth, governments will need to provide appropriate communications 
infrastructure to facilitate decentralized production through the use of new 
technologies. 
Apart from reorientation of existing production structures, it may also be 
essential for the governments to provide for development and adaptation of 
new technologies. This could be achieved through national research and 
development policies and programs that would in some cases imply 
essentially a modification of imported technologies rather than their local [p. 
302:1 manufacture, which might be too costly and unfeasible for limited 
markets and productive capacity. One difficulty is that most new 
technologies, with few exceptions, are almost exclusively developed in the 
advanced countries, which prevents the developing countries from capturing 
learning effects that could be obtained if some research were undertaken 
within the latter countries. 
(p. 303) Finally, as suggested by the case study of PV street lighting in 
India (Chapter 13), a major challenge for policy concerning implementation 
of such systems is the way government agencies can mobilize action to 
solve organizational problems in distribution of electricity and benefits. This 
is not a feature of PV systems alone but, rather, of community projects in 
general. One approach often argued, for the cultural and socio-political 
conditions of India's rural areas, is that such problems should be solved 
through mobilization of local participation. Another approach may argue, 
however, that this view of local participation often ignores the fact that 
villages have an imperfect distribution of power among castes and income 
groups so that benefits tend to be tilted to the more powerful groups where 
local participation is high in designing and implementing village projects. 
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BUTTEL, F., KENNEY, M., and KLOPPENBURG, J., From the Green Revolution 
to Biorevolution: Some Observations on the Changing Technological Bases of 
Economic Transformation in the Third World, in Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1985. 
This excellent article summarizes the new technologies involved in what it 
calls the new 'biorevolution" and attempts to conceptualize the influences 
this will have on developing countries. The effects of new technologies 
such as genetic engineering (where for example, plants or animals can be 
given useful characteristics of other plants or animals or micro-organisms 
can be programmed to manufacture desirable quantities of chemical 
substances), plant cell fusion (hybrid formation), tissue culturing 
(regenerating plants from cells) etc. can be felt through "chemical and 
pharmaceutical production, pollution and waste management, energy 
generation, food processing and animal and plant breeding". 
The pursuit of these new technologies has especially been taken up by 
multinational corporations (MNCs) despite the efforts of some larger 
developing countries (India and the Philippines) and proposals for 
intergovernmental research by UNIDO. Their control, including increasing 
use of patents, and the ability of developing country government bodies to 
get access to new information will be a major issue. So too will the social 
consequences (as in the "Green Revolution") of the dissemination of these 
technologies and the ability of governments to manipulate this. (DH - 83) 
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, Technological Change: Enhancing the 
Benefits, 2 volumes, Report by Commonwealth Working Group, London, 1985. 
These volumes concentrate on the main socio-economic and policy issues 
thrown up by the rapid diffusion of new technologies (microelectronics, 
biotechnology, new materials technologies, renewable energy technologies 
etc), in recent years. The second volume concentrates on detailed empirical 
analysis of each of the new technology sectors noted above. Thus, for 
example, in the area of biotechnology, a divide between new (e.g. gene 
cloning) and traditional (e.g. fermentation organisms in beer-making) 
technologies exists, and that recent innovations are tending to widen the 
technological gap. Many of the new technologies are seen as highly 
inappropriate (capital intensive and requiring advanced forms of production 
organization) but appropriate research bodies, both international and 
national, could adopt many of the new innovations - as has already 
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happened in some cases - e.g. International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Centre in Mexico. Furthermore, the strength of multinational corporations 
(MNCs), due to the enormous research budgets, will have to be tackled 
directly - perhaps by agencies of the UN. 
The first volume concentrates on the policy issues arising from this array of 
advanced technological developments. Suggestions regarding research and 
development, labour relations, control of technology, imports, etc. are 
propounded. The emphasis is on the necessity to be aware of the trade and 
production location effects of the new technologies and the need for active 
policy responses to avoid the worst aspects of the widening technological 
gap. (DH - 84) 
HOFFMAN, K., Managing Technological Change: The Impact and Policy 
Implications of Microelectronics, Report submitted to the Commonwealth 
Secretariat Working Group on the Management of Technological Change, 
London, 1984. 
This is a highly recommended, comprehensive review of the issues and 
trends in new microelectronic-based innovations (MRIs), their diffusion, their 
social impacts and existing and potential policy responses. MRIs create new 
products (computer-based machines, electronic goods etc.), alter the nature, 
especially the quality, of existing products and change numerous production 
processes. The debate as to the balance of social effects is far from decided. 
On the one hand the optimists see increased leisure time, reduction of 
dangerous jobs, new jobs, increased productivity and wealth, better quality 
goods, etc. while on the other hand the pessimists stress labour 
displacement, labour unrest, relocation of investments, the falling behind, 
and thus loss of markets, of countries less able to compete (a widening 
technological gap), etc. 
Hoffman goes into great detail to describe the major trends of diffusion of 
these new technologies in electronics, industry and services and draws on 
numerous empirical case studies. However, the literature is notably 
undecided as to the balance of effects in the Third World. He stresses that 
the electronics sector is and will be the main carrier of MRIs and will adopt 
a role similar to that attributed to the capital goods sector (i.e. the driving 
force of technical change). He stresses in particular the need for developing 
countries to develop their software capacity to adapt imported technologies 
to local needs. He notes the uneven diffusion of a vast array of MRIs (take 
cars versus clothing for example), especially in developed countries and 
relates these to labour implications (displacement, job creation in electronics 
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and services, the nature of the labour process etc.) market implications for 
developing countries etc. 
Chapter 4 reviews the present state of policy towards MRIs, and finds a 
huge gap between developed countries, newly industrialized countries and 
poorer developing countries. (DH - 85) 
JUNNE, G., New Technologies and Third World Development, in 
Vierteljahresberichte, No. 103, March 1986. 
In this introduction to a highly recommended special edition of this journal 
on new technologies and Third World development, the editor describes the 
two main "new technology" areas and proposes a conceptual framework to 
assess the potential effects of these on developing countries. Thus, 
microelectronics, which includes mostly computers and telecommunications 
equipment (sometimes merged and called information technology) affects 
mostly advanced industrial and services production. Biotechnology 
(techniques which use living organisms in production processes - e.g. 
breeding plants with certain characteristics (drought or pest resistance, 
yields, homogeneity of outputs, nitrogen fixing); animal reproduction 
(artificial insemination, twinning etc.); biomass development (e.g. energy 
from sugar); pharmaceuticals; flavouring, etc.) is as yet not so well analyzed 
but many observers expect it to have at least as many influences in the 
Third World as the "green revolution". 
Junne divides the areas of potential impact into four: 1. the impact of new 
technology application in developed countries on devel-oping countries - e.g. 
relocation of production in developed countries - although there is little 
empirical evidence yet. In fact some newly industrialized countries are 
receiving increased foreign investment due to their ability to apply new 
technologies; 2. the degree to which developing countries are able to apply 
new technologies themselves in order to overcome the threat to their 
comparative advantage based on cheap labour. It appears that the ability of 
even the most advanced newly industrialized countries to do so, is question- 
able, but there is no question of the increasing technological gap of the 
poorer developing countries. Nonetheless, there are numerous cases where 
new tech-nologies are also appropriate technologies and can be imple- 
mented. Some of its benefits could include energy efficiency, less skilled 
operatives, less maintenance, smaller scales and higher quality; 3. the degree 
to which developing countries can participate in the development of new 
technologies in order to avoid increasing technological depen-dence. Only 
very few large newly industrialized countries can get involved in the risky 
business of developing their own "hightech" capacity so most developing 
countries depend on relations with multinational corporations. New deals 
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and mechanisms of control will be necessary to make the best of this; 4. the 
impact of new technologies applied within developing countries on 
developing countries. New technologies rarely directly displace labour in 
developing countries as they are mostly new investments while on the other 
hand the employment creation effects of new technologies (i.e. the produc- 
tion of the new technologies) are rarely felt in developing countries (most 
equipment is imported). Similar arguments attach to the issue of 
"deskilling". Higher wages could be expected in any event. (DH - 88) 
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9. ORGANISING FOR UTILIZATION AND DISSEMINATION: 
MAKING IT HAPPEN! 
This section attempts to bring together a broad range of experiences and cases on how to 
make utilization happen. Because the word "utilization" is not a searchable word in most 
of the databases used in this project, other terms had to be substituted, such as technology 
transfer, commercialization, and diffusion. To some extent, some of the literature presented 
here overlaps with that presented in the section on "RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION 
AS A MANAGEMENT PROCESS". Yet because of its emphasis on practicality, it was 
thought to deserve a separate and concluding section. To styart with, here are some 
substantive excerpts from a classic, which recounts a the proceedings of a conference on 
Technology Transfer in the seventies: 
Frank Bradbury, Paul Jervis, Ron Johnston, Alan Pearson Technical Processes in 
Technical Change, Sijthoof & Noordhoff 1978, The Netherlands. 
(p 4) Common definition of technology transfer: "the process by which a 
technology is applied to a purpose other than the one for which it was 
originally intended," or in other words, "technology transfer is putting 
technology in a different context". This view reflects the origins of the term 
"technology transfer" in the United States where since 1940 the federal 
government has been responsible for the direction of a steadily increasing 
share of National R&D resources, primarily for achieving military, space, 
and atomic energy goals. 
... Quotation from Harvey Brooks (in "National Science Policy and 
Technology Transfer" in Proceedings of a Conference on Technology Transfer 
and Innovation NSF 67-5, Washington D.C. 1966) 
"Technology transfer is the process by which science and technology 
are diffused throughout human activity. Wherever systematic rational 
knowledge developed by one group or institution is embodied in a 
way of doing things by other institutions or groups we have 
technology transfer. This can be either transfer from more basic 
scientific knowledge into technology, or an adaptation of an existing 
technology to a new use. Technology transfer differs from ordinary 
scientific information transfer in the fact that to be really transferred it 
must be embodied in an actual operations of some kind. 
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(P.22) Models of innovation have customarily been represented graphically 
by boxes interconnected by arrows. This is, of course, partly a device used 
because it is convenient for the draughtsman. However, this representation 
is itself a model, commonly used in such diverse fields as cybernetics, 
communication theory and organisational design, which has its origins in 
electrical circuit diagrams. Adoption of this model entails the assumption 
that phenomena can be divided up into events or processes which can be 
conveniently be considered as relatively self-contained activities (the boxes), 
receiving inputs or stimuli, operating on them, and providing outputs 
directed towards other boxes. The inputs and outputs are the arrows. 
Boxes can be a number of types. They may denote events, such as "need or 
opportunity recognition" or "idea formulation", and they may refer to 
activities like "research" or "development". 
The compartmentalization into boxes provides a convenient way to describe 
the system which is being investigated, the boxes representing a division of 
the system into what appears to be its component parts.... 
But the division into boxes causes problems, in two ways. Firstly, the 
activity based division into boxes may not reflect the organizational skill- 
based compartmentalization which occurs in real life. Thus in the process 
of technological innovation the activity called "research" may, and in fact 
usually does, involve scientists and technologists in universities, others in 
research organizations established and maintained by industry, and yet more 
in the production and engineering departments. Secondly the box 
arrangement assumes that the output from one box is in a form suitable for 
the input to the next - but this does not always happen. A parallel in 
domestic electronics is that one cannot use any loudspeaker with any 
amplifier -- it is necessary to match the impedance of the speaker with the 
output impedance of the amplifier. 
In the past most attention has been focused on the boxes in the box-and- 
arrow models, with the assumption that if the components within a box 
operate properly the output will automatically be accepted by the next box. 
People have concentrated on the box and ignored the arrows, whereas our 
focus on transfer processes throws stress on the importance of the arrows 
though we do not suggest that boxes are unimportant. Our attention on the 
arrows, however, leads us to ask questions such as "what are they?" - in 
other words what medium carries the output from one box to another; is 
the analogue of the wire between speaker and ear more appropriate or 
"ether" between speaker and ear more appropriate? What are the obstacles 
which may prevent the arrows reaching their targets - are there barriers of 
one sort or another in the way? 
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(p. 25) Where does diffusion fit within our concept of transfer processes in 
technical change, and how do models of diffusion relate to descriptions of 
transfer processes? 
We suggest that diffusion must be seen as a special case of the broad 
category of transfer processes in technical change. The models of Rogers 
(Diffusion of Innovation), Mansfield ('Technical Change and the Rate of 
Imitation" in N.Rosenberg The Economics of Technological Change, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1971), and others have the common feature of describing 
the spreading of the usage of a technology within a population of users, 
usually within a group characterized by some common element of 
productive activity such as farming or mining. The lateral shift of 
technology transfer implies a shift of technology from one population or 
group of users to another, say, from farming to mining. 
(p. 27)... we see diffusion as one of the numerous transfer processes within 
technical change, but we distinguish it from lateral shift transfer which is 
another special category of transfer processes in which there is a contextual 
shift of technology from one user to another. 
...technology developed and applied in one context cannot be applied in 
another without some adaptation or modification. To apply technology in a 
new context demands the reworking of at least some of the later stages of 
the innovation process. 
(p. 28)... [Jervis in particular built on this concept by suggesting that] early 
attempts by Government laboratories at this horizontal transfer had relied 
on a two stage process, a transfer from the laboratory to a manufacturer or 
supplier who would then be responsible for all dealings with the eventual 
user. This approach had proved to be unsatisfactory and a three-cornered 
relationship with the originating laboratory, end user and manufacturer had 
been found necessary. In terms of our discussion of context the reason that 
this triangular is needed is easy to see. Transfer to the user requires the 
adaptation of the technology, but that adaptation can only be done if the 
context of the technology is understood. It is much easier for the creators 
of a technology to adapt it to a new use than it is for the intermediary. 
And when the intermediary, the supplier or manufacturer , is selected both 
ability to handle the technology and possession of suitable links with 
potential users (in marketing terms things such as sales force, distribution 
channels, after-sales service capability, and credibility with potential 
customers) are important criteria. 
(p. 29-30)... [Bell and Hill comment that] ...most models of innovation and 
technology transfer are inappropriate to the developing country situation, 
and that one of the primary reasons for this is that they ignore the need for 
a continuous interchange with a diversely located "technological stock", a 
body of knowledge and know-how....all innovation and transfer processes 
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need to draw on this stock of knowledge but in industrialised countries its 
existence can be, and in practise is, automatically assumed .... In the context 
of less developed countries, this stock of knowledge does not exist. It is 
not merely that the receiving countries do not have the necessary scientific 
and technological infra-structure but that, if the technology being 
transferred has been chosen with due regard to all aspects of user needs 
and constraints, the necessary infra-structure may not exist even in the 
industrialized countries. This is because the technology appropriate to the 
developing country may have passed out of use in the industrialized 
countries so long ago that, to all intents and purposes it is no longer 
available. (LDCs need technology "which is not at the leading edge but 
some way behind the trailing edge of practice in industrialised countries. If 
it is no longer in use it is difficult to identify and retrieve information about 
it. 
(p. 31) Time and time again, in different ways, participants stressed that 
the fundamental concern in transfer processes was the understanding of the 
environment, attitudes, needs and skill of the receiver .... At every step in the 
transfer process there must be dialogue between those who would transfer 
and those who would adopt; dialogue between concerning design detail, 
specification detail, user need detail -- contextual mapping to use the jargon 
of the morphological analysts .... It is only by the iterative process of 
information exchange culminating in direct verbal discussion with repeated 
readjustments of understanding and rephrasing of questions that a sufficient 
knowledge of context and specifications can be achieved. 
(p. 60) [Johnson has shown how].. the barriers around knowledge areas are 
necessary for their rapid development, but [that] transfer of information 
across these barriers is consequently hindered. Effective transmission will 
occur through personal contact where, once again, the transferor with his 
contexed knowledge and the receiver can effect the exchanges necessary to 
translate the information or process transferred into the receiver's work 
conditions. 
...we must recognise that individuals can fulfil both informal and informal 
roles. By formal agents we mean people such as liaison or transfer officers 
whose major function is to promote transfer and who operate at the 
interface between their own organization or department or that of a 
contractor, and the potential receiver organization. This category would also 
include the research scientist who after developing a product has his 
responsibility extended to transferring it out of the laboratory and possibly 
further, out of the innovating organization. A much wider range of actors 
can be grouped under the heading of informal agents. They include the 
university inventor or scientists in a government laboratory who feels 
motivated to ensure that industry takes up his ideas, and devotes time and 
energy to championing his product although this does not form part of his 
official duties.Schon (2) has commented that such "product champions" also 
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occur in industry, and can have a powerful effect in lowering or removing 
barriers to innovations. Other examples of informal agents include sales 
service personnel who may act as transfer agents in serving small customer 
companies; or staff who move from one department to another or one 
organization to another. When discussing transfer processes in technical 
change we recognise that there are two classes - those that will happen, in 
any case (unplanned) and others which people actively seek to promote 
(planned).... many organizations are trying to embody lessons from 
unplanned transfers in their planning, and one aspect of this involves 
formalising the roles of agents. 
The employment of formal liaison or transfer agents is considered to have 
been started with the U.S. Agricultural Extension Service, which is a late 19th 
century conception. The role of this Service in the promotion and diffusion 
of agricultural innovations has been widely studied (see Rogers). The use 
of formal agents has usually bee patterned directly on the model 
successfully established in the agricultural field, with the agent developing 
close and regular contacts with a limited number of potential customers and 
having a strong back-up providing information about new developments 
and technical support. The allocation of potential customers to agents was 
done on a geographical basis, each agent having a "parish" within which to 
work. Just as the extension service located its agents in agricultural 
colleges, so geographical allocation of resources located at teaching or 
research organisations has been adopted in many later transfer programmes. 
(p.65) We conclude therefore, that formal agents can be used as a 
mechanism to encourage and facilitate transfer processes, but that the 
success they will have will depend on their ability to act as an interface 
between sources of technical assistance and possible customers. A liaison 
agent can act as a catalyst for information flow, but wrongly chosen, or 
operating in an inappropriate way, he may become a barrier to the dialogue 
which is needed in the contextual mapping of technology on to use-system 
is to be achieved. The choice of mechanism for communicating between the 
source of the technology and the potential user is one of the main decision 
points for those involved in managing transfer programmes...there is no one 
"right" answer. 
(p. 97) The conclusions we have drawn can be summarized in seven 
statements: 
1. both technology and the processes by which it can be transferred are 
functions of their environments or contexts; 
2. there is no single best way to transfer technology. A multiplicity of 
transfer processes is available, only a few of which will be appropriate for a 
given situation; 
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3. a major determinant of success in transfer will be the degree to which the 
technology establishes a contextual fit in its new environment. Many factors 
will influence this goodness of fit; 
4. if transfer is to be encouraged then care must be taken to ensure that 
both the technology and the mechanism to be employed for transfer are 
appropriate within the contexts of provider and receiver. In addition 
sufficient modification of the technology to fit the receiver's context must be 
ensured; 
5. existing methodologies for studying transfer processes are inadequate and 
definitional problems inhibit the development of a relevant body of 
knowledge. New methodologies are needed, designed for the task in hand 
and departing as necessary from those appropriate to physical sciences; 
6. the study of technical change should now progress by the examination of 
these transfer processes, rather than by the investigation of those parts of 
the activity which can conveniently be compartmentalised within 
institutional or disciplinary boundaries; 
7. in studying transfer processes more stress must be placed than hitherto 
on concepts such as ownership and motivation. A greater focus on 
behavioral aspects of the process is needed. 
(from paper by F. R. Bradbury, Technology Transfer) p. 107 
Quote from New Scientist 1973, 5 July, p.26: 
Definitions of technology transfer: 
- the multi-lateral flow of information and techniques across the 
boundaries of science, technology, and the practical world; 
- transferring research results to operators; 
- accelerating the application of research and exploratory development 
results to industrial application; 
- science and technology transfer to the would-be-user at the earliest 
practicable date and in a language he can understand; 
- the process of matching solutions in the form of existing science and 
engineering knowledge to problems in commerce or public 
programmes; 
- getting knowledge out of the academic area and into the hands of 
those who apply it. 
These definitions describe innovation if they describe anything... preferred 
definitions would include: 
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- the process by which a technology is applied to a purpose other than the . 
one for which it was originally intended; and 
- technology transfer is putting technology into a different context. 
p.108...technology transfer is more than innovation and diffusion of 
innovation in that it implies a transverse shift, from the original trajectory of 
the innovation to another, aimed at another target. 
p 110.... SAPPHO ... has put before us a limited number of maxims for 
success in innovation. The five principal rules: 
1. study user needs; 
2. pay attention to promotion and marketing; 
3. do thorough development; 
4. use relevant extramural information; 
5. have sufficient authoritative leadership. 
...In particular the importance of studying user needs is something which 
bears much weight in the technology transfer analysis. 
p 130 R.D. Johnston in "Theories of Technology Transfer, or Models, Images, 
and Myths revisited" 
quoting Tom Burns to a 1966 MIT Conference on the Human Factors in the 
Transfer of Technology (T.Burns "Models, Images, and Myths" in W-Gruber 
and D.G. Marquis (eds) Factors in the Transfer of Technology The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1969, p11). 
Burns' article can be considered to be have marked a watershed in studies 
of technology transfer. His conclusion that "the mechanism of technology 
transfer is one of agents, not agencies; of the movement of people among 
establishments, rather than the routing of information through 
communication systems," marked a considerable step in understanding of 
technology transfer processes. 
p.139..Paul Jervis "Innovation and Technology Transfer - a Note on the 
Findings of Project SAPPHO" 
Project SAPPHO was a study of success and failures in industrial 
innovation, and the analytical results have been published widely Success 
and Failure in Industrial Innovation, Centre for the Study of Industrial 
Innovation, London, 1972) During the project 71 case studies of innovation 
were carried out, 36 in the chemical industry and 35 in the instrument 
industry, and the data gathered was used to detect differences between 
commercially successful and unsuccessful innovations. Much more data was 
gathered than has been discussed in the published reports, and if the 
success/failure comparison is abandoned, and the material considered as a 
set of detailed case studies, a number of additional analyses can be carried 
out. 
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R.M.Bell and S.C.Hill "Research on Technology Transfer and Innovation" 
Quoting Tom Burns (same source) in reference to the USA space 
programme to foster industrial application of government research: 
"Technology transfer is a matter of either the unplanned percolation, 
or the planned transmission, of ideas, technical routines or 
information from research (scientific and technological) to 
manufacturing industry and so into commercial exploitation and 
eventual use." 
Project Hindsight ... (K.Kreilkamp, "Hindsight and the real world of science 
policy", Science Studies 1, (1971) 43-66) based on a twenty year time scale 
and on a somewhat questionable methodology ... suggested that only 0.3% 
of research "events", which were relevant to a set of defense technology 
applications came from basic research funded by the Defence Department. 
Predictably, this demonstration of a possible chink in the armour of the 
conventional view was seen as threatening by both government and 
scientific establishments. The threat was quite explicit. Following the 
earliest publication of the Hindsight results, the journal "Science" published 
an article and later an editorial, both of which questioned the utility of 
academic research. However relief was on hand to restore peace of mind to 
the faithful. It was no coincidence that at this time the US National Science 
Foundation commissioned "Project Traces", (S.Globe, G.W.Levy, and 
C.M.Schwartz, Science, technology, and Innovation Report prepared for the 
National Science Foundation, NSF-0667, Columbus, Ohio, Battelle, 1973), the 
terms of reference of which allowed a much greater chance of fundamental 
research being shown as relevant. This study essentially replicated Project 
Hindsight, but on a longer time scale (50 years) and using a methodology 
relying on a more circumspect selection of cases and armchair reminiscence. 
From Project Traces it was demonstrated, not unexpectedly, that 70% of 
inputs to innovation ultimately came from fundamental research. Science 
was now able to publish an article which stated "Basic research was of 
overwhelming importance in five recent technological innovations of wide 
value" . 
(p.254) One striking feature of the industrialized societies is that the 
industrial production system operates very close to the universal frontier of 
advancing technology... 
(The following is based on research in Thailand) 
(p. 255)...In a society like Thailand many parts of the leading edge of 
economic advance rest on technology that is far behind the leading edge of 
current advance, and on techniques which have long since "stabilised" and 
ceased to change in significant ways. In many cases it is so far behind that 
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it is close to, or behind the trailing edge of technology -- the historical 
phase boundary at which technology passes out of use in the industrialised 
societies. 
(p. 262)...the production-oriented structures in the "typical DC firm" may be 
rich in "change" resources. Such resources may seldom be institutionalized 
in a way which sets change as their primary objective, but nonetheless they 
are in fact frequently involved in technical change. 
The contrast in the LDCs is stark. The "typical LDC firm" is poverty 
stricken with respect to those resources. in the mass of firms in the small- 
scale sector (employing less than fifty workers) it is hard to find those 
resources... (also absent in larger firms) 
Plant managers and production engineers often have very little of the deep 
technological experience which allows effective technical decision-making. 
Even when such experience does exist, one finds two types of constraints on 
its use for these types of change. First there is a very limited degree of 
division and specialization of labour. Often the manufacturing manager has 
management responsibility also for personnel and engineering (perhaps also 
for sales and finance). Beneath him in the organization one may drop 
straight to production foremen. Secondly, and partly in consequence of the 
limited specialization of function, the problems of day-to-day management 
seem to occupy a high proportion of available time of those who might be 
change-oriented. Attention to change, even if all other factors are 
favourable, just has to be put off. 
Engineering and maintenance facilities again tend to be "thin" on experience, 
"light" in staff, and heavily involved in day-to-day demands. Quality 
control facilities, if they exist, very often add up to little more than on-line 
"checking" capabilities. Product design or product improvement departments 
or sections hardly ever exist. Where they do, for example, in some 
electronics firms, their concern is almost exclusively with the "art" aspects 
rather than the technical aspects of design (for example, in designing next 
year's cabinet for the unchanged, technical "guts" of the portable radio). 
Production supervisors and foremen often have very limited technical 
experience. They and the production operatives seem totally oriented to 
basic operation. Again and again questions we asked management about 
the objectives of training at these levels induce response about operation -- 
and in detail about basic operation -- of the plant. Any "atmosphere" of 
change, of "stretching" the system or even optimising seems to be absent -- 
or at best rather "thin". 
In general then we suggest that in the LDCs this whole intra-firm "sub- 
culture" of technical change capabilities and attitudes hardly exists. We 
suggest that in DCs not only does it exist, but it plays key roles in the 
innovation process. 
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This reference is very rich indeed, and offers not only some useful definitions, but also 
goes into some of the more problematic issues of managing technology transfer iin the 
context of a particular third world coutry -- Thailand. 
It is useful now to examine what some organizations have done to transfer technology 
from their own research organizations. The case of India's Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) is examined first. This large complex of government-owned 
laboratories has adopted a fairly innovative way of financing from the government, based 
to a large extent on a new formula that would recognize the performance of various 
laboratories in commercializing technologies. The formula which has been recently adopted, 
could prove to be a powerful incentive to government researchers to become more 
commercial minded. 
Bhojwani, H.R. 1989. Commercialisation of Research Results: Experience of 
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. Paper presented at Workshop on 
Commercialisation and Evaluation of Research Results, Nigeria, 24-28 April 1989. 
7 p. 
(p. 1) CSIR has 40 research institutions which cover areas of science and 
technology such as Molecular Biology, Ocean Development, Geophysics etc. 
and industries such as Chemicals, Drugs, Food, Mining, Electronics Leather 
etc. Besides it has five Regional Research Laboratories covering both 
scientific and industrial on multidisciplinary and multi-product basis. Thus 
the research results of CSIR laboratories are of value to different sectors of 
the economy such as agriculture, health, public utility systems, rural 
development, defence besides industry per se. 
... New A1212roach (p. 4) 
The direct government financial support to CSIR till date was based on an 
informal appreciation of the needs of CSIR and a loose evaluation of its 
performance. However CSIR suggested to the government that the 
government support to it be based on its performance to commercialise 
research results and the productivity and efficiency of its R&D activities. Its 
performance in commercialising research results was to be measured in 
terms of external funds it could obtain from Contract Research, Consultancy, 
Technical Services and from Licensing of Technology; where as its R&D 
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productivity was to be measured in terms of 'net surplus' it could generate. 
Accordingly the government grant to CSIR would now be on the basis of an 
agreed formula with quantifiable parameters as indicated: 
G, = Go(l+r)t+O + 'Ft-1 + &Rt-1 
CORE GRANT MATCHING INCENTIVE 
GRANT GRANT 
CORE GRANT MAINTAIN THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
MATCHING GRANT LINKED TO CUSTOMER CREDIBILITY 
INCENTIVE GRANT LINKED TO PRODUCTIVITY 
Q ADHOC LIABILITY 
F EXTERNAL CASH INFLOW 
R R&D RECEIPTS (NET) 
(p. 5) Hitherto there was no pressure on CSIR to commercialise its research 
results or in more wider terms it entire knowledge base. But now not only 
would the government grant' be linked to external cash flow; but CSIR has 
further been directed to generate at least 33.3 percent of its R&D 
expenditure through external cash-flow by 1992-93. 
Thus, the importance of enhancing the external cash-flow through 
commercialisation of the entire base of research results has assumed 
paramount importance. 
Cash Inflow 
As indicated CSIR's performance in commercialisation research results is to 
be evaluated in terms of the credibility it has established with its customers. 
This can be measured by the cashflow it can generate from sources other 
than he government grant. There are broadly four S&T based sources of 
cash-inflow viz. Contract Research, Consultancy, Technology Sale, Technical 
Services. Table 3 [Not included here] indicates the progress of these in 
time. 
It is evident that cash-inflow due to technology sale is presently about one 
order of magnitude lower than that due to consultancy and two orders of 
magnitude lower than that due to contract research. 
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A similar experiment was also tried in New Zealand, as reported in the next article, which 
also includes some reflections on the longer-term consequence of performance funding, or 
more precisely in this case, user-pay funding. 
Palmer, GM. 1989. Commercialisation of R&D: The New Zealand Experience. 
Paper presented at Workshop on Commercialisation and Evaluation of Research 
and Development, Lagos, Nigeria, 24-28 April 1989. 6 p. 
Government Policy (p. 1-3) 
Government policies in recent years have been aimed at decreasing public 
expenditure and Government involvement in operations of all kinds. This 
sharper focus on control of government expenditure and on means for 
improving the efficiency with which the Government uses its resources, has 
seen the introduction of a variety of techniques, including a shift of 
attention from inputs towards outputs. The policies have not shown much 
selectivity and science and technology have been included. In early years the 
changes came through the use of control techniques such as across the 
board expenditure cuts, staff ceiling controls and the requirement that, 
unless Cabinet made an express exception, new policies could be funded 
only by an [p. 2:1 equivalent reduction in expenditure on existing policies. 
However in recent years more imaginative measures have been emerging. 
Provision has been made for most government departments to operate 
under a revolving fund system under which certain of the Government's 
activities could be restructured on a commercial or quasi-commercial basis. 
Departments were encouraged to specify output objectives and carefully 
define their corporate plans so as to assist the process of Government 
looking for means by which different spending activities could be ranked 
one against the other. 
Thus the decrease in public finance to science and technology has been part 
of a systematic withdrawal by Government of assistance and support to all 
sectors of the economy to create so-called neutral market conditions. This 
must be seen alongside the efforts, particularly by the present Government, 
to deregulate the economy through inter alia removing such regulatory 
mechanisms as import tariffs and quotas, stopping interventions such as 
agricultural subsidies, deregulating the finance market and floating the 
dollar, and the establishment of State Owned Enterprises (commercial 
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companies which have taken over previously public funded activities such 
as electricity supply, coal resources, state forests, rail and shipping, etc.). 
This process of evolution and more transparent accountability for the 
operation of government agencies has included the introduction of the "user 
pays" concept. [p. 3:1 The user pays policy as it affects government-funded 
science agencies is such that the direct users of science are now being billed 
for investigations, advice and service which was previously provided in the 
main free of charge. An important incentive under the user pays regime has 
been for funds so earned to return to the departments rather than, as was 
the case in earlier years, being paid into a central Government consolidated 
fund. There has been little question that Government should continue to 
fund long term basic or strategic research, but the groundrules have not 
been made clear and the definitions of such things as "public good" or 
"appropriable" research remain unclear. This has made it very difficult for 
science managers to operate effectively under the new regime. 
There have undoubtedly been major changes in the management attitudes 
and style of the traditionally government-funded science agencies. But many 
of the difficulties have been attitudinal rather than technical. Many scientists 
seeing or believing that funding for their particular specialty was at risk 
under new government policies, concluded that the Government no longer 
believed in the importance of science and technology. This has caused major 
morale problems within the science community and needs to be addressed. 
Another concept which is difficult for many with more ideological views on 
the social responsibilities of Governments, is that the policies introduced in 
New Zealand are a major swing away from Government as a provider of a 
service t that of purchasing the services it requires, often on a contractual 
basis, from those best able to provide those services. The organisation of the 
health and education systems is also following this principle. 
Likewise those users and beneficiaries of what was previously a free service, 
not faced with being charged at commercial rates, equally have difficulties 
accepting the new regime. 
It is important to recognise therefore, that any major changes towards a 
more commercial, client-oriented and contractual approach by Governments 
to science and technology (or any other activity), raises major philosophical 
and attitudinal issues which must be given careful attention. Clear definition 
of new or changing policies must be given and regrettably we have fallen 
short in this area. Low priority has been attached by the Government to 
developing and communicating a clear policy on science and technology 
under the new regime. 
Organisational and Structural Implications (p. 3-4) 
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In the New Zealand context, the changes have raised questions as to 
whether the current organisation and structure of what has been 
predominantly a government-funded R&D process is the most appropriate to 
cope with the new regime. The mechanisms by which Government receives 
S&T policy advice under the new and changing regime; makes strategic 
decisions on where its S&T funds should be spent, and the kinds of 
agencies to which it should direct this investment, remain key questions. It 
is not simply a matter of making the [p. 4:1 user pay. So-called 
commercialisation is a much more complex issue than this and involves 
taking a holistic view of the whole process of science and technology. It 
involves, for example, the relationship with the private and commercial 
sector, and also requires a re-assessment of the role of the higher education 
system in research, education and training. With operational R&D 
institutions in effect looking increasingly at a range of contracts to undertake 
their science, be it from Government or other clients, the question as to 
whether these same agencies should be involved in policy advice to 
Government, in view of possible conflicts of interest, is another critical issue. 
New mechanisms will be required to meet these changing demands, and 
management of technological change. 
(p. 4) Operating R&D agencies have to "sell" their experiences and skills to 
Government in order to receive a contract for government-funded R&D. 
Long-term strategic research therefore under this scenario is as much a 
commercial deal, given that it implies a choice by Government as to who it 
is going to fund and under what regime. Government R&D agencies will in 
turn contract out their services for other government departments. In New 
Zealand for example, the forensic work for the Police and Transport 
Departments is contracted out to DSIR. Similarly, major contracts with the 
Health Department are arranged for things like chemical quality advice in 
foods, water and pharmaceuticals. The continuation of these contracts will 
depend very much on the continuing need of the client department and the 
performance of the agency providing the services. Outside of the 
government sector of course the next step is selling services to the 
commercial, industry and service sectors, be it a chemical analysis, a 
geological survey, or a social or environmental assessment. Public relations 
and marketing skills are becoming an important feature of the R&D scene. 
We nefinally present a number of other examples , by no means exhaustive, of other 
mechanisms or initiatives taken to commercialize or utilize technology. The number of 
case studies and documented experiences is so large, that the whole area deserves to be a 
designated a research topic on its own. What would be required is a systematic search of 
all case studies, and a method for assessing them say against a particular framework, in 
order to derive some managerially-oriented genertalities. 
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SMILLIE, IAN, No Condition Permanent: Pump-Priming Ghana's Industrial 
Revolution, Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1986. 
This study of the development of the Technology Consultancy Centre (TCC) 
in Ghana provides a thoughtful analysis of successful and unsuccessful 
technology selection and development in a number of small industry areas. 
"The book is about the hard-won lessons that emerged from a long and 
sometimes painful search both for appropriate hardware and for a workable 
technique for applying it in the cause of human development." TCC 
projects recounted include nut and bolt manufacture, soap making, glue 
making, weaving, foundries, cotton spinning, and agricultural equipment 
manufacture. The book demonstrates clearly the dynamic nature of 
technology choice, and the importance of on-going learning to the success of 
small industry ventures. (DH - 124) 
DE WILDE, T., Use of Technology: Rural Industrialisation, Sarvodaya Press, Sri 
Lanka, 1980. 
This is a study of the problems of applying technology in rural Sri Lanka. 
The analysis is carried out at three levels. Firstly, it looks at the evolution 
of the organisation of technology in Sri Lanka over a very long historical 
period (480 BC to 1970s). Secondly, it carries out a macro-analysis of 
industrial production units established under the government Divisional 
Development Council Scheme (DDCS) in 1972-77. Thirdly, this is 
supplemented by a micro-analysis of nine strawboard factories set up under 
the DDCS. At this level the author focuses on three sets of variables: 
organizational (e.g. standardization); socio-psychological variables 
(management ideology, workers' maturation); and economic variables (e.g. 
raw material use, production costs). 
The author argues that there has been a deterioration over time in the 
protection of village production units. With respect to the DDCS the author 
declares that it failed due to its concentration on production rather than an 
integrated system approach. In addition the political interference was found 
to be prevalent and harmful, and an alternative approach of basing 
industrial production units on community participation at the village level 
was advanced. (DH - 104) 
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CARR, M., Developing Small-Scale Industries in India: An Integrated 
Approach: The Experience of the Birla Institute of Technology's Small Industry 
Scheme, ITDG, London, 1981. 
This book describes the nature and impact of a successful institute in 
developing and promoting small-scale industries. The Birla Institute of 
Technology started in 1960 to "develop an awareness of the needs of 
industry among technical students through work on projects of practical use 
to neighbouring industries". From this it attracted the interest of the state 
government and other institutions. 
The report concentrates on three aspects of this case: replicability, 
integration and entrepreneurial development. It stresses the impact of [p. 
60:1 a small group of committed teachers in the implementation of a 
workable model of small industry promotion. Similarly it stresses the 
integration of several, usually disparate, features (e.g. testing facilities, 
favourable banking arrangements, entrepreneurial training) under the 
direction of a single working group. The author argues that the scheme "is 
concerned as much with the development of entrepreneur-ship as it is with 
that of small industries". The study includes seven short case studies as 
well as a comparison with the performance of other centres in India. (DH - 
100) 
The following excerpt is revealing in that it provides the essence of the results of a recent 
workshop of business and government officials to discuss commercialization of technology, 
and comparing the experience of several Asian countries. 
APO (Asian Productivity Organization). 1986. Proceedings of the Symposium on 
the Commercialization of Indigenous Technology. Asian Productivity 
Organization, New Delhi, October 7-11, 1985. (Compiled and edited by 
volunteers in Technical Assistance.) 214 p. 
(p. 2) The above presentations included several interesting cases, such as the 
commercialization experiences of the Korea Technology Advancement 
Corporation (K-TAC), the Research Development Corporation of Japan 
(JRDC), The Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad, the Volunteers in 
Technical Assistance, USA (VITA), and the Bharat Heavy Electricals in India. 
Other studies related to the commercialization process of Shirasu Porous 
Glass (SPG) in Japan using volcanic ash, and exploitation of some 
developments in India in the field of energy and in rural areas. Analysis of 
the salient features of these presentations and ensuing discussions are given 
below. 
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Criteria for Project Selection and Review (p. 2-3) 
National development is dependent on a wide spectrum and quantum of 
technologies. Particularly during the early stages of economic development, 
the major focus of developing countries has to be on how to import 
required technologies intelligently and aggressively. Indigenous efforts in the 
context [p. 3:] of limited technical and financial resources may have to 
concentrate largely on innovations. Absorption, assimilation, and adaptation 
of imported technologies would pave the way towards building up 
indigenous technological capabilities. More often than not, a number of R&D 
institutes in developing countries are required to do too many things such 
as testing, standardization, and research all at once, and thus fritter away 
their energy. This results in the need for priority setting. 
In fact, most of the R&D institutes in developing countries initially aim 
toward academic excellence and then vaguely hope for the research results 
to be disseminated through some unknown form of osmosis, which hardly 
ever occurs. Commercialization cannot be a mere post R&D phenomenon 
but must be taken into account right from the stage of project selection and 
throughout different phases of R&D progress. As revealed by the 
experiences of JRDC and K-TAC, utmost care has to be exercised to select 
research projects of promise. Interestingly, Bharat Heavy Electricals (India), 
which manufactures a wide variety of power equipment and has one of the 
largest R&D facilities among the Indian industries, has recently opened a 
marketing and commercial division within the research wing itself. 
In this context, the three major criteria that were considered in the Shirasu 
(volcanic ash) based product development in Japan in Miyazaki Prefecture 
may be of interest: 
the project must have a strong local flavor; 
it must have a favorable impact on local industries; 
it must aim for new material development applicable in advanced 
technology areas, such as biotechnology and medical science, which 
are of particular interest to the Miyazaki Prefecture in its development 
of Technopolis. 
Management of R&D (p. 5) 
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Successful commercialization of results would very much depend on the 
R&D capabilities and the management of the R&D functions. Multi- 
disciplinary team approaches, flexibility, industrial experience of R&D 
personnel, linkage with industry, and linkage of education with practical 
research were some of the important factors brought forth during 
discussions. R&D at any stage is a risky business and strong leadership 
plays a key role to boost the morale and enthusiasm of researchers. (...) 
(p. 6) As revealed by some of the experiences from the United States, 
problems in commercialization of R&D are not confined to the developing 
countries. The crucial issue in technology commercialization does not lie in 
the lack of scientific knowledge, but in the organization of that knowledge 
into a useful form, so that it can be adopted to local conditions and form a 
basis for technological development. The successful exploitation of the U.S. 
transfer of technology by the Japanese is a typical example. The U.S. firms 
face problems in effecting a smooth transfer from basic research to 
prototype to production model, an area in which the Japanese excel. 
Several of the country papers cited a number of negative factors in R&D 
management that stand in the way of successful commercialization. These 
included: absence of demand-pull approach in project selection; search for 
technical excellence at the cost of commercial reality; mismatch of objectives 
and interests of R&D institutes and corporate objectives; technological gaps 
between R&D institutes and firms and time lags in transfer; lack or loss of 
creditability of R&D institutes with client industries and lack of sustained 
follow-up; transformation of overseas educated elite into desk managers of 
R&D; search for too quick results without sustained efforts; lack of an 
integrated approach; and the like. 
Market and Dynamic Partner (p. 6-7) 
Experiences reveal that successful commercialization depends upon market 
demand rather than on technology. This is amply demonstrated by the 
strategy of the Japanese Sony Corporation [p. 7:] in securing the license for 
transistors from Bell Laboratory and subsequently succeeding in capturing 
the international market for transistor radios. An analysis of the Korean 
experience also indicates that the most crucial factor for successful 
commercialization is demand-pull. Technology push without cognizance of 
market needs has largely met with failure. 
(p. 8) Several country papers listed a number of measures taken by the 
government to promote successful exploitation. These included: stressing 
indigenous technology promotion as part of national planning strategy and 
programs; provision of social infrastructure like education and training; 
availability of risk capital and financial assistance on soft terms; promotion 
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of transfer agents and design engineering as well as project engineering 
facilities; establishment of science parks to promote high-tech ventures; 
protection of genuine indigenous products from spurious imitations of low 
quality, and the like. 
In short, successful commercialization will be influenced by the following 
factors: appropriate project identification and conduct of in-depth feasibility 
studies during the different phases of development; identification of dynamic 
business partners; solid financial resources; and continuous technology 
upgrading and effective government protection. In all these areas, 
government can play an effective catalytic or promotional role. 
Syndicate Discussions (p. 8-11) 
Towards the end of the Symposium, all the participants, resource persons, 
and observers divided themselves into two working groups to discuss 
aspects relating to "cooperation and linkage leading to successful 
commercialization of technology." The reports of the two groups were 
presented at the plenary session on the concluding day. Ensuing discussions 
led to the adoption of the following conclusions and recommendations. 
Review and Selection of Topics 
Research topics can come from public research institutes, universities, 
and industries. 
There should be industrial participation from the very beginning of 
the review and selection process of research topics. The interested 
industry should finance a substantial part of the cost. 
Agencies utilizing outside consultants drawn from the universities and 
industrial experts can review and select the topics. 
[p. 9:1 The candidate projects should be monitored on a continuous 
basis and reviewed periodically. 
R&D persons should have sufficient industrial experience so that they 
can cooperate freely with industrialists in a confident manner. 
Bridging the Gap 
The gap between the generators of technology and the prospective 
entrepreneur or existing enterprise could be bridged through the following 
means: 
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Making people aware of how a technology can improve the quality of 
life. 
Informal contacts between generators and users of technology and 
among professionals. 








chambers of commerce 
governmental organizations 
Specialized news letters. 
Governmental programs to generate confidence in domestic 
technology, which might include: 
- demonstration projects 
- technology fairs 
- establishment of industrial standards applicable to both domestic 
and imported products 
- follow-up of technologies domestically and after sales service by 
suppliers. 
Marketing and Technology 
Organizations responsible for R&D marketing must be functional and 
effective. 
Marketing of technology can be effected through direct negotiation 
with appropriate industries by the government agency (e.g., JRDQ. It 
can also be done through semi-government organization (e.g., K-TAQ. 
[p. 10:1 The prefeasibility study is a fundamental prerequisite for 
marketing technology. This should provide information such as 
investments required, market potential and prospects, and profit 
generation potential. 
The technology generator must play a role of assistance to the 
entrepreneur throughout the process of development and production 
to minimize the risk of the entrepreneur. 
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Role of Financing Agencies and Other Transfer Agents 
There can be different types of financing and transfer agencies: 
government (e.g., JRDC), public R&D agencies (e.g., K-TAC), 
development banks (e.g., Malaysian Development Bank), and venture 
capital companies. 
Their role is to facilitate the development and transfer of technology 
including new developments and the modification of existing ones. 
Commercialization of technologies will be greatly facilitated by: 
Induction of development banks to give preferential treatment 
to loans for the exploitation of new technologies including low 
interest loans with long grace periods and long repayment 
schedules. 
Provision of revolving fund. 
Creation of capital investment guarantee agencies for R&D 
development by entrepreneurs without collateral. 
Extension of banking services to include technical and 
management assistance and other consultancies. 
Formation of venture capital resources. 
Government Policies and Supporting Measures 
Government should crate R&D institutes that can attract R&D 
personnel with industrial experience both from within the country 
and abroad. 
Incentive measures and minimum protection should be given to 
industries that develop commercializable indigenous technologies for a 
limited period of time. The government should also provide incentives 
to industries that establish R&D facilities. 
[p. 11:1 The government should decentralize information dissemination 
networks throughout the country for easy access. 
The government should establish a one-stop business service agency 
to facilitate investment activity. 
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As part of the above symposium, there was one presentation made by a representative from 
Technonet, a somewhat unique network for technology diffusion to small enterprises. It is 
reminiscent of the Canadian experience with CRIQ in Quebec, and IRAP, at Ottawa's 
National Research Council. 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF INDIGENOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNONET 
ASIA'S EXPERIENCE by Mr. Md. Shahabuddin Paruque (Industrial 
Development Officer, Technonet Asia, Singapore) (p. 197) 
INTRODUCTION 
(...) In brief, it is a cooperative grouping of 16 participating organizations 
that aims at upgrading the quality and efficiency of production in those 
countries' targeted enterprises. It does so by applying knowledge of known 
processes, methods, techniques, equipment modifications, and approaches to 
existing operations affected by the transfer of technical information, the 
provision of industrial extension services, the facilitation of technology 
sharing and its adaptation, and entrepreneurial development. 
(p. 200-201) Technonet's approach to an effective transfer of technology 
either from local or foreign sources is very labor intensive. It can only be 
successfully implemented by people -- a cadre of well trained and creative 
technical information and industrial extension specialists, who are vital links 
between sources of technology and the entrepreneurs. They are in a better 
position for organizing and facilitating technological needs, obtaining 
solutions from appropriate sources and making the necessary adaptations. 
They also can make the technologies more comprehensible for the 
entrepreneur. To effect such a program is not an easy task. It will require 
the development of institutional capabilities and substantial investment in 
manpower development and other resources. Government has a key role to 
play in promoting the indigenous technology generation and adaptation that 
is consistent with their development goals. Depending on the development 
strategy in each country, various schemes are being implemented towards 
this end. 
There are various ways that technology transfer is effected between a donor 
and receiver. For simplicity sake, we classify this mechanism into two areas 
according to structure. The first one is non-contractual: "technical 
information, [p. 201J in-plant consultancy, special workshop training, study 
tour, research study, etc." The second is contractual: "joint venture, licensing, 
franchising, leasing, turn key project, etc." Technonet's activities are mainly 
concentrated in the non-contractual area of technology transfer and sharing, 
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although we have a current limited scale program on a contractual 
technology transfer facilitation program for the Asian and Canadian SMI 
enterprises. 
Let me expand on the activities that are performed by Technonet in 
accelerating technology transfer in the non-contractual area. 
Technologies that are not generally complex in nature can also be 
transferred without any need for contracts. This is the case with 
conventional technology or basic technology transferred through published 
technical information, trade exhibits, etc. Institutionalized training is one of 
the main channels for technology transfer in the non-contractual area. The 
main aim of technology transfer in the non-contractual area is to develop 
and upgrade capabilities of human resources within the country to reach 
certain levels so that they can absorb/adapt technology and develop 
technologies in the future. There are many mechanisms to facilitate 
technology transfer in this area, such as technical training, seminars, 
demonstrations, exhibits, technical information services, extension services, 
consultancy services, and so on. However, these mechanisms can be grouped 
into three; namely, mass presentation, group presentation, and individual 
contacts and direct personal visits. For the mass presentation, the main 
mechanisms are providing technical information services, conducting 
conferences, holding exhibits, and using mass media (newspapers, television, 
radio, etc.) for disseminating scientific and technological knowledge. Group 
presentation covers training activities, demonstrations, seminars, group 
consultancy services, etc. Individual contacts and direct personal visits are 
the activities of extension services, inquiry-answer services, letters, advisory 
services, and so on. 
Lastly, as a sobering thought, we present an analysis by Sagasti in which he essentially 
questions the North American Paradign that companies will innovate and adopt new 
technologies to become more competitive. 
Francisco SAGASTI, MARKET STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
BEHAVIOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, in Wad, A. (ed.). 1988. Science, 
Technology and Development. Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, USA. 315 p. 
The Comvonents of the Conceptual Model (p. 150-151) 
There are three sets of factors that ultimately influence technological 
behavior in a given industrial branch: (a) industrial organization and market 
structure; (b) type of technology and level of technological capabilities 
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prevailing in the branch; and (c) characteristics of the leading firms in the 
branch. These three sets of factors have to be taken together. Regardless of 
which of them is taken as a starting point, in the end all three must be 
examined to provide an adequate understanding of the technological 
behavior of the branch. 
The combined effect of these three sets of factors, together with the 
objectives of the firms, condition the behavior of individual firms of the 
branch. One of the key manifestations of this behavior is the form of 
competition prevailing in the branch and the set of competitive strategies 
adopted by the leading firms in it. Indeed, the competitive strategies 
mediate between the three sets of factors and other expressions of the 
behavior of firms in the branch, including technological behavior. In this 
context, it becomes necessary to examine the extent to which technological 
advantages play a clear and identifiable role in the patterns of competition 
observed in the branch and in the competitive strategies of the leading 
firms. The larger the role played by these technological advantages, the 
greater the pressures for innovation and for the development of 
technological capabilities. 
(p. 150-151) The technological behavior of firms in the branch is manifested 
through the choice of techniques incorporated into the productive processes, 
which generally involves the introduction of major innovations, and also 
through the firms' technology absorption efforts, which encompass all [p. 
151:] minor innovative activities. Outside the industrial branch, the 
technological behavior of firms generates a pattern of demand for 
technology, in which imports usually play the dominant role in relation to 
domestic supply. Within the branch, technical choices and technology 
absorption efforts determine the speed and direction of technical change, 
which in turn affect market structure and industrial organization, the type of 
technology and level of technological capabilities and the characteristics of 
leading firms. Each of these three main sets of factors - market structure, 
type of technology and characteristics of the leading firms - will be 
examined in turn, before focusing on competitive strategies and the role that 
technology plays in them. 
(p. 151-153) For the purpose of the present essay the terms market structure 
and industrial organization encompass the characteristics that refer to the 
interactions, interrelations and relative market power of the firms concurring 
in a particular industrial branch. Following the approach proposed in the 
STPI methodological guidelines [Footnote: Francisco R. Sagasti and Alberto 
Arraoz, Science and Technology for Development: Methodological Guidelines 
for the STPI Project, Ottawa, International Development Research Center, 
19761, an industrial branch is defined as the collection of firms engaged in 
the production of similar goods oriented towards a particular market, and 
includes also those productive and service units that provide inputs to these 
firms and are closely related to them. 
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According to the model proposed in this essay, the characteristics defining 
the market structure and industrial organization of a given branch are: 
(i) Size of the market, (...) 
(ii) [p. 152:1 Degree of concentration, (...) 
(iii) Vertical integration, (...) 
(iv) Market segmentation, (...) 
(v) [p. 153:1 Barriers to entry, (...) 
(vi) Nature and de egr a of government intervention, (...) 
(p. 160) Nevertheless, however difficult the task may be, the design of 
policies to stimulate technological innovation in developing countries must 
be based on an understanding of the factors that condition the process of 
technical change in industry. For this reason, it is necessary to identify some 
interconnections between the three sets of factors that characterize the 
structure of an industrial branch and the diverse manifestations of 
technological innovation. One possible approach is to examine the ways in 
which forms of competition and competitive strategies mediate between the 
structural characteristics of the branch and its technological behavior. 
(p. 161-162) The predominant forms of competition in a given branch will 
be conditioned by the structure of the market, the type of technology 
employed, and the characteristics of the leading firms; within this 
framework the competitive strategy of an individual firm will make use of 
different vehicles for competition. 
In developing country markets, where oligopolistic structures and behavior 
prevail, there is a general tendency [p. 162:1 to avoid price reductions and 
prefer other forms of competition in order to maintain and enlarge a firm's 
share of the market. This is because of the desire to keep profits above an 
acceptable level and increase them as far as possible, but without sacrificing 
risk aversion and the firm's preference for stability. In other words, NNPGs 
play a very important role in guiding firm behavior in developing country 
markets. Notice also that in oligopolistic market structures productivity gains 
and cost-reducing innovations usually do not result in lower prices for 
consumers, but rather in higher profit margins for the innovators. In some 
cases there may be limited forms of price competition, primarily through 
discounts and credit lines for wholesale distributors, but these are used 
rather infrequently and their impact is felt only at the level of commercial 
intermediaries, rather than at the consumer level. 
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Consequently, in the design of competitive strategies a tendency emerges to 
engage in other forms of competition - less threatening or destabilizing - 
before undertaking major price reduction, which is usually kept as a last 
resort. Furthermore, in developing country markets, where governments 
usually intervene to a larger extent than in those of developed countries, 
price controls and regulations often reinforce the trend to avoid price 
competition, as does the adoption of protectionist measures to shield local 
firms from the threat of imported products. In extreme cases, particularly 
when government controls appear to be excessive, firms will display 
"pseudo-competitive behavior," going through the motions of competition to 
appease government officials, but in fact acting in a concerted way. 
The overall impact of the three factors examined in this section - market 
structure, type of technology and characteristics of leading forms - on the 
competitive strategies of developing country firms that pursue a combination 
of profit and NNPG objectives is likely to be in the direction of reducing 
competitive pressures, choosing forms of competition and strategies that do 
not disturb the "stability" of the branch, and limiting the extent to which 
price policies and technological innovation will be used as vehicles for 
competition. 
The Principle of the "Least Technological Efforts" (p. 164-167) 
The behavioral consequences of the conceptual model proposed in the 
preceding sections may be put forward in the form of a "General Principle" 
and four theses regarding the impact that market structures, types of 
technology, and characteristics of leading firms, as well as patterns of 
competition, have on technological behaviors of industrial branches in 
developing countries. 
General Principle of the Least Technological Effort 
The leading firms, and the branch as a whole, will avoid forms of 
competition that involve major technological innovations and will exhaust all 
other forms of competition first. There is a strong preference for patterns of 
competition that involve, directly or indirectly, the least technological effort. 
First Thesis: Progression of Technological Activities 
Firms will follow a progression from innovative activities that require lesser 
to those that require greater technological effort and risk. This takes the 
form of preferring the acquisition of well known rather than advanced 
techniques, of favoring incremental changes rather than replacing existing 
practices, and indicates a bias towards the performance of minor innovative 
activities. Only a departure from the "steady state" prevailing in the branch 
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will force firms, and the leading ones in particular, to [p 165:1 proceed to 
higher levels of effort and risk in the performance of technological activities 
and the introduction of innovations. 
Second Thesis: Socialization of Technological Risks 
If and when it becomes inevitable to introduce major technological 
innovations, there will be a tendency to socialize risks by making all or 
most firms in the branch assume the same risks, by asking the government 
to bear a share of the risks (through subsidies, guaranteed purchases, 
preferential access to capital, etc.), or by influencing consumer behavior in a 
concerted way to accept the results of "experimental" production. 
Third Thesis: Special Roles for Foreign and Local Technology Supply 
When a firm introduces an innovation into the productive process for the 
first time, the demand for technology will be oriented towards foreign 
sources of supply. After the imported technology has been incorporated into 
the productive process, there emerges a demand for local technology 
absorption activities (adaptation of products to local conditions, cost- 
reducing improvements, capacity-stretching, and other minor innovations). 
Only under exceptional circumstances will there be a substitution of foreign 
technology for the results of local research, development and engineering 
efforts. This, coupled with advances at the technological frontier and the 
occasional need to keep up with them, leads to a pattern of long-term and 
sustained dependence on foreign sources of technology in which the 
incorporation of new and more advanced foreign technologies takes place 
sporadically. 
Fourth Thesis: Irrelevance of "Pull" and "Push" Forces for Innovation 
The traditional "market pull" and "science and technology push" forces that 
stimulate innovation and the domestic generation of technology in the 
developed countries are mostly irrelevant in the context of import 
substituting industries. The first because the set of conditions prevailing in 
developing countries allow the leading firms to [p. 166:1 disregard market 
signals and consumer preferences to a large extent. The second because 
there are no local scientific and technological capabilities to generate 
advances that could induce major industrial innovations. In consequence, the 
main forces leading to innovative behavior emerge out of the combination of 
uncommon circumstances, pressures and opportunities affecting the leading 
firms that set the pace for the branch as a whole. 
The "General Principle" and the four theses put forward in this section refer 
to industrial activities as a whole and should be particularized at the level 
of an individual branch. For this purpose, it is necessary to generate specific 
hypotheses regarding the impact that a combination of market structure, 
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type of technology, and characteristics of leading firms - taken together with. 
a given balance of profit of NNPB objectives - will have on the prevailing 
forms of competition in the branch, and on the technological behavior of the 
various firms and the branch as a whole. 
There are two additional issues to be considered to complete the 
development of the conceptual framework. The first refers to the impact of 
the macroeconomic situation and of government policies on the three sets of 
factors, on the patterns of competition, and on technological behavior. For 
example, during a period of high economic growth when markets are 
expanding, there may be a recomposition of the market structure and 
industrial organization (entrance of new firms, increased vertical integration, 
etc.); new technologies are likely to be introduced through capital 
investments (altering the level of technological capabilities of the branch); 
and new firms may assume a leadership role. All of these will influence the 
forms of competition, the competitive pressures faced by the firms and, 
ultimately, their technological behavior. On the other hand, during a 
recession a very different picture can be expected. Similar remarks can be 
made with regard to the impact of government policies referring, for 
example, to the degree of protectionism: in a highly protected industrial 
branch the market structure, level of technology, and characteristics of 
leading firms are likely to be quite different from those that would prevail 
if a relatively more open market policy were implemented, with the 
consequent differential impacts on patterns of competition and on 
technological behavior. 
The second issue refers to the feedback from technology choices and 
technology activities to market structure and industrial organization, type 
and level of technology, and characteristics of the leading firms. The lines of 
influence [p. 167:1 are mostly in one direction, from the latter to the former, 
and only under exceptional circumstances will technological behavior affect 
the three sets of factors examined here. This unusual event could take place, 
for example, through the introduction of major technical innovation by a 
leading firm, or though the accumulation of technological advantages 
derived from technology absorption activities. In both cases, a firm or group 
of firms would acquire enough market power to alter the "steady state" 
prevailing in the branch and force a realignment of market structure, type 
and level of technology and characteristics of leading firms. 
Concluding Remarks (p. 167) 
This essay has examined the combined impact of a variety of sources of 
influence on technological behavior. Starting from an analysis of market 
structure, type of technology, and characteristics of the leading firms in a 
branch, it examined the interactions between these factors and the balance 
between profit and NNPB objectives prevailing in the branch, so as to 
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derive their implications for the patterns of competition and for the 
competitive strategies adopted by individual firms. 
